Seiger-Todd v. New Penn Financial

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedMay 4, 2023
Docket3:21-cv-00497
StatusUnknown

This text of Seiger-Todd v. New Penn Financial (Seiger-Todd v. New Penn Financial) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Seiger-Todd v. New Penn Financial, (D. Nev. 2023).

Opinion

2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 4 TURIA R. SEIGER-TODD, Case No. 3:21-cv-00497-ART-CLB 5 Plaintiff, ORDER 6 v.

7 NEW PENN FINANCIAL LLC, dba SHELLPOINT MORTGAGE 8 SERVICING; THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON fka THE BANK OF 9 NEW YORK, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS CWABS, INC. 10 ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES SERIES 2005-AB3; and DOES 1-10, 11 inclusive

12 Defendants.

13 I. DISCUSSION 14 Before the Court are a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 20) and Motion for 15 Summary Judgment (ECF No. 21) filed by Defendants Newrez LLC f/k/a New 16 Penn Financial LLC d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing, and the Bank of New 17 York Mellon f/k/a the Bank of New York (collectively, “Defendants”) on July 13th, 18 2022. Plaintiff Turia R. Seiger-Todd (“Plaintiff”) failed to respond to either motion. 19 Accordingly, the Court now grants both of Defendants’ Motions. 20 Under Local Rule 7-2(d) “[t]he failure of an opposing party to file points and 21 authorities in response to any motion, except a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 22 or a motion for attorney’s fees, constitutes a consent to the granting of the 23 motion.” LR 7-2(d). Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, 24 as Plaintiff failed to file points and authorities in response to Defendants’ Motion 25 to Dismiss. (ECF No. 20). 26 Regarding Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 21), 27 Defendants moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s fourth claim, an alleged 28 1 violation of 12 CFR § 1024.41(c)(1)(i)(ii), failure to make determination of loan 2 modification application within 30 days, actionable pursuant to Title 12 U.S.C. § 3 2605(f). (Id. at 5). 4 Defendants have submitted evidence that establishes Plaintiff submitted 5 an incomplete loan modification application to Shellpoint and that Defendants 6 complied with federal law in processing that application. (ECF No. 21 at 8). Thus, 7 Defendants have met their initial burden on summary judgment by showing the 8 absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to Plaintiff’s fourth claim. See 9 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). The burden now shifts to 10 Plaintiff to produce evidence that demonstrates an issue of fact exists as to the 11 timeliness with which Defendants processed her loan application. See Nissan Fire 12 & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). 13 It appears that Plaintiff was properly served with the motion for summary 14 judgment and neither opposed it nor submitted any evidence in opposition. There 15 is no indication that Plaintiff requested service at a different address. See LR IA 16 3-1 (“An attorney or pro se party must immediately file with the court written 17 notification of any change of mailing address, email address, telephone number, 18 or facsimile number. . . . Failure to comply with this rule may result in the 19 dismissal of the action . . . .”) 20 Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the motion means that Plaintiff has failed to 21 meet her burden on summary judgment to establish Defendants’ alleged untimely 22 processing of her loan modification application as she failed to come forward with 23 any evidence to create an issue of fact as to whether Defendants’ processing was 24 dilatory. Accordingly, because Defendants’ evidence establishes the absence of 25 genuine issue of material fact, and Plaintiff has failed to come forward with 26 evidence to meet her burden that an issue of material fact exists, Defendants’ 27 Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 21) is granted. 28 In addition, this Court dismisses the action for failure to prosecute under 1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). “It is within the inherent power of the court to sua sponte 2 dismiss a case for lack of prosecution.” Ash v. Cvetkov, 739 F.2d 493, 496 (9th 3 Cir. 1984) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962)). “Only 4 ‘unreasonable’ delay will support a dismissal for lack of prosecution.” Id. (citing 5 Nealey v. Transportation Maritima Mexicana, S.A., 662 F.2d 1275, 1280 (9th Cir. 6 1980). Unreasonable delay creates a presumption of injury to the defense. Ash, 7 739 F.2d at 496. 8 When considering dismissal for failure to prosecute, courts must consider 9 the following five factors: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of 10 litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to 11 defendants/respondents; (4) the availability of less drastic alternatives; and (5) 12 the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits.” Pagtalunan v. 13 Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 14 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992)). “District judges are best situated to decide when 15 delay in a particular case interferes with docket management and the public 16 interest.” Ash, 739 F.2d at 496. 17 The first three factors weigh strongly in favor of dismissal. As of the date of 18 this order, Plaintiff failed to respond to both of Defendants’ motions for more than 19 eight months. This is unquestionably an unreasonable delay which prejudices 20 Defendants as a matter of law. The public’s interest in the expeditious resolution 21 of litigation is impeded by Plaintiff’s failure to continue participating in this 22 lawsuit, and the court’s need to manage its docket is thwarted by Plaintiff’s failure 23 to prosecute her action. See Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 24 2002) (“It is incumbent upon the Court to manage its docket without being 25 subject to the routine noncompliance of litigants.”) 26 Regarding the last two factors, while there is a public policy favoring 27 disposition of cases on their merits which weighs in favor of Plaintiff, this is not 28 outweighed by the other factors that compel dismissal. The absence of 1 |} communication from Plaintiff for more than eight months leaves the court with 2 || no sanction short of dismissal. 3 II. CONCLUSION 4 It is therefore ordered that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 20), 5 and Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 21), are granted. 6 It is further ordered that this case is dismissed with prejudice. 7 The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close this case. 8 9 DATED THIS 4th day of May 2023. 10 11 12 4 os plaid je 13 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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Seiger-Todd v. New Penn Financial, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/seiger-todd-v-new-penn-financial-nvd-2023.