7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SEHAJPREET SINGH (A-201-684-248), No. 1:26-cv-0141 WBS CSK P 12 Petitioner,
13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
14 ORESTES CRUZ, Field Office Director of the San Francisco Field Office of U.S. 15 Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
16 Respondent. 17 18 Petitioner Sehajpreet Singh (A-201-684-248), an asylum seeker from India, filed a petition 19 for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner entered the United States on 20 March 27, 2019, was initially detained by immigration officials and released pursuant to a Family 21 Reunification Application on or about April 4, 2019. On August 28, 2025, petitioner was re- 22 detained. This habeas action concerns petitioner’s re-detention. For the following reasons, this 23 Court recommends that the petition be granted, and petitioner be released immediately. 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1 2 Petitioner is a native and citizen of India who entered the United States on March 27, 2019 3 without inspection at Calexico, California, and was immediately apprehended by U.S. Customs 4 and Border Protection. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) At the time of his initial detention, petitioner was 15 5 years old. On March 28, 2019, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) issued a 6 Notice of Custody Determination (DHS Form I-286) for petitioner stating that pursuant to 7 “section 236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act [‘INA’, 8 U.S.C. § 1226] and part 236 of 8 title 8, Code of Federal Regulations,” petitioner would be detained “pending a final administrative 9 determination in [his] case.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 4.) Petitioner requested an immigration review of 10 this custody determination. (Id.) On March 28, 2019, DHS issued petitioner a Notice to Appear 11 in INA Section 240 (8 U.S.C. § 1229a) removal proceedings, which are standard removal 12 proceedings.2 (ECF No. 1-1 at 20.) 13 On April 4, 2019, petitioner was released from ICE custody under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) 14 pursuant to a Family Reunification Application. (ECF No. 1 at 4; ECF No. 1-1 at 71.)3 On June 15 12, 2019, DHS issued another Notice to Appear, for petitioner to appear on July 25, 2019. (ECF 16 No. 1-1 at 18.) 17 Thereafter, petitioner filed an affirmative asylum application. (Id. at 4; ECF No. 1-1 at 18 34-35, 37-49.) Petitioner applied for temporary work authorization and his application was 19 approved. (Id.; ECF No. 1-1 at 51.) 20 On May 20, 2024, an immigration judge granted administrative closure of petitioner’s 21 removal proceedings. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) On June 23, 2025, DHS moved to re-calendar
22 1 Petitioner filed a verified habeas petition, attaching various documents from his immigration 23 file, which respondent does not dispute. (ECF No. 1 at 8.) A court “may treat the allegations of a verified . . . petition [for writ of habeas corpus] as an affidavit.” L. v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 24 924 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197-98 (9th Cir. 1987)). Respondents do not contest petitioner’s factual allegations. (See ECF No. 8.) 25 2 Removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (INA § 240) are standard removal proceedings, which are different from expedited removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 26 § 1225(b)(1) (INA § 235(b)(1)). 27 3 Petitioner states that the Family Reunification Application is appended as Exhibit C, but Exhibit C is a Federal Bureau of Investigation Final Disposition Report, DHS Booking Record, 28 DHS Orders to Detain petitioner, and other FBI documents. (See ECF No. 1-1 at 5-16.) 1 petitioner’s removal proceedings. (Id.) On July 7, 2025, the immigration judge denied DHS’s 2 motion to re-calendar petitioner’s removal proceedings. (Id.) 3 On August 27, 2025, ICE issued an arrest warrant for petitioner under INA § 236 4 (8 U.S.C. § 1226), claiming there was probable cause to believe petitioner is removable based on 5 petitioner’s ongoing removal proceedings.4 (ECF No. 1 at 5; ECF No. 1-1 at 68.) On August 28, 6 2025, petitioner was re-detained by ICE. (ECF No. 1 at 6.) ICE informed petitioner he was 7 detained without bond pursuant to Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025) 8 (hereafter “Hurtado”). (Id.) 9 On September 15, 2025, DHS filed a second motion to re-calendar petitioner’s removal 10 proceedings, and the immigration judge granted the motion. (Id.) 11 Respondents do not contest petitioner’s factual allegations. (See ECF No. 8.) 12 II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 13 On January 9, 2026, petitioner filed his verified petition for writ of habeas corpus and 14 motion for a temporary restraining order. (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) On January 9, 2026, the district judge 15 denied petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining order where petitioner was detained on 16 August 28, 2025, but did not explain why he did not seek injunctive relief sooner. (ECF No. 4.) 17 The matter was referred to the assigned magistrate judge, and this Court set a schedule for merits 18 briefing. (ECF Nos. 4, 6.) On January 19, 2026, respondent timely filed a motion to dismiss the 19 petition. (ECF No. 8.) On January 26, 2026, petitioner timely filed an opposition to the motion 20 to dismiss. (ECF No. 9.) Respondent did not file a reply. On May 14, 2026, petitioner filed a 21 motion for ruling on the petition. (ECF No. 14.) Briefing is now complete on the merits. 22 III. LEGAL STANDARD 23 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every 24 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) 25
4 The Court notes that this appears to be an invalid basis for the arrest warrant where petitioner’s 26 removal proceedings were administratively closed at the time that this arrest warrant issued in 27 August 2025 after an immigration judge administratively closed petitioner’s removal proceedings in May 2024 and in July 2025 denied the government’s motion to recalendar the proceedings. 28 (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Petitioner’s removal proceedings were not recalendared until September 2025. 1 (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in 2 custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure 3 release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas 4 corpus may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the 5 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has 6 served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its 7 protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s 8 habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 9 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 10 IV. DISCUSSION 11 Generally, noncitizens are subject to civil immigration detention only if the noncitizen 12 presents a risk of flight or danger to the community. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (holding that 13 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) does not authorize indefinite detention). The petition raises three claims 14 for relief: (1) detention under the wrong statutory provision (statutory claim); (2) due process 15 violation from the retroactive application of Hurtado; and (3) due process violation based on 16 detention without a bond hearing.5 (ECF No. 1 at 6-7.) Respondents do not argue that petitioner 17 is a flight risk or a danger to the community and instead argue that as an “applicant for 18 admission,” petitioner’s detention is mandatory under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and he is ineligible 19 for a bond hearing. (ECF No. 8 at 2.) Respondents also cite In re Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I 20 & N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), and conclusorily note without any argument that petitioner failed to 21 exhaust administrative remedies. (ECF No. 8 at 2-3.) 22 A. Denial of Temporary Restraining Order 23 Generally, “decisions at the preliminary injunction phase do not constitute law of the 24 case” because “a preliminary injunction decision is just that: preliminary.” Ctr. for Biological 25 Diversity v. Salazar, 706 F.3d 1085, 1090 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Ranchers Cattlemen Action 26 Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of America v. U.S. Dep't of Agr., 499 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 27
28 5 The Court notes that 1 2007)). “As most commonly defined, the [law of the case] doctrine posits that when a court 2 decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent 3 stages in the same case.” Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983). “Law of the case 4 directs a court’s discretion, it does not limit the tribunal’s power.” Id. 5 Here, the district court denied petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining order due to 6 petitioner’s delay in seeking injunctive relief where petitioner was detained on August 28, 2025, 7 but did not seek injunctive relief until over four months later on January 9, 2026 and provided no 8 explanation for his delay. 1/9/2026 Order at 1-3 (ECF No. 4). The district court found that 9 petitioner therefore “failed to demonstrate the existence of irreparable harm.” Id. at 3. The 10 district court did not address the underlying claims. Therefore, law of the case does not apply. 11 B. Statutory Claim (Claim One) 12 This Court must first decide whether petitioner, who has no criminal record and has lived 13 in the United States since he was released in April 2019 when he was 15 years old, is subject to 14 discretionary release as first ordered by immigration officials under § 1226(a) as petitioner 15 contends, or whether petitioner is now subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A), as 16 respondents argue. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) mandates detention during removal proceedings for 17 applicants “seeking admission” and does not provide for a bond hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) 18 “provides the general process for arresting and detaining [noncitizens] who are present in the 19 United States and eligible for removal.” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1196 (9th 20 Cir. 2022). Under § 1226(a), the government makes an initial custody determination, and the 21 noncitizen will be released upon a showing “to the satisfaction of the officer that such release 22 would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the [noncitizen] is likely to appear for 23 any future proceeding.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1196 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8)). 24 Section 1226(a) provides “an initial bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, the opportunity 25 to be represented by counsel and to present evidence, the right to appeal, and the right to seek a 26 new hearing when circumstances materially change.” Id. at 1202. Therefore, “[i]f the noncitizen 27 is detained under section 1226(a), she is entitled to a bond hearing.” Labrador-Prato v. Noem, 28 2025 WL 3458802, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2025) (citing Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 1 306 (2018)). Respondents contend § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies because petitioner is an “applicant for 2 admission” and therefore subject to mandatory detention. (ECF No. 8 at 2.) 3 The Court concludes that § 1226(a) applies to petitioner. First, immigration authorities 4 released petitioner pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226 on April 4, 2019. (ECF No. 1 at 4; ECF No. 1-1 5 at 71.) In addition, immigration authorities expressly noted that it was evaluating custody 6 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226. (ECF No. 1-1 at 4.) Respondents do not dispute these facts. (See 7 ECF No. 8.) 8 Second, this Court agrees with and joins the majority of courts nationwide, including the 9 Eastern District of California and the majority of circuit courts that have addressed the issue, in 10 rejecting respondent’s new interpretation6 of Sections 1225 and 1226. See, e.g., Barbosa da 11 Cunha v. Freden, No. 25-3141, 2026 WL 1146044 (2d Cir. Apr. 28, 2026) (“Today, although we 12 part ways with two other circuits that have addressed this question, we join the overwhelming 13 majority of federal judges across the Nation to consider it and conclude that the government’s 14 novel interpretation of the immigration statutes defies their plain text.”); Lopez-Campos v. 15 Raycraft, et al., 2026 WL 1283891, at *1 (6th Cir. May 11, 2026); Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, 16 Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami, No. 25-14065, 2026 WL 1243395 (11th Cir. May 6, 2026); Castañon-Nava 17 v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1060-62 (7th Cir. 2025); Rodriguez Vazquez v. 18 Bostock, 2025 WL 2782499, at *1, 21-22 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025) (concluding, after a 19 thorough analysis, that “the government’s [interpretation of § 1225] belies the statutory text of the 20 [Immigration and Nationality Act], canons of statutory interpretation, legislative history, and 21 longstanding agency practice”); J.Y.L.C. v. Bostock, 2025 WL 3169865, at *2 (D. Or. Nov. 12, 22 2025) (collecting cases rejecting the government’s assertion that § 1225 empowers DHS to arrest 23 and hold a noncitizen present without legal status who has spent years in the U.S.); Cardona- 24 Lozano v Noem, 2025 WL 3218244, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2025) (“Repeatedly, [district 25 courts across the country] have found that DHS and the [Board of Immigration Appeals’] 26
27 6 Until DHS changed its policy in July 2025, the Government consistently applied Section 1226(a), not Section 1225(b)(2), to noncitizens residing in the United States who were detained 28 by immigration authorities and subject to removal. See Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1196. 1 construction of the [Immigration and Nationality Act] is incorrect and that petitioners who have 2 long resided in the United States but are being held under § 1225 are entitled to relief.”) 3 (collecting cases)); Faizyan v. Casey, 2025 WL 3208844, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025) 4 (holding that § 1226 applies to a petitioner who “DHS has consistently treated” as subject to 5 discretionary detention and “who has been residing in the United States for two years” (internal 6 quotation marks and citation omitted)); Josue I.C.A. v. Lyons, 2025 WL 3496432, at 3 n.6 (E.D. 7 Cal. Dec. 5, 2025) (collecting cases); Morales-Flores v. Lyons, 2025 WL 3552841, at *3 (E.D. 8 Cal. Dec. 11, 2025) (collecting cases) (“Courts nationwide, including this one, have 9 overwhelmingly rejected respondents’ arguments and found DHS’s new policy unlawful.”). 10 “These courts examined the text, structure, agency application, and legislative history of 11 1225(b)(2) and concluded that it applies only to noncitizens ‘seeking admission,’ a category that 12 does not include noncitizens like [petitioner], living in the interior of the country.” Salcedo 13 Aceros v. Kaiser, 2025 WL 2637503, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025) (collecting cases). By 14 contrast, “[t]he government’s proposed reading of the statute (1) disregards the plain meaning of 15 section 1225(b)(2)(A); (2) disregards the relationship between sections 1225 and 1226; (3) would 16 render a recent amendment to section 1226(c) superfluous; and (4) is inconsistent with decades of 17 prior statutory interpretation and practice.” Guerro Lepe v. Andrews, 2025 WL 2716910, at *4 18 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025) (collecting cases). This Court incorporates and adopts the thorough 19 and persuasive reasoning of the district court in Lepe, 2025 WL 2716910, at *3-9. 20 This Court recognizes that the issues presented in this habeas petition and thousands of 21 other similar petitions in this district and across the country are complex, and have resulted in a 22 circuit split. See, e.g., Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-3741, 2026 WL 819258 (8th Cir. Mar. 25, 2026); 23 Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026); Alonzo v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-01519 24 WBS SCR, 2025 WL 3208284, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025); Valencia v. Chestnut, No. 1:25- 25 cv-01550 WBS JDP, 2025 WL 3205133, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025); Xavier Oliveria v. 26 Albarran, et al., No. 1:25-cv-01760 WBS AC, 2025 WL 3525923 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025); Mo v. 27 Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01789 WBS CSK, 2025 WL 3539063 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2025). At this 28 time, there is no binding authority on district courts in the Ninth Circuit where neither the Ninth 1 Circuit nor the Supreme Court have decided the issues. 2 This Court does not find Buenrostro-Mendez or Avila to be persuasive, and instead finds 3 the analysis in Castañon-Nava, 161 F.4th at 1060-62, and Barbosa da Cunha, 2026 WL 1146044, 4 to be more persuasive. See also Lopez-Campos, 2026 WL 1283891, at *1; Hernandez Alvarez, 5 2026 WL 1243395; Gurvinder Singh v. Chestnut, 2026 WL 413839 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2026); 6 Singh v. Baltazar, 2026 WL 352870, at *3-6 (D. Colo. Feb. 9, 2026) (rejecting the Buenrostro 7 majority in its interpretation of § 1225 as nonbinding and highlighting the Seventh Circuit Court 8 of Appeals’ disagreement with the Buenrostro majority) (citing Castanon-Nava, 161 F.4th at 9 1052); Tomas Nicolas v. Warden, 2026 WL 364399, at *3 n.3 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 10, 2026) 10 (disagreeing with Buenrostro majority and declining to follow); Chachipanta Cando v. Bondi, 11 2026 WL 357551, at *5 n.6 (D. Neb. Feb. 9, 2026) (same); Aroca v. Mason, 2026 WL 357872, at 12 *15 n.40 (S.D. W.Va. Feb. 9, 2026) (same). In any event, neither Buenrostro-Mendez nor Avila 13 are binding on this Court. 14 Following the majority of courts, this Court also rejects the government’s new 15 interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and their contention that petitioner is an “applicant for 16 admission” subject to § 1225(b)(2). This Court finds that petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. 17 § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations because petitioner was expressly released pursuant to 18 § 1226 in April 2019, he has resided in this country for over 6 years since his release, and 19 petitioner’s August 2025 arrest and re-detention were not upon his arrival to the United States. 20 “Federal regulations provide that [noncitizens] detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings at 21 the outset of detention.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 306 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1)). As such, 22 petitioner should have been provided a bond hearing before his re-detention and is entitled to 23 relief on his statutory claim. 24 C. Due Process Claim (Claim Three) 25 Petitioner also argues that he has a liberty interest in freedom from imprisonment pursuant 26 to the Fifth Amendment, and not being incarcerated after prior release without an individualized 27 bond hearing. (ECF No. 1 at 6-7.) Respondents fail to respond to petitioner’s due process claim. 28 (See ECF No. 8.) Respondents therefore fail to demonstrate the government has satisfied the 1 requirements of the Due Process Clause, “which of course constitute[s] the supreme law of the 2 land[.]” Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 472 (1943) (Black, J., concurring). 3 The Due Process Clause protects persons in the United States from being deprived of life, 4 liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “It is clear that 5 commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due 6 process protection.” Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). “[T]he Due Process Clause 7 applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is 8 lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. “The Due Process 9 clause applies to noncitizens in this country in connection with removal proceedings, even if their 10 presence is unlawful or temporary.” Tinoco v. Noem, 2025 WL 3567862, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11 14, 2025) (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690). 12 The Court analyzes petitioner’s due process claim “in two steps: the first asks whether 13 there exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines 14 the procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with 15 the Constitution.” Garcia v. Andrews, 2025 WL 1927596, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2025) (citing 16 Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)). The Supreme Court has 17 found that a protected liberty interest may arise from a conditional release from physical restraint. 18 Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143, 147-49 (1997). Even when a statute allows the government to 19 arrest and detain an individual, a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause may 20 entitle the individual to procedural protections not found in the statute. See id. (finding due 21 process requires pre-deprivation hearing before revocation of preparole); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 22 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (same, in probation context); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 23 (1972) (same, in parole context). To determine whether a specific conditional release rises to the 24 level of a protected liberty interest, “[c]ourts have resolved the issue by comparing the specific 25 conditional release in the case before them with the liberty interest in parole as characterized by 26 Morrissey.” Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864, 887 (1st Cir. 2010) (internal quotation 27 marks and citation omitted). 28 Here, petitioner’s initial detention and subsequent release in April 2019 are similar 1 because it allowed petitioner to live in the United States, subject to immigration supervision, but 2 free of custody for 6 years. Such time allowed petitioner to form “enduring attachments of 3 normal life.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. Petitioner was 15 years old when he was released by 4 immigration authorities and subsequently obtained work authorization. This Court finds that 5 petitioner’s original release and time out of custody gave rise to a constitutionally protected 6 liberty interest. 7 Petitioner’s release pursuant to § 1226 was premised upon a finding that, at the time of 8 petitioner’s release, he was not dangerous nor a flight risk. See 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8) (“Any 9 officer authorized to issue a warrant of arrest may, in the officer’s discretion, release an alien not 10 described in [8 U.S.C. § 1226](c)(1), under the conditions at section [8 U.S.C. § 1226](a)(2) and 11 (3) of the Act; provided that the alien must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such 12 release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for 13 any future proceeding.”); Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d 14 sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v. Sessions, 905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2018); F.M.V. v. Wofford, 2025 15 WL 3083934, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025). In light of all of the foregoing, the Court finds that 16 petitioner’s prior release created a reasonable expectation that he would be entitled to retain his 17 liberty as long as he was not a flight risk and did not pose a danger to the community. See Perry 18 v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-03 (1972) (finding reliance on governmental representations 19 may establish a legitimate claim of entitlement to a constitutionally-protected interest); F.M.V., 20 2025 WL 3083934 at *4-5; Guillermo M. R. v. Kaiser, 2025 WL 1983677, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 21 17, 2025) (recognizing that “the liberty interest that arises upon release [from immigration 22 detention] is inherent in the Due Process Clause”); Ortega v. Kaiser, 2025 WL 1771438, at *3 23 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2025) (collecting cases finding that noncitizens who have been released have 24 a strong liberty interest). 25 Next, the Court turns to what procedures are necessary to ensure that the deprivation of 26 that protected liberty interest meets the demands of the Constitution. The Ninth Circuit has 27 “regularly applied Mathews [v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)], to due process challenges to 28 removal proceedings.” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206 (9th Cir. 2022); see also 1 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 993 (9th Cir. 2017) (applying Mathews factors in 2 immigration detention context). In applying the Mathews test to a procedural due process claim 3 challenging immigration detention, the Ninth Circuit explained that “Mathews remains a flexible 4 test that can and must account for the heightened governmental interest in the immigration 5 detention context.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F. 4th at 1206-07 (citations omitted). Under Mathews, 6 the Court considers three factors: (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous 7 deprivation; and (3) the government’s interest. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 8 First, petitioner has a clear interest in remaining free from detention. “Freedom from 9 imprisonment -- from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint -- lies at 10 the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (citing 11 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80 (“Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty 12 protected by the Due Process Clause.); Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 981 (“[T]he government’s 13 discretion to incarcerate non-citizens is always constrained by the requirements of due process.”). 14 For over 6 years, petitioner was free from custody before his re-detention. Petitioner also 15 obtained work authorization. The duration of his conditional release elevates and underscores his 16 interest in liberty. See Pinchi v. Noem, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2025) (in the 17 past five years, petitioner developed “extensive relations of support and interdependence” that 18 “underscore the high stakes of [his] liberty.”); Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 963 (N.D. 19 Cal. 2019) (holding that petitioner had a substantial liberty interest where he had been released 20 from custody for 18 months and was living with his wife, spending time with his mother and 21 other family members, working as a bicycle mechanic, and developing friendships in his 22 community). 23 The second Mathews factor also weighs in petitioner’s favor. “The risk of an erroneous 24 deprivation [of liberty] is high” when “[the petitioner] has not received any bond or custody 25 redetermination hearing.” See A.E. v. Andrews, 2025 WL 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 26 2025). Again, civil immigration detention, which is “nonpunitive in purpose and effect[,]” is 27 typically justified under the Due Process Clause only when a noncitizen presents a risk of flight 28 or danger to the community. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; Padilla v. ICE, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023). Respondents do not contend that petitioner is or was a flight risk 2 or a danger to the community. (See generally ECF No. 8.) In addition, respondents do not 3 contend that petitioner has a criminal record. (Id.) Here, petitioner has been detained since 4 August 2025, without being given an individualized bond hearing to evaluate whether petitioner 5 is a flight risk or a danger to the community. No neutral arbiter has determined whether 6 petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the community. 7 As to the third Mathews factor, this Court recognizes that the government has an interest 8 in enforcing immigration laws, but respondents’ interest in detaining petitioner without a hearing 9 is “low.” Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 970; Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1094 10 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2025). Detention hearings in immigration courts are routine, and impose a 11 “minimal cost.” Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 1094. In addition, here, the government’s interest is 12 even lower because petitioner was previously released after immigration officials determined he 13 was not a flight risk or danger to the community, he lived in the country for over 6 years on 14 release, and he has no criminal record. See Pinchi, 2025 WL 1853763, at *2. 15 Overall, balancing these factors, the Court finds that the Mathews factors weigh in favor 16 of finding petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing, and petitioner should have been provided such a 17 hearing before he was re-detained. “An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of 18 life, liberty, or property be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the 19 nature of the case.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (internal 20 quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added). In criminal cases, parolees released on 21 parole, which does not provide “absolute liberty,” but rather “conditional liberty properly 22 dependent on observance of special parole restrictions,” are also entitled to due process, including 23 a predeprivation hearing before their parole can be revoked. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480-86. 24 “Numerous district courts have held that these principles extend to the context of immigration 25 detention.” F.M.V., 2025 WL 3083934 at *6 (collecting cases). Respondents point to no reasons 26 a pre-deprivation hearing could not be held, and provided no evidence of “urgent concerns,” thus, 27 “a pre-deprivation hearing is required to satisfy due process.” Guillermo M. R. v. Kaiser, 791 F. 28 Supp. 3d at 1036. Accordingly, the Court finds that petitioner is also entitled to relief on his due 1 process claim (claim three). 2 This Court expressly notes that it is not addressing the length of petitioner’s detention and 3 whether such detention is prolonged or indefinite where petitioner does not challenge the length 4 of his detention in the instant petition. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (“A statute permitting 5 indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious constitutional problem.”) (detention of 6 noncitizen after final order of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)); Black v. Decker, 103 7 F.4th 133 (2d Cir. 2024) (indefinite detention of noncitizen violates due process) (detention of 8 noncitizen pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)). Therefore, if petitioner remains detained, petitioner is 9 not barred from filing a separate habeas petition challenging his detention as prolonged or 10 indefinite where such a claim was not raised in the instant petition or ripe at the time the instant 11 petition was filed. 12 D. Other Claim and Arguments 13 In light of the Court’s recommendation that petitioner’s requested relief be granted on 14 claims one and three, petitioner’s remaining habeas corpus claim (claim two) need not be 15 resolved. 16 In addition, though Respondents state in passing in a single sentence that petitioner failed 17 to exhaust administrative remedies, they present no legal authority, facts, or explanation for this 18 argument. (See ECF No. 8 at 3.) Simply stating “Petitioner has failed to exhaust administrative 19 remedies,” is insufficient to raise this argument. (See id.) This unsupported argument therefore 20 fails. 21 V. CONCLUSION 22 In summary, the Court recommends that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be granted 23 on claims one and three. 24 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 25 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be GRANTED. 26 2. Respondents’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 8) be DENIED. 27 3. Respondents be ordered to IMMEDIATELY release petitioner Sehajpreet Singh (A- 28 201-684-248). If respondents have custody of petitioner’s documents (e.g., ] identification, passport, work permit, Social Security card, etc.), respondents shall 2 return those to petitioner at the time of release. Respondents be ENJOINED AND 3 RESTRAINED from re-detaining petitioner unless the government demonstrates, by 4 clear and convincing evidence at a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral 5 decisionmaker, that petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community such that her 6 physical custody is legally justified. Petitioner shall be allowed to have his counsel 7 present at any such hearing. This injunction does not address other circumstances 8 where detention authority is established under different authority than what is 9 presented in this case (e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) or 8 U.S.C. § 1231). 10 4. The Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of petitioner and close 11 this case. 12 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 13 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within seven days of 14 | the date of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the 15 || court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to 16 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the objections shall be 17 || filed and served within seven days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that 18 | failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District 19 | Court’s order. See Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 20 21 || Dated: May 20, 2026 A aA Aan Spe | CHI SOO KIM 23 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 24 25 26 cesk/sing.0141.26.frs.merits 27 28 14