Segall v. Shore

215 S.E.2d 895, 264 S.C. 442, 1975 S.C. LEXIS 373
CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina
DecidedMay 29, 1975
Docket20023
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 215 S.E.2d 895 (Segall v. Shore) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Segall v. Shore, 215 S.E.2d 895, 264 S.C. 442, 1975 S.C. LEXIS 373 (S.C. 1975).

Opinion

Per Curiam:

This case is before us on appeal from the order of the Honorable Clarence E. Singletary, presiding judge of the Court of Common Pleas for Greenville County. We are of the opinion that his order properly sets forth and disposes of all of the issues on the appeal to this Court. Let his order, with minor deletions of matters not necessary to disposition of the issues, be printed as the directive of this Court.

ORDER OF JUDGE SINGLETARY

The plaintiffs in this case are among the beneficiaries under the Will of Max Shore, a resident of Greenville County, South Carolina, who died on September 27, 1971. They are also shareholders in their own right of one or both of the defendant corporations which form a major part of Max Shore’s estate. The plaintiff Jean Segall is also a co-Executrix and co-Trustee under the Will and is the Secretary and a Director in both of the defendant corporations.

The primary relief sought in this action has dealt with accountings from the individual defendants who are the remaining co-Executors and co-Trustees under the Will, as well as officers and Directors of the Defendant corporations, and (in the case of Sidney Shore and Reuben Shore) partners who survived Max Shore in the defendant partnership, Carolina Blouse Co.

*446 The defendants Sidney Shore and Reuben Shore are also beneficiaries under the Will of Max Shore. One of the defendants, Morris Root, was the accountant for all of the businesses of Max Shore for a number of years. He is also an Executor and Trustee under the Will of Max Shore and a Director of both defendant corporations.

Plaintiffs seek, among- other things, an accounting from the defendants on the ground that the individual defendants, in their various fiduciary capacities, have mismanaged the affairs and assets of the estate, the corporations, and the partnership, and have engaged in manipulation and self-dealing with these fiduciary assets for their own personal benefit.

The principal assets of Max Shore at the time of his death consisted of (1) all of the common stock in MacShore Classics, Inc. (Classics) ; (2) 25% of the common stock of The Shore Company, Inc. (Shore Company) ; and (3) a one-third interest in the partnership, Carolina Blouse Company (Carolina Blouse).

The main business of these three entities was the production and sale of ready-to-wear blouses, shirts and similar apparel. The Shore Company was organized to hold two parcels of real estate and plant facilities, one in Woodruff, South Carolina, and the other at Greenville, South Carolina. Substantially, the role of Classics was to purchase raw materials, subcontract the production of goods, make sales and receive the profits. Carolina Blouse was the production entity and was paid for the finished goods by Classics.

During the 1950’s and 1960’s MacShore Classics, Inc., conducted a manufacturing operation, producing certain types of clothing. While so engaged, this corporation had a sales force, advertising personnel and production units. In the late 1960’s MacShore Classics, Inc. suffered severe financial setbacks, and by 1969 had accumulated losses in the approximate amount of $750,000.00. For tax purposes, this constituted a carried loss. Some time during the latter part *447 of 1969, the defendant Reuben Shore, solicited business from Lady Arrow Division of Cluett Peabody and Company, Inc. (Lady Arrow). When this account' was obtained, Reuben Shore was a partner in Carolina Blouse and was also employed by a MacShore sales subsidiary.

At all times pertinent herein, Carolina Blouse was essentially a production entity. However, from the inception of the Lady Arrow business in 1969 until November of 1970, Carolina Blouse profited from and was paid directly by Lady Arrow for the goods the partnership- produced for Lady Arrow. From November of 1970 until the time of Mr. Shore’s demise, MacShore Classics, Inc. profited from and billed Lady Arrow. This change in handling the Lady Arrow contracts was apparently brought about by the fact that any profits that accrued to Classics, at least in part, could be credited against the aforesaid carried forward tax loss of Classics. In any event, Classics, rather than Carolina Blouse, in November of 1970, began to bill Lady Arrow for the work produced by Carolina Blouse and, in turn, partially paid Carolina Blouse for its cost of production. Without full payment for the Lady Arrow productions, Carolina Blouse could not meet costs of production and, consequently, Classics financed the balance of same by loans to Carolina Blouse. The full financial details of these dealings are not revealed in the record. Although, both Classics and Carolina Blouse appear to have done “contract” work during their. respective existences from the time the Lady Arrow account was obtained until Max Shore’s death, neither entity conducted any manufacturing operations requiring sales forces.

The salient issues are as follows:

(1) Whether Reuben and Sidney Shore are obliged to account to Carolina Blouse and Classics in connection with the appropriation of the money and properties of these two entities since January 1, 1972, including the business arrangement enjoyed by Classics with Lady Arrow.

*448 (2) Whether or not Reuben and Sidney Shore are, as surviving partners in Carolina Blouse, liable for a certain debt reflected on the books of MacShore Classics, Inc.

(3) Whether preferred stock in Classics held by Jean Segall and her children should be redeemed.

(4) The proper disposition of proceeds from a certificate issued by Washington Investors Plans, Inc. and

(5) The measure and amount of rentals due The Shore Company for its Greenville Plant.

Before discussing the five enumerated basic issues, it will be helpful to make an additional general observation which is supported by the weight of the evidence. The defendants Reuben Shore, Sidney Shore, and Morris Root do not appear to appreciate their responsibility as Executors and Trustees under the Will of the late Max Shore. As Executors they are held to a high standard of candor and trust when dealing with any asset of the Estate they have been entrusted to administer. Rather, the record reflects actions on their part typical of those taken by Max Shore when he was alive. The weight of the evidence indicates Max Shore, when alive, did in fact dominate the three entities in which his Estate has an interest. He solely made all meaningful financial and tax decisions in dealing with the two corporations and the partnership, Carolina Blouse, despite the fact that his two adult sons were equal partners in Carolina Blouse. These defendant Executors and Trustees now must account to the Court for their actions, and may not deal with the assets of the estate free from accountability as Executors and Trustees.

*449 QUESTION I

Whether or Not the Plaintiffs are Entitled to an Accounting of the Business Conducted by the Defendants Sidney Shore and Reuben Shore since January 1, 1972.

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Related

Kiriakides v. Atlas Food Systems & Services, Inc.
527 S.E.2d 371 (Court of Appeals of South Carolina, 2000)
Weeks v. McMillan
353 S.E.2d 289 (Court of Appeals of South Carolina, 1987)
Segall v. Shore
236 S.E.2d 316 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1977)

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Bluebook (online)
215 S.E.2d 895, 264 S.C. 442, 1975 S.C. LEXIS 373, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/segall-v-shore-sc-1975.