Seeney v. State

• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Decided: June 17, 2020
• Docket: 518, 2019
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

DARNELL SEENEY, aka § DONNELL SEENEY, § No. 518, 2019 § Defendant Below, § Appellant, § § Court Below–Superior Court v. § of the State of Delaware § STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID Nos. 1109005127 (N) § 1404009588 (N) Plaintiff Below, § Appellee.

Submitted: April 9, 2020 Decided: June 17, 2020

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN, Justices.

ORDER

After careful consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion

to affirm, and the record below, it appears to the Court that:

(1) The appellant, Darnell Seeney, aka Donnell Seeney, appeals from the

Superior Court’s November 14, 2019 order sentencing him for a violation of

probation (“VOP”). The State has filed a motion to affirm the judgment below on

the ground that it is manifest on the face of Seeney’s opening brief that his appeal is

without merit. We agree and affirm.

(2) On October 6, 2015, Seeney pleaded guilty to one count of

strangulation and one count of act of intimidation. The Superior Court immediately sentenced Seeney as follows: for strangulation, to five years of Level V incarceration

to be served under 11 Del. C. § 4204(k), with no probation to follow; for act of

intimidation, to five years of Level V incarceration, suspended for four years of

Level IV probation to be served at the discretion of the Department of Correction

(“DOC”), suspended after twelve months, followed by twenty-four months of Level

III probation with GPS monitoring.

(3) On October 13, 2019, an arrest warrant was issued for Seeney on new

charges of strangulation and terroristic threatening. On November 4, 2019, Seeney’s

probation officer filed an administrative warrant with the Superior Court, alleging

that Seeney was in violation of the terms of his probation because he had: (i) picked

up new criminal charges; (ii) failed to report to probation; (iii) absconded from

probation; (iv) removed his GPS monitoring anklet; and (v) failed to follow through

with the special terms of his probation, including TASC monitoring, substance abuse

treatment, domestic violence education, and mental health treatment. In a

supplemental VOP report filed with the court, Seeney’s probation officer alleged

that Seeney had, in violation of a no-contact order, contacted the alleged victim of

his new strangulation and terroristic threatening charges by telephone to ask her to

drop the charges against him. The supplemental report also noted that Seeney had

twice tested positive for alcohol.

2 (4) Seeney appeared with counsel at the VOP hearing and admitted

violating the terms of his probation. The Superior Court found Seeney in violation

of the terms of his probation and sentenced him to five years of Level V

incarceration, suspended after four years for one year of Level IV supervision to be

served at the discretion of DOC, suspended after six months, with no probation to

follow.1 This appeal followed.

(5) On appeal, Seeney argues that the Superior Court abused its discretion

in sentencing him to more than twenty-five percent of his backup time because his

violation was “technical” in nature. Instead, Seeney asserts that the Superior Court

sentenced him as if he had been found guilty of the still-pending strangulation and

terroristic threatening charges. Seeney’s position appears to be premised on the

Violation of Probation Sentencing Policy contained in the Sentencing

Accountability Commission (“SENTAC”) Benchbook.

(6) Seeney’s argument is unavailing. “It is well-established that appellate

review of sentences is extremely limited.”2 Our review of a sentence generally ends

upon a determination that the sentence falls within the statutory limits prescribed by

1 The Superior Court also discharged Seeney as unimproved from probation in an unrelated case, Cr. ID No. 1109005127(N). 2 Kurzmann v. State, 903 A.2d 702, 714 (Del. 2006).

3 the legislature.3 As a preliminary matter, Seeney’s contention that the Superior

Court sentenced Seeney as if he had been found guilty of the new criminal charges

is belied by the transcript of the VOP hearing: the Superior Court judge repeatedly

stated that he did not consider Seeney’s pending charges when fashioning Seeney’s

VOP sentence. As for Seeney’s argument that the SENTAC guidelines limit the

period of Level V incarceration he could receive for a VOP on a “technical

violation,” we have long held that the SENTEC guidelines are non-binding and

provide no basis for appeal where, as here, the sentence falls within the prescribed

statutory limits.4 In sentencing a defendant for a VOP, the trial court is authorized

to impose any period of incarceration up to and including the balance of Level V

time remaining to be served on the original sentence.5

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior

Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Karen L. Valihura Justice

3 Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 604 A.2d 839, 842 (Del. 1992) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 4 Id. at 845. 5 11 Del. C. § 4334(c).