Security Trust Co. v. Boyd

32 A.2d 779, 27 Del. Ch. 160, 1943 Del. Ch. LEXIS 46
CourtCourt of Chancery of Delaware
DecidedJune 23, 1943
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 32 A.2d 779 (Security Trust Co. v. Boyd) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Chancery of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Security Trust Co. v. Boyd, 32 A.2d 779, 27 Del. Ch. 160, 1943 Del. Ch. LEXIS 46 (Del. Ct. App. 1943).

Opinion

Harrington, Chancellor:

Edward L. Rice, by the Seventeenth item of his will, devised and bequeathed all the residue of his estate, in trust, for certain named persons; and by a codicil thereto he substituted the complainant for the trustee originally named to administer the trust. In that item, he first directed his trustee to divide the net' income from the corpus of the trust among his wife and five children during their natural lives. It then provided:

“And upon and immediately after the death of any of my children leaving to survive a child or children living at the time of my death, then upon this further trust to pay over half-yearly the one sixth part of said net income during the lifetime of my wife and the one fifth part thereof after her death, to such child or children of said deceased child of mine, in equal shares during their natural lives; and if any of my children should die without leaving to survive any such child or children, then to pay over the share of said net income to which such child of mine was entitled during his or her lifetime, to my other children and their children during their respective lives, as hereinbefore provided as to the other portions of said income. And upon the death of any grand-child of mine who may have been living at my death, then upon this further trust to pay over, assign, transfer and convey, free from any trust, to such child or children as he or she shall leave to survive, and the issue of such child or children as may then be deceased, in equal shares, such a part of the said residue of any estate as shall be in the same proportion to the whole of said residue as the share of the net income to which such grandchild was or would have been entitled on the death of his or her parent, bore to the whole of said residue; the issue of a deceased child of any such grand-child to take only such part or share as its deceased parent would have taken if living. And if there be no issue surviving such grand-child, then upon this further trust, to hold such part of said residue as aforesaid, to or for my other children or grand-children or their issue, subject to the same trusts, powers, provisos, limitations, ends, intents and purposes as are herein devised and declared of and concerning the said residue of my estate:
“Provided, that if any of my children should be deceased at the time of my death, leaving issue, then I direct and empower the said [164]*164trustee to pay over to such issue, the same part or share of the net income or of the residue of my estate as such issue would have been ultimately entitled to receive, if his or their parent or parents had been living at the time of my death; and if any of my children should be deceased at the time of my death, without issue to survive, then the share of the child so deceased without issue to lapse for the benefit of my wife and living children, and the issue of any deceased child, and be held or disposed of by the said trustee according to the trusts hereby created:”

The testator, therefore, provided:

(1) That “upon ** * * the death of any of my children leaving to survive a child or children living at the time of my death”, and after the death of his wife, the one-fifth part of the net income from the trust should be paid “to such child or children of said deceased child of mine in equal shares during their natural lives; * * *.”

(2) If any of his children “should die without leaving to survive any such child or children”, his trustee was then “to pay over the share of said net income to which such child * * * was entitled during his or her lifetime, to my other children and their children during their respective lives, as hereinbefore provided as to the other portions of said income.”

(3) “And upon the death of any grandchild of mine who may have been living at my death”, then his trustee was directed “to pay over * * * free from any trust, to such child or children as he or she shall leave to survive, and the issue of such child or children as may then be deceased, in equal shares, such a part of the said residue of my estate as shall be in the same proportion to the whole of said residue as the share of the net income to which such grandchild was or would have been entitled on the death of his or her parent, bore to the whole of said residue; the issue of a deceased child of any such grandchild to take only such part or share as its deceased parent would have taken if living.”

(4) “And if there be no issue surviving such grand[165]*165child”, the trustee was “to hold such part of said residue as aforesaid, to or for my other children or grandchildren or their issue, subject to the same trusts * * * as are herein devised and declared of and concerning the said residue of my estate: * *

Wallace E. Ryon and William M. Ryon, children of Wallace H. Ryon, deceased, and great grandchildren of the testator, claim that the whole scheme of the will indicates that children and on their death certain grandchildren, were to share in the income on a stirpital basis during their lives, and that an ultimate division of capital, free from any trusts, among great grandchildren was also intended on the same basis. They, therefore, claim that the primary shares in that fund of great, grandchildren, whose parent had died, would be increased from time to time by the subsequent death without issue of any of the brothers and sisters of that parent, as well as by the death, after the death of their father, of a child of the testator, without leaving issue. I am in accord with both of these contentions.

All of the testator’s five children survived him, and primarily were entitled to the whole of the income from the trust fund in equal shares during their lives. On the death of any of them, their children, living at the death of the testator, were also to receive their parent’s share of the income for life in equal shares. In case of the death of a child of the testator, without leaving any such child or children, “the share of the * * * net income to which such child was entitled * * was to be paid to the testator’s “other children and their children during their respective lives * * but “as hereinbefore provided as to the other portions of said income”. In that event, depending upon the .facts, the income on that portion of the fund was, therefore, payable to the testator’s children, and, in case of death, to their children, as above indicated.

Eventually, the great grandchildren of the testator were to take the capital free from any trusts; but the ques[166]*166tian is how the distribution was to be made, and what are the shares of Wallace E. Ryon and William M. Ryon. The trustee claims that the only contemplated distribution of capital to a great grandchild was on the death of his or her parent, and has acted accordingly. If that construction of the will be correct, the descendants of some qualified grandchildren might ultimately receive much more than a stirpital share; but that does not seem to have been the testator’s intent.

On the death of a grandchild living at the death of the testator, his surviving children and the issue of any that might be dead, were to be paid in equal shares, absolutely, such a part of the residue of the testator’s estate “as the share of the net income to which such grandchild was or would have been entitled on the death of his or her parent, bore to the whole of said residue.”

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Bluebook (online)
32 A.2d 779, 27 Del. Ch. 160, 1943 Del. Ch. LEXIS 46, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/security-trust-co-v-boyd-delch-1943.