Securities & Exchange Commission v. Warner

652 F. Supp. 647, 55 U.S.L.W. 2468, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4994
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedFebruary 2, 1987
Docket86-6742-CIV, 86-1984-CIV
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 652 F. Supp. 647 (Securities & Exchange Commission v. Warner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Securities & Exchange Commission v. Warner, 652 F. Supp. 647, 55 U.S.L.W. 2468, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4994 (S.D. Fla. 1987).

Opinion

ORDER

GONZALEZ, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE has come before the court upon the Motions to Dismiss filed by defendant American Savings and Loan Association of Florida (ASLA). This is an action brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) seeking to permanently enjoin defendant ASLA and the other defendants from committing future violations of federal securities laws. ASLA has filed four motions to dismiss, each based upon a separate theory. Each motion will be considered separately below.

I. UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY

ASLA moves to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. ASLA contends that the authority of the SEC to seek injunctive relief in district court violates the separation of powers doctrine. ASLA argues that because Art. II, § 3 of the Constitution commands the President to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” Congressional delegation of enforcement power to the SEC is unconstitutional.

The doctrine of separation of powers is designed to keep “each of the three general departments of government entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others.” Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 630, 55 S.Ct. 869, 874, 79 L.Ed. 1611 (1935). “The Constitution does not contemplate an active role for Congress in the supervision of officers charged with the execution of the laws it enacts.” Bowsher v. Synar, — U.S.-,-, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 3187, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986).

In Bowsher, the Court held that Congress unconstitutionally delegated the authority to determine spending reductions to the Comptroller General. The Comptroller General is removable from office at the initiative of Congress and may be removed either by impeachment or “at any time” by joint resolution of Congress. 31 U.S.C. § 703(a)(2). The Court concluded that the Comptroller General is subservient to Congress. Id. at-, 106 S.Ct. at 3191. The Court held that “[bjecause Congress had retained removal authority over the Comptroller General, he may not be entrusted *649 with executive powers.” Id. at-, 106 S.Ct. at 3191.

In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976), the Court held that the civil enforcement authority of the Federal Elections Committe was unconstitutional because several members of the Commission were appointed by Congress and not by the President. The court noted that the President was charged with the duty to enforce the laws. Consequently, the Court held that only “officers of the United States” appointed pursuant to Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution could initiate civil actions to enforce federal laws.

It is important to note, however, that the Court did not hold the delegation of enforcement authority to the Commission unconstitutional per se. Instead, the Court ' stayed that portion of its judgment affecting the authority of the Commission to conduct civil enforcement actions for thirty days. The limited stay was designed to “afford Congress an opportunity to reconstitute the Commission by law or to adopt other valid enforcement mechanisms without interrupting enforcement of the provisions the court sustained]____” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 143, 96 S.Ct. at 693.

The present case involves the power of the Securities and Exchange Commission to seek injunctive relief prohibiting violations of federal securities laws. Unlike the situations in Bowsher and Buckley, Congress has neither the power to appoint or remove (except for impeachable offenses) the Commissioners of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The President appoints the Commissioners pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a). Although the statute establishing the Commission is silent regarding the removal of Commissioners, members of independent agencies such as the SEC are generally removable by Congress only for impeachable offenses. See Bowsher v. Synar, — U.S. at-, n. 4, 106 S.Ct. at 3188, n. 4.

The court cannot conclude that the authority of the SEC to seek injunctive relief interferes with the power of the President to enforce the laws. Congress exercises no control over the actions of the Commissioners of the SEC. See I.C.C. v. Chatsworth Cooperative Marketing Association, 347 F.2d 821 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 938, 86 S.Ct. 390, 15 L.Ed.2d 349 (1965). Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction by Virtue of Unconstitutional Delegation of Enforcement Authority must be DENIED.

II. STATUTORY REMOVAL OF ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY

Under section 12(i) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 78Z(i), the authority to administer and enforce the reporting and proxy provisions of the 1934 Act against ASLA lies with the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (“FHLBB”). ASLA argues therefore, that the SEC lacks authority to enforce the anti-fraud provisions of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.

ASLA fails to note, however, that section 12(i) does not grant the FHLBB the authority to enforce the antifraud provisions. Instead, section 12(i) limits the FHLBB’s jurisdiction to several specific provisions of the 1934 Act. Conspicuously absent from the grant of jurisdiction to the FHLBB is the enforcement of section 10(b). “Where Congress has consistently made express its delegation of a particular power, its silence is strong evidence that it did not intend to grant the power.” Marshall v. Gibsons’s Products, Inc. of Plano, 584 F.2d 668, 676 (5th Cir.1978) quoting Alcoa Steamship Co. v. Federal Maritime Commission, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 144, 146, 348 F.2d 756, 758 (1965).

The difference in the actions brought by the SEC and the FHLBB against ASLA underscores the court’s conclusion that Congress did not intend to vest enforcement of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws with the FHLBB. The SEC alleges that ASLÁ perpetuated a fraud on its shareholders and the investing public generally. On the other hand, the FHLBB *650 contends that ASLA made untrue statements of material facts and reported misleading facts in its periodic reports.

The fact that there may well be some overlap between the functions of the SEC and the FHLBB is neither unusual nor unfortunate.

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652 F. Supp. 647, 55 U.S.L.W. 2468, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4994, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/securities-exchange-commission-v-warner-flsd-1987.