Securities & Exchange Commission v. Vaskevitch

657 F. Supp. 312, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13486
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMarch 30, 1987
Docket87 Civ. 1620 (RWS)
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 657 F. Supp. 312 (Securities & Exchange Commission v. Vaskevitch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Vaskevitch, 657 F. Supp. 312, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13486 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).

Opinion

SWEET, District Judge.

A motion for a preliminary injunction, expedited discovery, and an accounting has been made by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). The motion is unopposed and will be granted.

Prior Proceedings

For some months, the SEC has been conducting an investigation pursuant to a Formal Order of Private Investigation entitled In the Matter of Trading in Certain Securities by Plenmneer, Ltd. and Others (HO-1865), authorized and issued by the Commission on August 14, 1986. On March 10, 1987, the SEC learned that one of the targets of the investigation, against whom the SEC had gathered substantial evidence, had made immediate arrangements to transfer substantial assets from the United States to a Swiss bank. The SEC also learned that the target had in the previous two months transferred nearly $2 million out of the United States to offshore accounts. To prevent further dissipation of assets subject to disgorgement, the Commission applied to Part I of this court early in the morning on March 11, 1987 before filing the complaint. The Honorable Robert L. Carter, sitting in Part I, signed a Temporary Restraining Order returnable March 20, 1987. On March 20, the TRO was extended ten days from the bench in order to further examine the extensive documentary material submitted by the SEC in support of its application.

Facts

The facts set forth by the SEC in the affidavits, documents and transcribed testimony before the SEC establish a strong prima facie case of previous securities violations and a reasonable likelihood that the wrongs will be repeated. In addition, unless an asset freeze is granted, there is a reasonable likelihood that such funds may be secreted outside the jurisdiction of the court, and consequently that no funds will remain to satisfy any final judgment that may ultimately be granted.

In broad strokes, the facts of this case are simple, and the pattern (though not the scale) is typical to violations of the securities laws; someone entrusted with confidential information tips off an outsider who secretly trades on the basis of the information and reaps unfair profits at the expense of the average investor.

Nahum Vaskevitch (“Vaskevitch”) was a managing director of the Mergers and Acquisitions department in the London Office of Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner and Smith (“Merrill Lynch”). Given his high position and the collegial working relationships of Merrill Lynch’s M & A Department, Vaskevitch was privy to vast amounts of confidential information about the company’s clients.

David Sofer is an investor and businessman who conducts business in the United States, Israel, and other foreign nations. In the names of Plenmeer Ltd. (“Plenmeer”) and Meda Establishment (“Meda”), both of which are also defendants, Sofer opened securities brokerage accounts at Russo Securities, Inc. (“Russo”) and MKI Securities (“MKI”). The evidence sub *314 mitted by the SEC shows that Sofer had complete control over the accounts.

The affidavits and documents submitted by the SEC show a recurring pattern. Vaskevitch, in his position as the London M & A director, would learn valuable, confidential information about an acquisition under negotiation but not yet public. During the crucial periods in which the deals were negotiated, telephone calls were placed to Vaskevitch’s home or office from telephones readily accessible to Sofer, such as the phones in his hotel suite or in offices of acquaintances whom he was visiting. After the calls were placed, Plenmeer and Meda would begin to buy heavily in the securities which Vaskevitch knew to be moving quickly toward a deal. An obvious inference from these facts is that Vaskevitch, in violation of his duty to Merrill Lynch and its customers, was passing confidential information to Sofer on which Sofer, knowing or having reason to know of Vaskevitch’s breach, secretly traded for their mutual profit. Consequently, the SEC has made out a strong prima facie case of insider trading that implicates Sofer, Vaskevitch, Plenmeer and Meda.

The SEC has documented at least four extraordinary business transactions in which this pattern essentially repeated itself: a transaction involving Pay Less Drug Stores, Northwest, Inc.; a transaction involving the Saga Corporation; and an attempted transaction involving Par Pharmaceutical Co. In some deals, the SEC has documented the fact that telephone calls were placed, but even when they have not, Sofer’s buying pattern tracks Vaskevitch’s knowledge of changes in the deal. The SEC has calculated that the profits reaped by trading in the Plenmeer and Meda accounts in three of these securities exceeds $2 million.

The frequency and size of these transactions plainly sustain a strong inference that the wrong will be repeated. Certainly no moral compunctions appear to hinder the defendants, and Vaskevitch—only recently discharged from Merrill Lynch—has carried away a wealth of secrets from the days in which he was trusted by his colleagues.

Finally, it appears from the evidence presented by the SEC that as the heat of the investigation was increasingly brought to bear on Sofer, he took steps to move his considerable assets outside the United States. Under the circumstances it is an entirely fair inference that he was doing so to secrete their booty. Although the SEC has presented evidence that Vaskevitch, Sofer, Plenmeer and Meda have all been served, none have appeared and none have tendered any evidence in any form in opposition to the SEC’s application.

Conclusions

When there is a dispute over facts, an evidentiary hearing is required before issuing a preliminary injunction. Here, however, the defendants have chosen not to appear and, therefore, not to oppose the SEC’s facts. A defendant “cannot block issuance of an injunction simply by refusing to submit evidence on contested fact issues.” Guardians Ass’n of New York Police Dept., Inc. v. Civil Service Commission, 490 F.2d 400, 403 (2d Cir.1973) (Friendly, J.). This application for a preliminary injunction therefore has been considered entirely on the basis of the uncontested documentary material submitted by the SEC.

These documents make out a prima facie case that by passing nonpublic information to Sofer to reap profits on the market, Vaskevitch has violated a fiduciary duty to Merrill Lynch and its clients. As the Supreme Court said in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659, 103 S.Ct. 3255, 3263-64, 77 L.Ed.2d 911 (1983), “Not only are insiders forbidden by their fiduciary relationship from personally using undisclosed corporate information to their advantage, but they also may not give such information to an outsider for the same improper purpose of exploiting the information for their personal gain.” See also 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). In turn, a tippee inherits the tipper’s fiduciary duty if the insider has breached his duty “and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach.” Id. at 660, 103 S.Ct. at 3264.

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Bluebook (online)
657 F. Supp. 312, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13486, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/securities-exchange-commission-v-vaskevitch-nysd-1987.