Securities & Exchange Commission v. United Benefit Life Insurance

387 U.S. 202, 87 S. Ct. 1557, 18 L. Ed. 2d 673, 1967 U.S. LEXIS 2975
Supreme Court of the United States·Decided May 22, 1967·No. 428·Published·Cited by 101 cases

Opinion

*204 Mr. Justice Harlan

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This action was initiated by the Securities and Exchange Commission to enjoin respondent (United) from offering its “Flexible Fund Annuity” contract without undertaking the registration required by § 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 1 and to compel United to register the “Flexible Fund” itself as an “investment company” pursuant to § 8 of the Investment Company Act of 1940. 2

The “Flexible Fund Annuity” is a deferred, or optional, annuity plan having characteristics somewhat similar to those of the variable annuities this Court held, in S. E. C. v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co., 359 U. S. 65 (VALIC), to be subject to the Securities Act. Like the variable annuity, it is a recent effort to meet the challenge of inflation by allowing the purchaser to reap the benefits of a professional investment program while at the same time gaining the security of an insurance annuity. 3 There are, however, significant differences between the “Flexible Fund” contract and the variable annuity, and it is claimed that these differences suffice to bring the “Flexible Fund” contract within the “optional annuity contract” exemption of § 3 (a)(8) of the Securities Act 4 and to bring the “Flexible Fund” itself within *205 the “insurance company” exemption of § 3 (c) (3) of the Investment Company Act, 54 Stat. 798, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-3(c)(3).

The purchaser of a “Flexible Fund” annuity agrees to pay a fixed monthly premium for a number of years before a specified maturity date. That premium, less a deduction for expenses (the net premium), is placed in a “Flexible Fund” account which United maintains separately from its other funds, pursuant to Nebraska law. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 44-310.06 (1963 Cum. Supp.). United undertakes to invest the “Flexible Fund” with the object of producing capital gains as well as an interest return, and the major part of the fund is invested in common stocks. The purchaser, at all times before maturity, is entitled to his proportionate share of the total fund and may withdraw all or part of this interest. The purchaser is also entitled to an alternative cash value measured by a percentage of his net premiums which gradually increases from 50% of that sum in the first year to 100% after 10 years. Other features, common to conventional annuity contracts, are also incorporated in United’s plan. 5

At maturity, the purchaser may elect to receive the cash value of his policy, measured either by his interest in the fund or by the net premium guarantee, whichever is larger. He may also choose to convert his interest into a life annuity under conditions specified in the *206 “Flexible Fund” contract. These conditions relate future benefits to dollars available at maturity so the dollar benefits to be received will vary with the cash value at maturity. However, the net premium guarantee is, because of this conversion system, also a guarantee that a certain amount of fixed-amount payment life annuity will be available at maturity.

After maturity the policyholder has no further interest in the “Flexible Fund.” He has either received the value of his interest in cash, or converted to a fixed-payment annuity in which case his interest has been transferred from the “Flexible Fund” to the general reserves of the company, and mingled, on equal terms per dollar of cash value, with the interests of holders of conventional deferred annuities.

Because of the termination of interest in the “Flexible Fund” at maturity, the SEC contended that the portion of the “Flexible Fund” contract which dealt with the pre-maturity period was separable and a “security,” within the meaning of the Securities Act. It was agreed that the provisions dealing with the operation of the fixed-payment annuity were purely conventional insurance provisions, and thus beyond the purview of the SEC. The District Court held that the guarantee of a fixed-payment annuity of a substantial amount gave the entire contract the character of insurance. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. 123 U. S. App. D. C. 305, 359 F. 2d 619. That court rejected “the SEC’s basic premise that the contract should be fragmented and the risk during the deferred period only should be considered.” Considering the contract as a whole, it found, as the SEC had urged, that this Court’s decision in VALIC, supra, was controlling. But it read that decision to hold only “that a company must bear a substantial part of the investment risk associated with the contract ... in order to qualify its *207 products as ‘insurance.’ ” 123 U. S. App. D. C., at 308, 359 F. 2d, at 622. Because of the net premium guarantee and the conversion to payments which included an interest element during the fixed-payment period, the court concluded that the “Flexible Fund” met this test. Because of the importance of the issue, and the need for clarifying the implications of the VALIC decision, we granted certiorari, 385 U. S. 918. We now reverse for reasons given below.

First, we do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the “Flexible Fund” contract must be characterized in its entirety. Two entirely distinct promises are included in the contract and their operation is separated at a fixed point in time. In selling a deferred annuity contract of any type, United must first decide what amount of annuity payment is to be allowed for each dollar paid into the annuity fund at maturity. 6 In making that calculation United must analyze expected mortality, interest, and expenses of administration. The outcome of that calculation is shown in the conversion table which is included in the “Flexible Fund” contract.

The second problem United must face in a deferred annuity is to determine what amount will be available for the annuity fund at maturity. In a conventional annuity where a fixed amount of benefits is stipulated it is essential that the premiums both cover expenses and produce a fund sufficient to support the promised benefits. 7 In fixing the necessary premium mortality *208 experience is a subordinate factor and the planning problem is to decide what interest and expense rates may be expected. There is some shifting of risk from policyholder to insurer, but no pooling of risks among policyholders. In other words, the insurer is acting, in a role similar to that of a savings institution, and state regulation is adjusted to this role. 8

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Securities & Exchange Commission v. United Benefit Life Insurance, 387 U.S. 202, 87 S. Ct. 1557, 18 L. Ed. 2d 673, 1967 U.S. LEXIS 2975 (1967).

387 U.S. 202 (Securities & Exchange Commission v. United Benefit Life Insurance) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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