Securities & Exchange Commission v. Roussel

485 F. Supp. 295, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11713
CourtDistrict Court, D. Kansas
DecidedJanuary 25, 1980
DocketCiv. A. 76-511-C6
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 485 F. Supp. 295 (Securities & Exchange Commission v. Roussel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Roussel, 485 F. Supp. 295, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11713 (D. Kan. 1980).

Opinion

ORDERS ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

WESLEY E. BROWN, District Judge.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began this action, a complaint for Injunction, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, naming as defendants, Louis J. Roussel, Jr., and fifteen other individuals and corporations. It is alleged that in 1975, Roussel, aided and abetted by the National American Life Insurance Company (NALICO), and the other defendants, engaged in an unlawful scheme to obtain control of a Wichita, Kansas insurance holding company, Farm & Ranch Financial, Inc. (Farm & Ranch).

Shortly after the action was filed in Louisiana, all defendants, other than the “Kansas defendants,” consented to injunctive orders which were entered against them. Thereafter, and on November 29, 1976, this ¿ction was transferred to this District for further proceedings.

The “Kansas defendants” who remained in the case after transfer to this district are, Mick Stack Associates, Inc. (Mick Stack), a Wichita securities broker-dealer, and its principals and employees, Kenneth Mick, Richard Smith, and Robert Adrian. These defendants failed to plead, or to otherwise defend, so on March 15, 1979, the SEC filed Motion for Judgment by Default, or in the Alternative, moved for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. 3). The Clerk of Court entered default pursuant to the provisions of Rule 55, Fed.R.Civ.Proc. (Dkt. 6) but thereafter the defaulting defendants filed An *297 swers and Motions to Dismiss. (Dkts. 7, 8,9 and 10).

At hearing held on June 25, 1979, on plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment by Default, the Court determined that the default should be set aside, pursuant to Rule 55(c), Fed.R.Civ.Proc., inasmuch as Answers had been filed, and the parties agreed that the matter should be submitted to the Court upon its merits.

Thereafter, argument was heard upon plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and upon defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. At this hearing, counsel was able to stipulate that the evidence already before the Court accurately reflected the facts that each party would present, should a trial on the merits be had.

The evidence before the Court consists of transcripts of testimony and exhibits to these transcripts, and other documents obtained from the defendants and others during an investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1975. These documents had previously been filed with the Court in support of plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment by Default. Excerpts from this evidence appear as Exhibits to briefs, and, at the request of the Court, counsel has submitted specific excerpts from the transcripts for the Court’s attention. It should be noted that, in addition to portions of the evidence, specifically referred to by counsel, the Court has consulted the entire transcripts of testimony by defendants, Louis Roussel, Jr., Kenneth Mick, and the transcript of the testimony of Michael J. Shada, vice-chairman of the Board of Directors of National American Life Insurance Company.

After considering this evidence, the Court determines that the Motions to Dismiss of defendants should be overruled, and that the Motion for Summary Judgment of plaintiff should be sustained.

In the complaint filed in this action, the SEC alleges that Mick, Stack Associates, Inc., Kenneth Mick, Richard Smith, and Robert Adrian, violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rules 10b-5 and 10b — 13,17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 and 240.10b-13, in connection with their activities in aiding and abetting the attempt by defendant Roussel to take over the insurance company, Farm & Ranch Financial, Inc. In particular, it is alleged that these defendants, while acting as managers of a tender offer for the stock of Farm & Ranch, purchased Farm & Ranch shares from Mick Stack customers in the open market, outside the tender offer. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-13 thereunder, prohibit persons from making simultaneous tender offers for, and market purchases of, the same security.

In addition, it is alleged that the defendants, while purchasing Farm & Ranch shares from their customers at $3.50 to $5.00 per share, failed to disclose to these persons that Mick Stack had a standing purchase order from Roussel to purchase Farm & Ranch shares for $5.20 per share and that the profits derived from such market purchases and sales to Roussel would be greater than those received for acting as managing dealer for the tender offer. It is further alleged that defendants failed to disclose that the shares acquired by Mick Stack in the open market for Roussel would reduce the number of shares available for successful completion of the tender offer. The SEC also charges that defendants failed to disclose to their customers that Roussel was acquiring over 10% of the stock of Farm & Ranch in violation of Kansas law. In this connection it should be noted that K.S.A. 40-3304 prohibits the control of any domestic insurance company without prior approval of the Kansas Department of Insurance. K.S.A. 40-3302(c) defines “control” as existing when any person holds 10% or more of the voting securities of an insurance company.

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5, provides:

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange,

*298 (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,

(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or

(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

Thus, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 broadly prohibit all fraudulent and deceptive conduct “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”

Rule 10b-13, 17 C.F.R. 240-10b-13 prohibits a purchase of securities, outside of the tender offer, by a person making the tender offer:

(a) No person who makes a cash tender offer or exchange offer for any equity security shall, directly or indirectly, purchase, or make any arrangement to purchase, any security (or any other security which is immediately convertible into or exchangeable for such security), otherwise than pursuant to such tender offer

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Bluebook (online)
485 F. Supp. 295, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11713, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/securities-exchange-commission-v-roussel-ksd-1980.