Securities & Exchange Commission v. Princeton Economic International Ltd.

73 F. Supp. 2d 420, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16938
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedOctober 28, 1999
Docket99 Civ. 9667, 99 Civ. 9669
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 73 F. Supp. 2d 420 (Securities & Exchange Commission v. Princeton Economic International Ltd.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Princeton Economic International Ltd., 73 F. Supp. 2d 420, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16938 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

OWEN, District Judge.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) alleges that Martin A. Armstrong, and his companies, Princeton Economic International Ltd. and Princeton Global Management Ltd. (collectively, “defendants”) and their myriad of subsidiaries and affiliates of all stripes, 1 violated section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 77g(a), and section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, by fraudulently offering and selling promissory notes in the millions issued by a down-the-line subsidiary of defendant Princeton Economic International Ltd. (“PEIL”), Cresvale International, Limited (Tokyo) (“Cresvale”), to Japanese institutional investors, and misrepresenting the net asset value to the investors, thereby concealing large and mounting trading losses. The Commodities Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) claims that defendants also violated sections 4b, 4m and 4o (1) of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6b, 6m, 6o (1), by engaging in this scheme as to futures.

In August and early September 1999, defendants began to transfer assets in an apparent .effort to hide them against a day of reckoning appearing on the horizon. On September 13, 1999, Judge Kaplan of this Court granted a temporary restraining order restraining defendants from further violating securities laws, freezing defendants’ assets, appointing a temporary receiver to collect the assets and report and granting other relief. However, shortly thereafter, Armstrong, with full knowledge of this order, and on the advice of at least one of his attorneys, covertly filed his own proceeding for receivers in the Turks and Caicos Islands to diminish, if not thwart, this Court’s Temporary Receiver’s powers and ability to act. On September 19, 1999, the Supreme Court, Providenciales, in the Turks and Caicos Islands appointed Joint Provisional Liquidators (“JPLs”) of PEIL. (See infra at p. 425). As a result, this Court entered a second temporary restraining order on September 19, 1999 ordering defendants not to file any petition in bankruptcy on behalf of the corporate defendants or seek the appointment of a liquidator, receiver or other fiduciary without leave of this Court. 2 As of this moment, I have sanc *422 tioned an accommodation (subject to defea-sance) between the Temporary Receiver and the Turks JPLs. The SEC, CFTC and Temporary Receiver now move for preliminary injunctions.

The SEC’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction

On October 14, 1999, the SEC, PEIL and Princeton Global Management entered into a Partial Consent Judgment of Permanent Injunction. Accordingly, the SEC seeks a preliminary injunction only against Armstrong as heretofore temporarily restrained as provided in Judge Kaplan’s order. This would put Armstrong under court restraint against future violations of the securities law, freeze assets, prohibit the destruction of documents and further authorize the Temporary Receiver to act as specified — except to the extent that the Memorandum of Agreement of October 7, 1999 (“MOA”) is in force and modifies any provision of Judge Kaplan’s and my orders.

In obtaining a statutory injunction, a government agency is not subject to the burdens borne by a private litigant, such as proof of irreparable injury or inadequacy of other remedies. CFTC v. British Am. Commodity Options Corp., 560 F.2d 135, 141 (2d Cir.1977). Section 20(b) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b), and section 21(d) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d), entitle the SEC to a preliminary injunction upon “a substantial showing of likelihood of success as to both a current violation and the risk of repetition.” SEC v. Cavanagh, 155 F.3d 129, 132 (2d Cir.1998); SEC v. Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d 1028, 1039-40 (2d Cir.1990).

The SEC contends that Armstrong violated section 17(a) of the Securities Act and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, acting with scien-ter, 3 by making material misrepresentations (or material omissions if he had a duty to speak) or using a fraudulent device in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. SEC v. First Jersey Sec., 101 F.3d 1450, 1467 (2d Cir.1996).

I find jurisdiction here. Defendant Armstrong’s contention in his memorandum to the Court that “the Princeton Notes were issued by foreign entities outside the United States” (Def.’s Br. at 21) is patently and facially contrary to the record. A Princeton Note for $10,420,000 issued by Cresvale to Kissei Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. bears Armstrong’s signature, (Decl. of Kristine Collins in Supp., Ex. 12), and counsel’s guarded protestation at the hearing of the non-authenticity of Armstrong’s signature evaporates in the comparison to Armstrong’s nine admittedly genuine signatures on Exhibit 9 to the same declaration. This operation was, it is clear, all one ball of Armstrong’s wax. The claim in his memorandum (Def.’s Br. at 21) that he “did not participate in the offer and sale of the Princeton Notes,” is specious. Further, in penning the memorandum’s language, “The SEC fails to allege any participation by the defendant [Armstrong] in the offer and sale of the Princeton Notes” (Def.’s Br. at 21-22), the writer appears not to have read ¶ 12 of the SEC’s complaint.

Next, the Princeton Notes are securities. Finally, there is no question that the SEC, on this record, has put before this Court documentary and other evidence which shows that Armstrong and the entities under his control, having represented that the proceeds of their note sales would be kept in segregated accounts and used to purchase conservative investments, actually lost sums in the many millions in risky currency and commodities trading, and then commingled accounts prior to subsequent transactions to cover this up. From this, it appears that he and entities under his control used thereafter-acquired investor money to pay off maturing notes fostering the appearance that all was well, and arranged for the mailing of letters to investors containing false statements *423 which overstated the net asset value of the accounts (the “NAV letters”). These misrepresentations were material, and certainly were in connection with later “sales” as the law has in mind, and their contents would have unquestionably influenced an investor’s decision. First Jersey,

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73 F. Supp. 2d 420, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16938, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/securities-exchange-commission-v-princeton-economic-international-ltd-nysd-1999.