Securities & Exchange Commission v. Kane (In Re Kane)

212 B.R. 697, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 1839, 1997 WL 577416
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedAugust 12, 1997
Docket19-10117
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 212 B.R. 697 (Securities & Exchange Commission v. Kane (In Re Kane)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Kane (In Re Kane), 212 B.R. 697, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 1839, 1997 WL 577416 (Mass. 1997).

Opinion

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

JAMES F. QUEENAN, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge.

In this adversary proceeding, the Securities and Exchange Commission, (the “Commission”) moves for summary judgment against the Debtor, William F. Kane (“Kane”). It requests that a judgment in favor of the Commission against Kane be declared nondischargeable pursuant to section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code as a debt for money obtained by fraud, and pursuant to section 523(a)(4) as a debt for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity-

The documents filed in support and in opposition to the motion fail to indicate any genuine issue of material fact. They disclose that Kane was an employee of American Financial Advisors (“AFA”). In July of 1992, AFA began selling promissory notes issued by its parent company, Financial Advisors, Inc. AFA used “telemarketers” who read directly from scripts to sell the promissory notes. If a person called was interested at the end of the initial phone conversation, the call would be transferred to a sales agent who would read to the potential investor a second script and mail to him various promotional information. By February of 1994, AFA had sold approximately 146 promissory notes to at least 102 investors for an aggregate price of more than $3,500,000.00.

Kane performed the function of manager of AFA’s office and was known to at least one of AFA’s sales agents as AFA’s “Director of Marketing.” Kane was the supervisor of AFA’s telemarketers; he provided them with their scripts, monitored their solicitations and determined what promotional material would be mailed. He supervised and trained some of AFA’s sales agents. Kane also served as a sales agent who directly offered and sold AFA’s promissory notes. All of his knowledge about the promissory notes was obtained from AFA or its principals; he did not undertake any independent inquiry or investigation of his own.

Kane represented to investors orally and in literature that the money they invested would be used only to fund collateralized automobile loans to be made to credit risk purchasers of new and used automobiles. Kane also represented to investors that any loan made by AFA would be 100% insured and that the insurance would cover a loss if someone disappeared with the vehicle. In actuality, most of the funds AFA received from the promissory note offering were converted to the personal benefit of its principals. Out of the over $3.5 million raised by AFA, only about $850,000 was used to make automobile loans. The automobile loans *700 made by AFA were not insured against default, and there was a strong possibility that the car which served as collateral on each loan would not be sufficient to pay the balance on the loan plus the costs of repossession and sale of the vehicle.

Kane represented to investors that AFA had reported sales and stockholder’s equity of $2,349,524 and $618,000 in 1990 and $9,578,690 and $1,390,602 in 1991. In 1992 its stock was worthless. Kane authorized the shipment of promotional materials representing that AFA had commenced the promissory note program in 1990 and describing the financial performance of AFA’s automobile loan operation in 1991 and 1992. In actuality, AFA did not finance its first automobile until July of 1993. Kane failed to disclose that he was paid substantial commissions for the sales of the promissory notes or that AFA was the subject of several law enforcement actions involving its promissory note offering.

Kane pled guilty to a one count information charging him with conspiracy to commit mail, wire and securities fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 371. In a civil action brought against him by the Commission, he was found to have violated sections 5(a) and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. sections 77e(a), 77e(c) and 77q(a), and sections 10(b) and 15(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. sections 78j(b) and 77o(a). The District Court ordered Kane to disgorge $122,670, plus pre-judgment interest thereon.

I. THE COMMISSION HAS STANDING TO BRING THIS ACTION

The only requirement for standing to bring a cause of action based on a violation of section 523(a)(2)(A) or 523(a)(4) is that the action must be brought by a creditor. 11 U.S.C. § 523(c) (1994). A creditor is an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A) (1994). A “claim” is defined as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment ...” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (1994). As the holder of the disgorgement order, the Commission has a claim.

Nathanson v. National Labor Relations Bd., 344 U.S. 25, 73 S.Ct. 80, 97 L.Ed. 23 (1952), is the landmark Supreme Court case on this question. In Nathanson, the Court held that the N.L.R.B. was a creditor within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, and therefore had standing to bring a cause of action against a bankrupt employer for back pay owed its employees. Id. at 27. The court noted that the N.L.R.B. was, the “public agent chosen by Congress to enforce the National Labor Relations Act.” Id. Much like the N.L.R.B., the Commission is the agency chosen by Congress to enforce the security laws.

In Securities and Exch. Commission v. Maio (In re Maio), 176 B.R. 170 (Bankr.S.D.Ind.1994), the court held that the Commission had standing in a proceeding to have a judgment against a chapter 11 debtor for securities violations declared nondischargeable. The court came to this conclusion even though the Commission does not have exclusive authority to bring suit. That the Commission will not be the ultimate recipient of the monies owed does not effect its standing. Id. at 171. Denial to the Commission of the right to bring nondischargeability complaints would unduly hinder its ability to enforce the Securities Act. Id. at 172.

Securities and Exch. Comm’n v. Cross (In re Cross), 203 B.R. 456 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1996), is the only decision holding the Commission does not have standing in a nondisehargeability action. That ease is distinguishable from the present case in that the prior court order there required the disgorgement to be paid to a receiver, not the Commission. Id. at 457. As a result, the court reasoned that the Commission had no pecuniary interest because it was the receiver whose role was analogous to the N.L.R.B. in Nathanson. Id. at 458. Had it been the Commission and not the receiver who was awarded the disgorgement, the court indicated it would have ruled that the Commission had standing as a creditor.

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212 B.R. 697, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 1839, 1997 WL 577416, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/securities-exchange-commission-v-kane-in-re-kane-mab-1997.