Securities Credit Co. v. Hill

17 Fla. Supp. 102
CourtCircuit Court of the 4th Judicial Circuit of Florida, Duval County
DecidedApril 14, 1961
DocketNo. 61-72-E
StatusPublished

This text of 17 Fla. Supp. 102 (Securities Credit Co. v. Hill) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Circuit Court of the 4th Judicial Circuit of Florida, Duval County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Securities Credit Co. v. Hill, 17 Fla. Supp. 102 (Fla. Super. Ct. 1961).

Opinion

WILLIAM H. MANESS, Circuit Judge.

This cause is now before the court on various motions and pleadings filed after defendants were ordered to show cause why they should not surrender possession of certain improved property occupied by them as their home since 1950 to one T. Ha-good Gooding, the named purchaser at a foreclosure sale of the said property or why a writ of assistance should not be issued pursuant to Gooding’s application therefor. All such motions and pleadings raise the same question, to-wit — the right of Gooding to possession as the one to whom the clerk has issued a certificate of title as against defendants who challenge the legality of the foreclosure sale, claim homestead rights therein which have not been destroyed, assert the inadequacy of the amount bid for the property and who offer full restitution to Gooding.

[104]*104From the testimony presented before the court, and the record herein, it clearly appears that proper service of process was made upon both defendants and that they failed to appear in proper person or through counsel and defend the foreclosure suit. In due course a decree pro confesso was entered against both and without further notice a final decree of foreclosure was entered upon proper proof in affidavit form for $783.29. The decree further provided that — “If the aforesaid total sum(s) ... are not forthwith paid ... that the clerk should sell the property . .. at public sale, within the legal hours of sale on Monday, February 20, 1961, to the highest and best bidder for cash at the front door of the Duval County Courthouse ...” No notice of this decree or demand for payment was communicated to defendants. The “Notice of Sale” was published one time in the language quoted above.

The Duval County Courthouse has four public entrances. The largest, and by far the one used by the greatest amount of traffic, bears the name “Duval County Courthouse” over the five glass doors leading to a main lobby which is approximately 28 feet wide and 75 feet long leading to a bank of three elevators, faces north and is directly accessible to pedestrians from Bay St. This will be referred to as the “main entrance”. In addition there is an entrance with three glass doors also facing north (Bay St.) near the westerly end of the building which is accessible only by a paved walk from Market St. which borders the west end of the courthouse property. In addition there is a 2-door entrance facing the St. Johns River to the south and a 2-door entrance facing Liberty St. on the east.

Pursuant to the order of this court and the “Notice of Sale”, a few minutes after 11 A. M. on February 20, 1961, one C. W. Martin, deputy clerk of this court, walked to a point at the east wall of the lobby of the main entrance, a few paces from the easternmost door (inside the building) where he read the “Notice of Sale” in a conversational tone (with no loud outcry or special effort to attract attention) and called for bids. The plaintiff’s attorney bid $788.29 and T. Hagood Gooding bid $789. (These two persons, and the clerk, were the only persons present at the sale. Gooding learned of the sale from reading the notice in the Financial News and had learned from plaintiff’s counsel the exact time the sale would be held). There were no other bids. Gooding did not have the cash with him to meet his bid and the deputy clerk, with approval of plaintiff’s counsel, permitted Gooding to go to the bank and obtain a cashier’s check for his bid. Gooding returned before 2 P. M. and delivered a cashier’s check to the clerk for $789, for which the clerk subsequently issued a certificate of title without further formalities.

[105]*105At the time of the foreclosure sale the property was sold subject to a first mortgage on which there remained a balance unpaid of approximately $4,400; that mortgage was in default but Gooding paid the two delinquent payments of $45 each; in addition the United States held a judgment against defendants herein for an FHA improvement loan in the original sum of $660.09 plus interest at 6 per cent from June 18, 1959, which judgment this court assumes, but expressly does not adjudicate, to be a lien enforceable against this property; the fair market value of said property for cash at time of sale and now is $7,000, and for a credit sale could have been sold for $8,500. The original VA mortgage on said property was in the sum of $7,150; it is still occupied by the original mortgagors-owners (defendants herein) and their three children; it is located in the city limits of the city of Jacksonville and is generally known as 1651 McMillian St.; the lot size is less than one-half acre and is “homestead property” within the meaning of the constitution of the state of Florida relating to exemptions from forced sale.

The sum paid by Gooding is still in the registry of the court and defendants, through their counsel, have offered to promptly reimburse Gooding for all sums paid by him to the holder of the first mortgage, pay the sums due under the final decree or otherwise do what equity requires under the circumstances to set aside the certificate of title and the foreclosure sale.

It is further undisputed that the defendant-wife, Annette E. Hill, (who is a co-tenant by the entirety) did not, in fact, sign the note and mortgage, herein sued upon and foreclosed, in the presence of the two purported witnesses shown on said documents and did not in fact acknowledge said mortgage before the notary public as shown thereon; that in fact said defendant signed such note and mortgage in the kitchen of her home at the request of her husband who represented to her only that he was “putting up the furniture” for such loan; that these two documents were given to the defendant-husband by an officer or employee of plaintiff corporation with directions to get his wife’s signature thereon and were witnessed and acknowledged under the supervision of an officer or employee of the plaintiff corporation who in fact knew, or should have known, that as to the purported witnesses and acknowledgment as to Annette E. Hill, such purported witnesses and such purported acknowledgment were false, fraudulent, void and of no legal validity. As to defendant Amos Hill, there does not appear that there is any such defect in the execution of such documents.

[106]*106Proper demand has been made upon defendants to surrender the possession of the property in question and such demand has been refused.

The foreclosure procedure followed in this case purports to meet the requirements of section 702.02, Florida Statutes. By its decree, this court ordered possession of the property in question delivered to “the purchaser at the sale”. However, under such proceeding no provision is made for obtaining possession and the purchaser is here proceeding under rule 3.18 of the 1954 rules of civil procedure which, generally speaking, entitles him to a writ of assistance if he is “the purchaser at the sale” but “only on order of the court”. However, notwithstanding the provisions of section 702.02(3) of the statutes that “upon the filing of the certificate of title, the sale shall stand confirmed .. . and title to the mortgaged property shall pass fully and completely to the purchaser named in such certificate . . .”, where, as here, the purchaser applies to the court rendering the decree for the equitable remedy by a writ of assistance, such application is in effect an application for confirmation of the sale and such confirmation is a condition precedent to the issuance of the writ.

The courts of Florida follow the general rule set forth in 7 C.J.S.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
17 Fla. Supp. 102, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/securities-credit-co-v-hill-flacirct4duv-1961.