Securities and Exchange Commission v. Taronis Technologies, Inc.

District Court, M.D. Florida·Decided June 22, 2023·No. 8:22-cv-01939·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:22-cv-1939-TPB-AAS

TARONIS TECHNOLOGIES, INC. (n/k/a BBHC, INC.), TARONIS FUELS, INC., SCOTT DAVID MAHONEY, and TYLER BURNETT WILSON,

Defendant. ______________________________________/

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE This matter comes before the Court on “Defendant Tyler Burnett Wilson’s Motion for Change of Venue,” filed on May 18, 2023. (Doc. 61). Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) filed a response in opposition on June 8, 2023. (Doc. 68). Upon review of the motion, response, court file, and record, the Court finds as follows: Background The SEC initiated this action in the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, in August 2022, asserting claims against two corporate entities, Taronis Technologies, Inc. and Taronis Fuels, Inc., and their executive officers, Scott Mahoney and Tyler Wilson. (Doc. 1).1 Specifically, as to Wilson, the SEC set forth claims against him in 14 of the 24 counts, alleging

1 The Court entered consent judgments against Taronis Fuels, Inc., and Mahoney. (Docs. 32; 33). Mahoney continues to litigate the civil monetary penalties imposed by the SEC. See (Docs. 59; 60; 71). Although the Clerk entered a default against Taronis Technologies, Inc. (Doc. 18), the SEC’s request for a default judgment was denied without prejudice as to Taronis Technologies, Inc. until final resolution of the claims against Wilson. (Docs. 50; 54). that he engaged in securities fraud, accounting violations, the filing of fraudulent or misleading financial reports, and aiding and abetting violations committed by Taronis Fuels, Inc. Initially, Wilson retained counsel to represent him in this matter and moved to dismiss the claims against him, arguing that the complaint represents a shotgun pleading, the SEC

failed to allege a plausible claim of securities fraud, the SEC stated no claim for aiding and abetting liability, the SEC failed to allege a plausible claim that Wilson falsified reports or lied to accountants, and the SEC stated no claim for violation under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 13a-14, for violation of § 304(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, or for control person liability. (Doc. 34).2 Notably absent from Wilson’s motion to dismiss is an argument challenging venue in the Middle District of Florida. Presently, Wilson – a licensed securities attorney – represents himself in this and other matters involving the corporate defendants, including an action to obtain the advancement of legal fees and costs.3 According to Wilson, Taronis Fuels, Inc. began to comply with its

obligations to advance legal fees and costs after Wilson prevailed in an action in the Court of Chancery for the State of Delaware, but all advancement payments ceased in the early fall of 2022. Consequently, Wilson contends that he can no longer afford counsel and must provide and finance his own defense in this matter. As Wilson asserts that he cannot accept the SEC’s prior proposed terms to settle the claims against him, he feels he must continue to defend himself at great personal expense. By the instant motion, Wilson argues that the case should be transferred to the Western District of Washington, Seattle Division, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). (Doc. 61).

2 The motion to dismiss remains under advisement. 3 The SEC indicates that, notwithstanding Wilson’s assertions to the contrary, Wilson is represented by counsel in an ERISA action proceeding in the District Court for the District of Arizona. (Doc. 68, at 2). The SEC responds in opposition, arguing that venue is proper in the Middle District of Florida and consideration of all relevant factors does not support a transfer of venue to the Western District of Washington. Legal Standard

Under § 1404(a), “[f]or the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought […] .” Among others, venue is appropriate in “a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located” and in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) & (2). Section 1404(a) provides discretion for the court to transfer based upon an “individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness” that calls on the court to weigh several case-specific factors. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988)

(quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)). To that end, courts engage in a two-step inquiry to determine whether transfer would be appropriate. Healthe, Inc. v. High Energy Ozone LLC, 533 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1126 (M.D. Fla. 2021). The first step requires the court to look at whether the action could have been brought in the transferee court. Id.; Windmere Corp. v. Remington Prods., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 8, 10 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (citation and internal quotation omitted). In making that determination, courts consider if the court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, if venue is proper there, and if the defendant is amenable to process issuing out of the transferee court. Windmere Corp., 617 F. Supp. at 10 (citation omitted). Once the court determines that an action might have been brought in the proposed transferee court, a case may be transferred under § 1404(a) where the court finds convenience and the interest of justice require transfer based on established public and private factors.4 See Soliman v. Daimler AG, No. 6:09-cv-00947-MSS-KRS, 2010 WL 11506980, at *3 (M.D. Fla.

Jan. 22, 2010); see also Trafalgar Cap. Specialized Inv. Fund (In Liquidation) v. Hartman, 878 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1282 (S.D. Fla. 2012). The plaintiff’s choice of forum receives deference and, as a result, should not be disturbed unless clearly outweighed by other factors. Robinson v. Giamarco & Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253, 260 (11th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted); Healthe, Inc., 533 F. Supp. 3d at 1126 (citation omitted). “Ultimately, transfer can only be granted where the balance of convenience of the parties strongly favors the defendant.” Steifel Lab’y, Inc. v. Galderma Lab’y, Inc., 588 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1339 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (citing Robinson, 74 F.3d at 260). Analysis

Wilson carries the burden of persuading the Court that transfer is appropriate and should be granted. Soliman, 2010 WL 11506980, at *3; see In re Ricoh Corp., 870 F.2d 570, 573 (11th Cir. 1989) (“Thus, in the usual motion for transfer under section 1404(a), the burden

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Securities and Exchange Commission v. Taronis Technologies, Inc., (M.D. Fla. 2023).

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