Securities and Exchange Commission v. Present

District Court, D. Massachusetts·Decided March 20, 2018·No. 1:14-cv-14692·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS __________________________________________ ) SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 14-cv-14692-LTS ) HOWARD B. PRESENT, ) ) Defendant. ) )

ORDER ON MOTION FOR ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT (DOC. NO. 357)

March 20, 2018

SOROKIN, D.J. The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) brought a civil enforcement action against Defendant Howard Present for violations of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers Act”) and rules thereunder. Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict on October 5, 2017 in favor of the SEC. Doc. No. 353. Pending before the Court is the SEC’s motion for entry of final judgment. Doc. No. 357. The SEC’s motion is ALLOWED. For the reasons that follow, the Court enjoins Present from future violations of the Advisers Act and orders Present to pay (i) disgorgement in the amount of $10,849,604, (ii) pre-judgment interest on the disgorgement amount, and (iii) a civil penalty in the amount of $1,575,000.

I. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF The SEC urges the Court to enjoin Present permanently from violating the Advisers Act provisions and related rules at issue in this action. Section 209(d) of the Advisers Act provides that, upon a showing that a person has engaged in an act or practice that violates the Act, a permanent injunction “shall be granted without bond.” 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(d). Injunctive relief is appropriate where there is a “reasonable likelihood of recidivism[.]” SEC v. Sargent, 329 F.3d 34, 39 (1st Cir. 2003). In determining whether future violations are reasonably likely, courts consider, among other factors, the nature of the violation (including its “egregiousness and its

isolated or repeated nature”), whether the defendant will be in a position to violate the law again, and whether the defendant has recognized the wrongfulness of his conduct. Id. These factors weigh in favor of injunctive relief. Based on the evidence presented at trial, the Court finds that Present’s conduct was egregious. While AlphaSector was not a sham product (a fact weighing against injunctive relief), Present secured AlphaSector’s success through false statements over a substantial period of time. Far from isolated instances, Present’s misstatements were consistent in message, broadly disseminated, and increasingly bold. Moreover, the false statements multiplied due to Present’s persistent disinterest in whether what he was advertising was truthful. The jury found that Present acted with scienter in the form of recklessness, defined as “an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, which

presents a danger of misleading other persons that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it.” Present’s recklessness lasted for most of the sales life of the AlphaSector strategy. It persisted in the face of pointed inquiry from investment professionals, among others. It arose despite his extensive familiarity with due diligence. Yet, only after Corey Hoffstein and Tom Rosedale raised the specter of legal action in July 2013 did Present inquire into whether the advertised pre-2008 returns were accurate and whether real client assets had in fact followed the strategy before AlphaSector’s inception. Doc. No. 363 ¶ 10. Even now, Present declines to take responsibility for years of misleading clients and potential clients. He fails to understand the wrongfulness of having misrepresented the strategy. See, e.g., Present Affidavit, Doc. No. 363 ¶ 14 (“based on the live performance of the [AlphaSector] Indexes, this was a ‘victimless’ violation”). Further, he blames his violations on

Jay Morton. Id. ¶ 16 (“it was an isolated event, triggered by a third-party’s fraud, and there were never any clients harmed”); id. ¶ 5 (characterizing his violations as “not engaging in enough due diligence to have discovered the truth of the matter”); id. (“my false statements were the direct result of fraudulent statements made to me verbally, in writing, and through contractual language from Jay Morton and his colleagues at NFR”). Nonetheless, Present bears independent, personal responsibility for his own independent conduct. Among other things, he recklessly made repeated false statements that lured cautious investors to trust their savings to an untested product that he represented as battle-hardened through two bear markets. His failure to recognize the harm of his misrepresentations, his sustained willingness to make ever-bolder statements without any support, and his inability to appreciate his own role in misleading investors now all indicate a reasonable likelihood of further violations.1 A permanent injunction is therefore appropriate.2

II. DISGORGEMENT The SEC seeks disgorgement by Present of $11,524,614, representing Present’s earnings from F-Squared after 2009,3 reduced by (i) an annual amount equal to Present’s pre-AlphaSector compensation (approximately $115,000 a year) and (ii) a “percentage arguably attributable to

1 Although Present notes that he has not worked in the securities industry since 2014, Present Aff., Doc. No. 363 ¶ 17, the Court finds it reasonably likely that Present will seek to resume what he characterizes as his “long, unblemished career … in the securities area[,]” id. ¶ 3. 2 In no way does the Court view an injunction as punishment for Present’s proceeding to trial. 3 28 U.S.C. § 2462 bars disgorgement of payments received more than five years before the SEC’s filing of its enforcement case (here, December 22, 2014). See Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S.Ct. 1635 (2017). continued sales of AlphaCycle,” assuming that the AlphaCycle product would have sustained F- Squared absent the intervening success of AlphaSector. Doc. No. 358 at 11. As an initial matter, Present contends that disgorgement is a penalty outside of the Court’s equitable authority to order, in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Kokesh that

disgorgement is a penalty for purposes of Section 2462. However, Kokesh’s holding on the scope of Section 2462 does not undermine First Circuit precedent supporting a court’s equitable power to prevent unjust enrichment by ordering disgorgement. See SEC v. Sargent, 329 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 2003) (distinguishing statutory civil penalties, which “are intended to penalize the defendant for illegal conduct,” from equitable disgorgement, which “merely restores a defendant to his original position without extracting a real penalty for his illegal behavior” (internal citations omitted)). Moreover, no court has understood Kokesh to call such authority into question. See, e.g., SEC v. Metter, 706 Fed.Appx. 699, 702 (2d Cir. 2017) (addressing Kokesh and upholding disgorgement order); SEC v. Jammin Java Corp., 2017 WL 4286180 at *2-4 (declining “to upset decades of settled jurisprudence” supporting courts’ equitable power to order

disgorgement). This Court likewise concludes that its equitable power to order disgorgement remains intact. The Court has discretion to enter an order of disgorgement in an amount reflecting “a reasonable approximation of the profits causally connected to” Present’s violations. SEC v. Happ, 392 F.3d 12, 31 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).

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