Securities and Exchange Commission v. Paulo Fernando De Bastos

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedFebruary 12, 2024
Docket23-12900
StatusUnpublished

This text of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Paulo Fernando De Bastos (Securities and Exchange Commission v. Paulo Fernando De Bastos) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Paulo Fernando De Bastos, (11th Cir. 2024).

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 23-12900 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 02/12/2024 Page: 1 of 3

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-12900 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus RBF TRUST LLC, a Florida company, et al.,

Defendants,

PAULO FERNANDO DE BASTOS,

Defendant-Appellant, USCA11 Case: 23-12900 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 02/12/2024 Page: 2 of 3

2 Opinion of the Court 23-12900

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 0:22-cv-61831-AHS ____________________

Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: The Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction is GRANTED. Paulo Fernando De Bastos appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion for deposition via videoconference. The SEC argues that the court’s order was not a final order or an appealable inter- locutory order because it was a pretrial discovery order not subject to immediate appeal, De Bastos’s interest in a remote deposition was merely a preference, and the order was not certified for inter- locutory review. We agree. We lack jurisdiction to review the court’s order denying De Bastos a remote deposition because it did not end the litigation on the merits, and it is therefore not final and appealable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; World Fuel Corp. v. Geithner, 568 F.3d 1345, 1348 (11th Cir. 2009); Rouse Constr. Int’l, Inc. v. Rouse Constr. Corp., 680 F.2d 743, 745 (11th Cir. 1982). Additionally, the order is not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine be- cause De Bastos may raise arguments about the court’s denial of his motion to appear remotely for his deposition after a final USCA11 Case: 23-12900 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 02/12/2024 Page: 3 of 3

23-12900 Opinion of the Court 3

judgment is issued in the case. See Plaintiff A v. Schair, 744 F.3d 1247, 1252-53 (11th Cir. 2014); Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1985) (stating that the collateral order doctrine is narrow, and its “reach is limited to trial court orders affecting rights that will be irretrievably lost in the absence of an immediate ap- peal”). Accordingly, De Bastos’s appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

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Related

World Fuel Corp. v. Geithner
568 F.3d 1345 (Eleventh Circuit, 2009)
Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller Ex Rel. Koller
472 U.S. 424 (Supreme Court, 1985)
A v. Richard Wayne Schair
744 F.3d 1247 (Eleventh Circuit, 2014)

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Bluebook (online)
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Paulo Fernando De Bastos, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/securities-and-exchange-commission-v-paulo-fernando-de-bastos-ca11-2024.