Securities and Exchange Commission v. George Wallace Stewart, et al.; Allen B. Gottlieb, Phyllis J. Gottlieb, individually and as guardian of Jesse H. Gottlieb v. Alexander Eisemann

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 29, 2026
Docket1:98-cv-02636
StatusUnknown

This text of Securities and Exchange Commission v. George Wallace Stewart, et al.; Allen B. Gottlieb, Phyllis J. Gottlieb, individually and as guardian of Jesse H. Gottlieb v. Alexander Eisemann (Securities and Exchange Commission v. George Wallace Stewart, et al.; Allen B. Gottlieb, Phyllis J. Gottlieb, individually and as guardian of Jesse H. Gottlieb v. Alexander Eisemann) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Securities and Exchange Commission v. George Wallace Stewart, et al.; Allen B. Gottlieb, Phyllis J. Gottlieb, individually and as guardian of Jesse H. Gottlieb v. Alexander Eisemann, (S.D.N.Y. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Securities and Exchange Commission, Plaintiff, 98-CV-02636 (LAP)

-against- ORDER George Wallace Stewart, et al., Defendants.

Allen B. Gottlieb, Phyllis J. Gottlieb, individually and as guardian of Jesse H. Gottlieb, 25-CV-9195 (LAP) Plaintiffs,

ORDER -against- Alexander Eisemann, Defendant.

LORETTA A. PRESKA, Senior United States District Judge: Previously, this Court ordered the parties in the above- captioned actions, 98-CV-2636 (the “SEC Action”) and 25-CV-9195 (the “Malpractice Action”), to appear for oral argument on February 10 and address any pending motions in the Malpractice Action. (Malpractice Action Dkt. 86.) Mr. Gottlieb now insists that this Court is “without judicial authority” to proceed with the February 10 hearing. (See Ex. A.) This Order collectively addresses Mr. Gottlieb’s request to cancel the February 10 hearing and various jurisdictional arguments raised by Mr. Gottlieb.1 To that end, the Court liberally construes Mr. Gottlieb’s various submissions as three separate motions, all of which are without merit. A. Gottlieb’s Motions to Transfer First, Mr. Gottlieb appears to rehash his longstanding argument that the Malpractice Action and a prior related litigation

initiated by the Gottliebs, 15-CV-9568 (the “2015 Action”), were improperly transferred to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).2 The Court construes this as a motion to return the cases to the district courts in which the Gottliebs originally filed. Mr. Gottlieb’s extensive arguments against transfer of those cases were considered and rejected by the original district judges in those cases, (2015 Action Dkt. 37; Malpractice Action Dkt. 72), and the transfer of the 2015 Action that Mr. Gottlieb continues to

1 Because Mr. Gottlieb’s unsolicited submissions in the SEC Action fail to comply with his filing bar, see SEC Action Dkt. 632, the Court is not required to consider such submissions. Nonetheless, the Court will consider certain otherwise-barred submissions to guide its interpretation of arguments raised by Mr. Gottlieb in the Malpractice Action.

2 See Ex. A. (“There still remains a pending motion at Docket #634, Motion to dismiss Phyllis’s Transferred Florida case 15-cv-23309 (Scola) wrongly being heard with case 98-cv-2636 (LAP) per Rule 60(b)(4) for lack of New York Jurisdiction . . . .”); SEC Action Dkt. 634 at 3 (“[C]ase 15-CV-23309 (Scola), U.S. District Court for Southern Florida was wrongfully transferred to New York without personal jurisdiction and/or subject matter jurisdiction over Phyllis . . . .”). collaterally attack was affirmed by the Court of Appeals long ago. Gottlieb v. SEC, 723 F. App'x 17, 20 (2d. Cir. 2018). The Court will not permit Mr. Gottlieb to relitigate the 2015 Action through the instant Malpractice Action. As to the transfer of the Malpractice Action, the Court agrees with the findings of Judge Mendoza, (see Malpractice Action Dkt. 72), who found that transfer

to this district was proper under § 1404(a). Any motion to re- transfer the Malpractice Action to the Middle District of Florida is without merit. Finally, Mr. Gottlieb’s suggestion that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Gottliebs in any of these transferred actions is equally meritless. “There is no requirement under § 1404(a) that a transferee court have jurisdiction over the plaintiff or that there be sufficient minimum contacts with the plaintiff; there is only a requirement that the transferee court have jurisdiction over the defendants in the transferred complaint.” Manchin v. PACS Grp., Inc., No. 24-CV-8636 (LJL),

2025 WL 1276569, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2025) (cleaned up). “In other words, there is no due process concern, at least to the level of requiring minimum contacts with the new forum, for plaintiff when a case is transferred under § 1404(a), because the plaintiff chose to initiate the litigation and in no sense is plaintiff unilaterally being haled into court to defend.” Id. (emphasis added). That is precisely the case here. The Gottliebs chose to file the 2015 and Malpractice Actions; they cannot now complain that this Court lacks jurisdiction merely because they are unhappy with how the cases have proceeded. B. Gottlieb’s Motions For Recusal Mr. Gottlieb also objects that the Malpractice Action was designated as related to Mr. Gottlieb’s prior litigations and

assigned to this Court per this District’s standard case assignment protocol. Mr. Gottlieb has suggested that (i) the Court is biased against Mr. Gottlieb; and (ii) this Court has a “conflict of interest” because of the prior proceedings against Mr. Gottlieb that make the Court a “witness” in the ongoing Malpractice Action. The Court liberally construes this as a motion for recusal. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)(“Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”); § 455(b)(5)(iv)(extending disqualification where the judge (“[i]s to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness in the

proceeding”) (emphases added). Neither prong warrants recusal. First, Mr. Gottlieb offers no evidence that the Court cannot hear this case in an impartial manner in the wake of the prior litigations that Mr. Gottlieb has pursued. Rather, Mr. Gottlieb recycles unsubstantiated allegations that the Court suffers from “Gottlieb derangement syndrome” on account of its prior rulings. (SEC Action Dkt. 634 at 24.) This rehashes the same argument that the Court of Appeals summarily rejected eight years ago. Gottlieb, 723 F. App'x at 19–20 (“Gottlieb's principal argument (that Judge Preska was biased because of her involvement with [the SEC Action]) does not raise any question of Judge Preska's impartiality for an objective observer.”). To the extent that Gottlieb makes new allegations, Section 455(a) “does not compel disqualification

simply on unfounded innuendo concerning the possible partiality of the presiding judge.” Barnett v. United States, No. 11 CIV. 2736 LAP, 2012 WL 1003594, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2012). Regardless of how the Court has ruled against the Gottliebs in the past, the Court is determined to ensure that the Gottliebs, as with all litigants before this Court, are accorded fair and impartial treatment. In any event, prior rulings are not a basis for recusal. Ezekwo v. (Off. of Pro. Misconduct) New York, No. 21- CV-1274 (LTS), 2021 WL 3146239, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2021). As to Mr. Gottlieb’s allegation that this Court may be a witness in the Malpractice Action, “an assertion that a judge will

be a material witness does not lead automatically to disqualification.” Adrian v. Mesirow Fin. Structured Settlements, LLC, 588 F. Supp. 2d 216, 219 (D.P.R. 2008) (citing U.S. v. Rivera, 802 F.2d 593, 601 (2d Cir. 1986)). Indeed, the Court is skeptical that such an issue could ever arise given that the Federal Rules expressly preclude the parties from calling this Court as a witness. See Fed. R. Evid. 605. It is also well-settled that “a judge is not required to recuse when there are other available witnesses that could provide the same testimony as that judge.” Arrowood Indem. Co. v. City of Warren, Mich., 54 F. Supp. 3d 723, 728 (E.D. Mich. April 22, 2014) (collecting cases).

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Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co.
459 U.S. 56 (Supreme Court, 1982)
United States v. John Frank Rodgers
101 F.3d 247 (Second Circuit, 1996)
Adrian v. Mesirow Financial Structured Settlements, LLC
588 F. Supp. 2d 216 (D. Puerto Rico, 2008)
Arrowood Indemnity Co. v. City of Warren
54 F. Supp. 3d 723 (E.D. Michigan, 2014)

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Securities and Exchange Commission v. George Wallace Stewart, et al.; Allen B. Gottlieb, Phyllis J. Gottlieb, individually and as guardian of Jesse H. Gottlieb v. Alexander Eisemann, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/securities-and-exchange-commission-v-george-wallace-stewart-et-al-allen-nysd-2026.