NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 27 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE No. 23-55364 COMMISSION, D.C. No. Plaintiff-Appellee, 2:20-cv-08985-FWS-DFM
v. MEMORANDUM* FRANK O. EKEJIJA,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
PATRICK JEVON JOHNSON; et al.,
Defendants.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE No. 23-55365 COMMISSION, D.C. No. Plaintiff-Appellee, 2:20-cv-08985-FWS-DFM
v.
FRANK O. EKEJIJA,
NVC FUND, LLC,
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Defendant-Appellant,
PATRICK JEVON JOHNSON,
Defendant,
CHARLES EVERETT, AKA Charly Everett,
Defendant.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE No. 23-55395 COMMISSION, D.C. No. Plaintiff-Appellee, 2:20-cv-08985-FWS-DFM
FRANK O. EKEJIJA; et al.,
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Fred W. Slaughter, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 27, 2025**
2 San Francisco, California
Before: FRIEDLAND, BENNETT, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
These consolidated cases stem from a civil enforcement action brought by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) against Appellants for violations of
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq., and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. After granting summary judgment against Charles
Everett (and denying his motion for reconsideration) and entering default judgments
against Frank Ekejija and NVC Fund, LLC (“NVC Fund”), the district court entered
final judgments against Appellants. Everett and Ekejija appeal pro se, and Ekejija
also purports to appeal on behalf of NVC Fund. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm in appeals No. 23-55395 (Everett) and No. 23-55364
(Ekejija) and dismiss appeal No. 23-55365 (NVC Fund).
1. Everett appears to argue that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment for the SEC because all the claims against him required the SEC
to prove that there was injury to a person, damage to property, or breach of a contract
with the SEC. But none of the claims required such proof. See SEC v. CMKM
Diamonds, Inc., 729 F.3d 1248, 1255 (9th Cir. 2013) (identifying elements to prove
a violation of section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e); Gebhart v.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
3 SEC, 595 F.3d 1034, 1040 n.8 (9th Cir. 2010) (identifying elements to prove a
section 10(b) claim, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), or Rule 10b-5 claim, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-
5, and noting that the SEC need not prove loss causation or economic loss); SEC v.
Dain Rauscher, Inc., 254 F.3d 852, 855 n.2, 855–56 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing
elements to prove a violation of section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77q(a)).
Everett also accuses the SEC and the district court of various violations,
including statutory violations. The alleged violations appear to be based on these
underlying premises: (1) the district court and SEC are illegitimate and thus lack any
governmental authority; (2) it was improper for the SEC to bring an investigation
and an enforcement action; (3) the district court was biased and colluded with the
SEC; and (4) the district court and the SEC are “foreign agents” under the Foreign
Agents Registration Act of 1938, 22 U.S.C. § 611 et seq.
Even assuming that the alleged violations are properly brought in this appeal
and could amount to reversible error, the underlying premises on which they are
based are meritless. Congress established the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California and the SEC. 28 U.S.C. § 84(c); 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a). Under
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the SEC is
authorized to investigate and bring enforcement actions, and the district courts have
jurisdiction over such actions. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(a)–(b), 77t(d)(1), 77v(a), 78u(a)(1),
4 78u(d)(1), 78u(d)(3)(A), 78u(e), 78aa(a). Everett identifies no specific facts
supporting his conclusory statements that the SEC’s investigation or enforcement
action was improper, or that the district court and SEC meet the statutory definition
of an “agent of a foreign principal” under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22
U.S.C. § 611(c). Similarly, Everett’s claim that the district court was biased and
colluded with the SEC is unsupported and contrary to the facts in the record. Everett
appears to rely only on the fact that the district court ruled against him. But “judicial
rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a [claim of] bias.” Liteky v.
United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).
Other than the above meritless arguments, Everett makes no discernible
argument about how the district court erred in granting summary judgment against
him, imposing remedies on him, or denying his motion for reconsideration. He has
therefore abandoned any challenge to those determinations. See Acosta-Huerta v.
Estelle, 7 F.3d 139, 140, 144 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that issues not supported by
argument in a pro se brief are abandoned), as amended (Oct. 8, 1993).
2. Ekejija largely raises the same arguments as Everett. He argues that
there was no evidence of injury to a person, damage to property, or breach of a
contract with the SEC. He also accuses the SEC and the district court of various
violations based on the same underlying premises asserted by Everett. We reject
those arguments for the same reasons discussed above.
5 Ekejija also argues that the district court abused its discretion in striking
certain filings of his. The district court struck the filings because of Ekejija’s
inaction, noncompliance with the local rules, and failure to follow the court’s orders
that directed Ekejija to the relevant rules and advised him of resources available to
pro se parties. There was no abuse of discretion. See United States v. Warren, 601
F.2d 471, 474 (9th Cir.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 27 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE No. 23-55364 COMMISSION, D.C. No. Plaintiff-Appellee, 2:20-cv-08985-FWS-DFM
v. MEMORANDUM* FRANK O. EKEJIJA,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
PATRICK JEVON JOHNSON; et al.,
Defendants.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE No. 23-55365 COMMISSION, D.C. No. Plaintiff-Appellee, 2:20-cv-08985-FWS-DFM
v.
FRANK O. EKEJIJA,
NVC FUND, LLC,
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Defendant-Appellant,
PATRICK JEVON JOHNSON,
Defendant,
CHARLES EVERETT, AKA Charly Everett,
Defendant.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE No. 23-55395 COMMISSION, D.C. No. Plaintiff-Appellee, 2:20-cv-08985-FWS-DFM
FRANK O. EKEJIJA; et al.,
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Fred W. Slaughter, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 27, 2025**
2 San Francisco, California
Before: FRIEDLAND, BENNETT, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
These consolidated cases stem from a civil enforcement action brought by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) against Appellants for violations of
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq., and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. After granting summary judgment against Charles
Everett (and denying his motion for reconsideration) and entering default judgments
against Frank Ekejija and NVC Fund, LLC (“NVC Fund”), the district court entered
final judgments against Appellants. Everett and Ekejija appeal pro se, and Ekejija
also purports to appeal on behalf of NVC Fund. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm in appeals No. 23-55395 (Everett) and No. 23-55364
(Ekejija) and dismiss appeal No. 23-55365 (NVC Fund).
1. Everett appears to argue that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment for the SEC because all the claims against him required the SEC
to prove that there was injury to a person, damage to property, or breach of a contract
with the SEC. But none of the claims required such proof. See SEC v. CMKM
Diamonds, Inc., 729 F.3d 1248, 1255 (9th Cir. 2013) (identifying elements to prove
a violation of section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e); Gebhart v.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
3 SEC, 595 F.3d 1034, 1040 n.8 (9th Cir. 2010) (identifying elements to prove a
section 10(b) claim, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), or Rule 10b-5 claim, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-
5, and noting that the SEC need not prove loss causation or economic loss); SEC v.
Dain Rauscher, Inc., 254 F.3d 852, 855 n.2, 855–56 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing
elements to prove a violation of section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77q(a)).
Everett also accuses the SEC and the district court of various violations,
including statutory violations. The alleged violations appear to be based on these
underlying premises: (1) the district court and SEC are illegitimate and thus lack any
governmental authority; (2) it was improper for the SEC to bring an investigation
and an enforcement action; (3) the district court was biased and colluded with the
SEC; and (4) the district court and the SEC are “foreign agents” under the Foreign
Agents Registration Act of 1938, 22 U.S.C. § 611 et seq.
Even assuming that the alleged violations are properly brought in this appeal
and could amount to reversible error, the underlying premises on which they are
based are meritless. Congress established the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California and the SEC. 28 U.S.C. § 84(c); 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a). Under
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the SEC is
authorized to investigate and bring enforcement actions, and the district courts have
jurisdiction over such actions. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(a)–(b), 77t(d)(1), 77v(a), 78u(a)(1),
4 78u(d)(1), 78u(d)(3)(A), 78u(e), 78aa(a). Everett identifies no specific facts
supporting his conclusory statements that the SEC’s investigation or enforcement
action was improper, or that the district court and SEC meet the statutory definition
of an “agent of a foreign principal” under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22
U.S.C. § 611(c). Similarly, Everett’s claim that the district court was biased and
colluded with the SEC is unsupported and contrary to the facts in the record. Everett
appears to rely only on the fact that the district court ruled against him. But “judicial
rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a [claim of] bias.” Liteky v.
United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).
Other than the above meritless arguments, Everett makes no discernible
argument about how the district court erred in granting summary judgment against
him, imposing remedies on him, or denying his motion for reconsideration. He has
therefore abandoned any challenge to those determinations. See Acosta-Huerta v.
Estelle, 7 F.3d 139, 140, 144 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that issues not supported by
argument in a pro se brief are abandoned), as amended (Oct. 8, 1993).
2. Ekejija largely raises the same arguments as Everett. He argues that
there was no evidence of injury to a person, damage to property, or breach of a
contract with the SEC. He also accuses the SEC and the district court of various
violations based on the same underlying premises asserted by Everett. We reject
those arguments for the same reasons discussed above.
5 Ekejija also argues that the district court abused its discretion in striking
certain filings of his. The district court struck the filings because of Ekejija’s
inaction, noncompliance with the local rules, and failure to follow the court’s orders
that directed Ekejija to the relevant rules and advised him of resources available to
pro se parties. There was no abuse of discretion. See United States v. Warren, 601
F.2d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Only in rare cases will we question the exercise of
discretion in connection with the application of local rules.”).
Other than the above unavailing arguments, Ekejija makes no discernible
argument about how the district court erred in entering default judgment against him,
imposing remedies on him, or issuing its other rulings. He has therefore abandoned
any challenge to those determinations. See Acosta-Huerta, 7 F.3d at 144.
3. Our court previously entered an order informing Ekejija that NVC
Fund’s appeal may be dismissed if no counsel filed a notice of appearance for NVC
Fund. No. 23-55365, Dkt. No. 4; see United States v. High Country Broad. Co., 3
F.3d 1244, 1245 (9th Cir. 1993) (“A corporation may appear in federal court only
through licensed counsel.”). Ekejija, a non-attorney, may not represent NVC Fund.
C.E. Pope Equity Tr. v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Although
a non-attorney may appear in propria persona in his own behalf, that privilege is
personal to him. He has no authority to appear as an attorney for others than
himself.” (citation omitted)). For that reason, we deny Ekejija’s “Motion for
6 Joinder,” which appears to be an attempt to represent NVC Fund. No. 23-55395,
Dkt. No. 13; No. 23-55364, Dkt. No. 12; No. 23-55365, Dkt. No. 12. Because no
attorney has entered an appearance for the entity, we dismiss NVC Fund’s appeal.
No. 23-55395: AFFIRMED.
No. 23-55364: AFFIRMED.
No. 23-55365: DISMISSED.