Secor v. Singleton

U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Missouri

Secor v. Singleton

9 F. 809, 3 McCrary's Cir. Ct. Rpts 230, 1881 U.S. App. LEXIS 2556

CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Missouri

DecidedDecember 6, 1881

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 9 F. 809 (Secor v. Singleton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Secor v. Singleton, 9 F. 809, 3 McCrary's Cir. Ct. Rpts 230, 1881 U.S. App. LEXIS 2556 (circtedmo 1881).

Pincite

Opinion

Treat, D. J.

A so-called demurrer was filed to the amended bill in this case on April 1, 1880, not in conformity with rule 31, United States supreme court. The plaintiff might have moved, therefore, more than a year ago, for a decree pro confesso as to said demur-rants. That so-called demurrer is now submitted and overruled. An examination of the case satisfies the court that if said demurrer had conformed to the rules, it would not have been well taken. It was interposed, obviously, for mere delay, inasmuch as the only legal question involved had been decided, as set out' in the bill, (65 Mo. 123,) adversely; which decision this court recognizes as conclusive on a question of state taxation.

To the amended bill, filed January 7, 1880, only one answer has been filed, which is a general denial, couched in the form of an answer to a law action in the state court, and not sworn to. No replication thereto has been filed; so the case has been suffered to float. More than a year ago the plaintiff could have had, by proper motion, a decree pro confesso: (1) Because the so-called demurrer was no demurrer in conformity with the rules of the supreme court; and, even if it were, it was. not well taken, under the conclusive rulings of the supreme court of Missouri. (2) Several of the defendants had interposed no answer to the amended bills. (3) The only defendant purporting to answer, interposed merely a general denial to the allegations of the bill, to which there should, possibly, have been a pro forma replication. Such practice as a general denial in form of a general issue is wholly unknown in equity; and, whether allowable or not, the case might have been set down for hearing on the pleadings, with such evidence as had been presented within the time prescribed for taking the same. If such a denial as to- Holliday puts the party to a formal replication and proofs, the said defendant could, on motion, have the case dismissed as to him. But the manner in which these faulty proceedings have been pursued induces the court to permit, on terms, further action to be had, so far as the same may pertain to the merits, and no further.

The demurrer will be overruled, at the cost of the demurrants. Plaintiffs may take such further action as they may deem necessary.

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Treat, D. J.

A so-called demurrer was filed to the amended bill in this case on April 1, 1880, not in conformity with rule 31, United States supreme court. The plaintiff might have moved, therefore, more than a year ago, for a decree pro confesso as to said demur-rants. That so-called demurrer is now submitted and overruled. An examination of the case satisfies the court that if said demurrer had conformed to the rules, it would not have been well taken. It was interposed, obviously, for mere delay, inasmuch as the only legal question involved had been decided, as set out' in the bill, (65 Mo. 123,) adversely; which decision this court recognizes as conclusive on a question of state taxation.

To the amended bill, filed January 7, 1880, only one answer has been filed, which is a general denial, couched in the form of an answer to a law action in the state court, and not sworn to. No replication thereto has been filed; so the case has been suffered to float. More than a year ago the plaintiff could have had, by proper motion, a decree pro confesso: (1) Because the so-called demurrer was no demurrer in conformity with the rules of the supreme court; and, even if it were, it was. not well taken, under the conclusive rulings of the supreme court of Missouri. (2) Several of the defendants had interposed no answer to the amended bills. (3) The only defendant purporting to answer, interposed merely a general denial to the allegations of the bill, to which there should, possibly, have been a pro forma replication. Such practice as a general denial in form of a general issue is wholly unknown in equity; and, whether allowable or not, the case might have been set down for hearing on the pleadings, with such evidence as had been presented within the time prescribed for taking the same. If such a denial as to- Holliday puts the party to a formal replication and proofs, the said defendant could, on motion, have the case dismissed as to him. But the manner in which these faulty proceedings have been pursued induces the court to permit, on terms, further action to be had, so far as the same may pertain to the merits, and no further.

The demurrer will be overruled, at the cost of the demurrants. Plaintiffs may take such further action as they may deem necessary.

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Bluebook (online)

9 F. 809, 3 McCrary's Cir. Ct. Rpts 230, 1881 U.S. App. LEXIS 2556, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/secor-v-singleton-circtedmo-1881.

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