Second Protestant Reformed Church v. Blankespoor

86 N.W.2d 301, 350 Mich. 347, 1957 Mich. LEXIS 284
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 26, 1957
DocketDocket 34, 35, Calendar 47,186, 47,187
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 86 N.W.2d 301 (Second Protestant Reformed Church v. Blankespoor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Second Protestant Reformed Church v. Blankespoor, 86 N.W.2d 301, 350 Mich. 347, 1957 Mich. LEXIS 284 (Mich. 1957).

Opinion

Dethmers, C. J.

This case is a sequel to First Protestant Reformed Church of Grand Rapids v. DeWolf, 344 Mich 624, hereinafter called First Case. The doctrinal dispute there involved is at the root of this case. There we-spoke of the so-called Hoeksema faction and DeWolf faction. The identical division and alignment exists here. For convenience, we. shall refer to the Schipper group, affiliated with Reverend Hoeksema, and the Blankespoor group, kindred spirits with Reverend DeWolf. The question here is which of the two is entitled to possession and control of the real and personal property of the corporation known as Second Protestant Reformed Church of Grand Rapids, hereinafter called Second Church. Two cases are combined in the presentation of this appeal. In both, Second Church is named party plaintiff. In the one, it is the Schipper group and, in the other, the Blankespoor group, each purporting-to act as Second Church, which brings suit as plaintiff against the minister and Consistory members of the opposing faction. Reverend Blankespoor and his Consistory members prevailed below and, hence, are here as appellees, while the appellants are those of the Schipper group.

Essential to decision is determination of the preliminary question whether the form of government of the denomination in question, the Protestant Reformed Churches of America, is congregational or presbyterian. In other words, is the decision of the majority of the members of Second Church or of its *351 local governing body, namely, its Consistory, on the one hand, or the decision of the majority of the highest governing body of the denomination which has passed on the controversy' controlling with' respect to the religions discipline to which the property shall continue to be dedicated. The trial court, in holding that the latter is controlling and, hence, that the form of government is presbyterial, relied on First Case. In that case the trial court had held to that same effect. In affirming on appeal, we said that the Church Order of this denomination is substantially the same as that of the Christian Reformed Church, under which, in Borgman v. Bultema, 213 Mich 684, we held the form of government of the latter to be presbyterial. Accordingly, in First Case we noted that the powers and functions of the several church judicatories of the Protestant Reformed Churches of America, the denomination here in question, were as set forth and explained in Borgman and in Holwerda v. Hoeksema, 232 Mich 648, with respect to the Christian Reformed Church. Appellees point to the provisions of articles fifth and sixth of Second Church’s articles of association, which, in effect, purport to give control of its property to a majority of the membership of the congregation. In Borgman we held a similar provision in the articles of association was void as an attempt to establish a congregational form of government in a local church which was part of a denomination whose form was presbyterial. Appellees say, however, that Second Church was not incorporated under the special statute involved in Borgman * but under the 1931 general corporation act, of which section 181 (CL 1948, § 450.-181 [Stat Ann §21.182]) provides:

*352 “Every such ecclesiastical corporation shall have authority to adopt bylaws prescribing * * * how far such corporation shall be subject to the approval or control of any other corporation or higher church body which corporation or body shall be named.”

Appellees urge that this provision of the statute authorizes and validates the mentioned provisions of .articles fifth and sixth of Second Church’s articles of association. We do not agree. The quoted statutory provision authorizes bylaws prescribing how far the corporation shall be subject to the approval or control of a named higher church body. The fourth article of Second Church’s articles of association does so prescribe by providing that:

“Fourth, The members of said church or society shall worship and labor together according to the discipline, rules and usage of the Protestant Reformed Church in the United States of America as from time to time authorized and declared by the Church Order of the Protestant Reformed Churches.”

The combined effect of the provisions of section 181 of the statute and of the fourth article of association is to place this local church in the same relationship to the denomination and to its higher church bodies as was the case in Borgman. Consequently, as in Borgman, the provision in the articles of association for congregational control must be held to be inconsistent with the controlling Church Order of the denomination and, hence, void. The form of government of this denomination is presbyterial. Applicable, therefore, is the following, quoted in our opinion in Borgman (p 705), from Fuchs v. Meisel, 102 Mich 357, 373, 371 (32 LRA 92):

“In the freedom of conscience and the right to worship allowed in this country, the defendants and the members of this church undoubtedly possessed the *353 right to withdraw from it, with or without reason. But they could not take with them, for their own purposes, or transfer to any other. religious body, the property dedicated to and conveyed for the worship of ■ God under the discipline of this religious association; nor could they prevent its use by those who chose to remain in the church, and who represent the regular church organization. If complainants maintain the allegations of their bill, — that they represent the regularly organized body of the church, and are its regular appointees, — they are entitled to the relief prayed.”

Also in point is the following from the syllabus in Hanna v. Malick, 223 Mich 100, quoted in United Armenian Brethren Evangelical Church v. Kazanjian, 322 Mich 651:

“Where the articles of incorporation and the bylaws of a local Orthodox Greek Church, as drafted and adopted by the original incorporators, who were natives of Syria, clearly express the intention to bring the church under the supreme authority and jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Antioch, those who adhere to that declaration of faith and recognized jurisdiction are entitled to the possession, control, and use of its property for its declared purpose as against those seceding from the original organization and seeking to divert its use and control to the jurisdiction of a Holy Bussian Synod or patriarch.”

In view of the above language of this Court, the next question presented is which of the contending parties here adheres to the declaration of faith and recognized jurisdiction of, remained in, and represents the regular organization of Protestant Be-formed Churches of America to which the property was dedicated.

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86 N.W.2d 301, 350 Mich. 347, 1957 Mich. LEXIS 284, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/second-protestant-reformed-church-v-blankespoor-mich-1957.