SEC v. Kevin Duff

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedDecember 4, 2025
Docket24-2254
StatusPublished

This text of SEC v. Kevin Duff (SEC v. Kevin Duff) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
SEC v. Kevin Duff, (7th Cir. 2025).

Opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-2254 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee,

and

KEVIN B. DUFF, Receiver, et al., Appellees,

v.

EQUITYBUILD, INC., et al., Defendants,

APPEAL OF: SHATAR CAPITAL PARTNERS. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:18-cv-05587 — Manish S. Shah, Judge. ____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 4, 2025 — DECIDED DECEMBER 4, 2025 ____________________

BeforeBRENNAN, Chief Judge, and KOLAR and MALDONADO, Circuit Judges. 2 No. 24-2254

KOLAR, Circuit Judge. This appeal concerns the district court’s distribution of proceeds from the sale of two proper- ties in the aftermath of a real estate Ponzi scheme. Victims of the scheme—a group of individual investors and appellant Shatar Capital Partners—both claim priority to those pro- ceeds. We previously decided a similar appeal concerning proceeds from a different set of properties involved in the same Ponzi scheme in SEC v. EquityBuild, Inc., 101 F.4th 526 (7th Cir. 2024) (“EquityBuild I”). Here, as in EquityBuild I, the district court adopted its ap- pointed receiver’s recommended distribution plan, awarding priority in both properties to the individual investors and lim- iting the claimants’ recoveries to their contributed principal, less any distributions previously received from EquityBuild. On appeal, Shatar challenges that decision, arguing that it should have priority because it recorded its mortgages on the properties before the individual investors recorded theirs. But because the district court did not err in determining that when Shatar invested, it was on inquiry notice of the individual in- vestors’ preexisting interests in the properties, we affirm. I. Background We recite the relevant factual and procedural background, including the EquityBuild Ponzi scheme, SEC action, receiv- ership, EquityBuild I, and the individual investors’ and Sha- tar’s investments in the subject properties. 1

1 All facts relevant to this appeal are set forth in this opinion, but more

detailed descriptions of the Ponzi scheme are recounted in EquityBuild I, 101 F.4th at 528–29 and SEC v. EquityBuild, Inc., 2023 WL 2018906, at *1–3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 15, 2023). No. 24-2254 3

A. The EquityBuild Ponzi Scheme From approximately 2010 to 2018, Jerome and Shaun Co- hen ran a Ponzi scheme through their real estate investment companies, EquityBuild, Inc. and EquityBuild Finance, LLC (“EBF”). The scheme began with the Cohens selling promis- sory notes to institutional lenders and individual investors. Each note supposedly represented a fractional interest in a specific real estate property, mostly residences on Chicago’s South Side. The notes entitled investors to 12 to 20% returns on their principal contributions. EquityBuild’s stated business model was straightforward. They pitched high-return promissory notes to investors, rep- resenting that the notes were fully secured by real property. In exchange for their contributions, EquityBuild’s investors could obtain fractional ownership shares in rental properties that EquityBuild would manage—an attractive passive in- vestment with little apparent downside, given that the notes were purportedly secured by the properties. Using investors’ collective funds, the Cohens would pur- chase an income-generating property, creating a mortgagee- mortgagor relationship between EquityBuild, on one hand, and the group of investors for a particular property on the other. EquityBuild would then enter a separate mortgagee- mortgagor arrangement with a third party at a higher interest rate and with a shorter term than traditional mortgages. Eq- uityBuild would retain the difference between the mortgage payments received from the third parties and the interest pay- ments made to the noteholder investors. The Cohens assured their investors that the third parties were qualified borrowers with strong credit, making default 4 No. 24-2254

unlikely. That was false. In reality, EquityBuild secured few third-party buyers, and itself owned most of the properties securing the notes, with some third parties renting. Equi- tyBuild also inflated the properties’ values, collecting on av- erage 47% more from investors than was needed to purchase the properties. That difference allowed the Cohens to retain 15 to 30% of the funds invested. In 2017, as they struggled to make payments on the prom- issory notes, the Cohens shifted away from selling notes and began offering investors stakes in real estate funds, which would pool capital to buy and renovate properties. Again the Cohens promised large returns. But EquityBuild used much of the new fund investors’ contributions to pay off earlier noteholders. And many of the properties the real estate funds invested in were the same properties supposedly securing the earlier noteholders’ investments. By late 2017, investors in more than 1,200 notes still had not been repaid their principal, and EquityBuild owed almost $75 million in delinquent payments. By May 2018, Equi- tyBuild and EBF had less than $100,000 in their accounts. EquityBuild’s activities bore the hallmarks of a Ponzi scheme, in which fraudsters secure funds from new investors to repay earlier investors, creating the illusion of high returns. For example, in the 25-month period from January 2015 to February 2017, the Cohens collected only $3.8 million in rev- enue from the properties while making $14.5 million in inter- est payments to investors. In August 2018, Shaun Cohen ad- mitted in a video emailed to EquityBuild’s noteholders that the company had used later investments to fund interest pay- ments to earlier investors, and the business structure was no longer sustainable. No. 24-2254 5

B. SEC Action and Equitable Receivership In August 2018, the Securities and Exchange Commission brought an enforcement action alleging that the Cohens, through EquityBuild and EBF, violated various provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities Act of 1933. Days later, the SEC obtained a temporary restraining or- der against the Cohens that froze their assets and halted Eq- uityBuild’s operations. The district court appointed a receiver and directed him to develop a plan to recover and liquidate EquityBuild’s assets for the benefit of the victims. Soon after, EquityBuild entered a consent judgment with the SEC, acknowledging the scheme. The receiver identified the properties owned by EquityBuild and presented the district court with his proposed liquidation plan. The receiver organized those properties into ten groups to facilitate an orderly distribution of funds to victims. C. EquityBuild I EquityBuild I arose from the claims-resolution process for the first of those ten groups: the Group 1 properties. EquityBuild I involved a private lender, BC57, LLC, that loaned about $5.3 million to EquityBuild in 2017 (after Equi- tyBuild had shifted its model from issuing notes to soliciting investments in real estate funds). The loan was secured by five properties on the South Side of Chicago. BC57 believed it had made its loan in exchange for priority mortgages on the five Group 1 properties. But at the time of BC57’s loan, those properties were already owned by EquityBuild and were sub- ject to preexisting liens held by various individual investors. BC57 was defrauded: at the closing of BC57’s investment, EquityBuild supplied it with false payoff letters and releases 6 No. 24-2254

purporting to show that the investment proceeds would pay off the existing loans secured by the individual investors’ liens on the five properties. But the individual investors with preexisting liens neither signed the releases nor received the funds contributed by BC57.

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SEC v. Kevin Duff, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sec-v-kevin-duff-ca7-2025.