Sebastian Symeonides v. Trump Ruffin Commercial, LLC, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: October 20, 2025
• Docket: 2:23-cv-00854
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 Case No.: 2:23-cv-00854-JAD-MDC Sebastian Symeonides, 4 Plaintiff Order Granting Motion to Remand and 5 v. Denying without Prejudice All Remaining Motions 6 Trump Ruffin Commercial, LLC, et al., [ECF Nos. 90, 91, 92, 119, 127] 7 Defendants

8 Virginia citizen Sebastian Symeonides sues Trump Ruffin Commercial LLC, its affiliated 9 entities (collectively, “the Hotel defendants”), and Otis Elevator Corporation for injuries he 10 claims he sustained when an elevator malfunctioned at the Trump Hotel in Las Vegas. Otis 11 removed this case from state court under diversity jurisdiction, representing that it was a citizen 12 of New Jersey and Connecticut. Otis’s counsel filed a declaration stating that she spoke with 13 counsel for the Hotel defendants, who “did not represent that any of [those entities had] 14 owners/members” who were citizens of Virginia or Nevada and “otherwise did not dispute 15 plaintiff’s contention in the complaint” that they are “foreign to Nevada.”1 So litigation 16 proceeded in this court for approximately two-and-a-half years. After this court ruled on Otis’s 17 summary-judgment motion and directed the parties to file a joint pretrial order, Symeonides filed 18 a motion to remand arguing that the Hotel defendants, three of whom are limited-liability 19 companies, failed to adequately allege the citizenship of their members and thus failed to meet 20 their burden to establish removal jurisdiction.2 21 22

23 1 ECF No. 3 at 2, ¶ 4. 2 ECF No. 127. 1 In response, the Hotel defendants filed an amended certificate of interested parties 2 identifying the citizenship of each member of the defendant LLCs.3 Though none of the 3 defendant members are Virginia citizens, one of the corporations nested within the membership 4 of two defendants—Trump Ruffin Commercial LLC and Trump Ruffin Tower I LLC—is a 5 Nevada corporation.4 In his reply, Symeonides acknowledges that the defendants have shown

6 that complete diversity does exist because none of the members are Virginia citizens.5 But he 7 now argues that the defendants violated the forum-defendant rule, which acts to prevent removal 8 when a defendant is a citizen of the forum state. Otis and the Hotel defendants insist that 9 Symeonides waived any argument based on the forum-defendant rule because it is a procedural 10 defect that must be raised within 30 days of removal.6 Symeonides responds that he is entitled to 11 equitable tolling of that deadline because the Hotel defendants didn’t provide notice of their 12 citizenship until he moved for remand based on their inadequate proof of diversity jurisdiction.7 13 I find that the 30-day deadline to raise procedural defects in removal is subject to the 14 equitable-tolling doctrine, and I apply it here. The Hotel defendants had the obligation to prove

15 their citizenship upon removal in this diversity case. Because they failed to do so, Symeonides 16 only learned of the forum-defendant problem after the Hotel defendants were held to their proof. 17 18 3 ECF No. 131. 19 4 The Hotel defendants’ amended certificate of interested parties identifies the sole member of Trump Ruffin Commercial LLC as Trump Ruffin Tower I, LLC, whose sole member is Trump 20 Ruffin LLC, whose members are Trump Las Vegas Managing Member LLC, Trump Las Vegas Member LLC, and Hyde Park LLC. Trump Las Vegas Member LLC has two members: Trump 21 Las Vegas Corp. and DJT Holdings LLC. Trump Las Vegas Corp. is a Nevada corporation. Id. at 2–3. 22 5 ECF No. 133. 23 6 ECF Nos. 130, 132, 139. 7 ECF No. 133. 1 Under these circumstances, I conclude that Symeonides’s deadline to raise the forum-defendant 2 rule was tolled until the Hotel defendants filed an adequate certificate of interested parties and 3 that this case is subject to remand based on that rule. So I remand this case and deny all pending 4 motions without prejudice to the parties’ ability to refile them in state court. 5 Discussion

6 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2), “a civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of 7 [diversity] jurisdiction . . . may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined 8 and served as defendants is a citizen of the state in which such action is brought.”8 Coined “the 9 forum-defendant rule,” § 1441(b)(2) recognizes that the purpose of diversity jurisdiction “is to 10 protect out-of-state defendants from possible prejudices in state court”—a purpose that doesn’t 11 apply if the defendant is a citizen of the forum state.9 Absent the “need for such protection,” the 12 forum-defendant rule “allows the plaintiff to regain some control over forum selection.”10 Under 13 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), a motion to remand based on the forum-defendant rule “must be made 14 within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal.”11 The forum-defendant rule is

15 procedural, not jurisdictional, and thus can be waived.12 16 17

18 8 Although Symeonides originally filed his remand motion on jurisdictional grounds, the parties agree that the Hotel defendants’ amended certificate of interested parties—which contains, for 19 the first time, the citizenship of each member of each defendant LLC—satisfies the defendants’ burden to show that complete diversity exists. So I focus on the only remaining issue in this 20 remand motion: whether Symeonides can seek remand based on the forum-defendant rule at this juncture. This court ordered surreply briefing on that specific issue. ECF Nos. 138, 139. 21 9 Lively v. Wild Oats Market, Inc., 456 F.3d 933, 940 (9th Cir. 2006). 22 10 Id. 11 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Lively, 456 F.3d at 939 (holding that § 1441(b) violations are subject to 23 § 1447(c)’s 30-day time limit). 12 Lively, 456 F.3d at 940–41. 1 The Hotel defendants acknowledge that one member of a defendant LLC is a Nevada 2 citizen, but they contend that Symeonides waived his right to seek remand on that basis.13 3 Symeonides blew the 30-day deadline by about two years, they argue, so he cannot rely on the 4 forum-defendant rule at this late stage in the proceedings. Symeonides responds that the court 5 should equitably toll that deadline because the Trump defendants failed to correct the record

6 about the citizenship of its LLC members and only did so after he filed his jurisdictional remand 7 motion.14 8 The defendants contend that the Ninth Circuit’s 2006 opinion in Lively v. Wild Oats 9 Market, Inc.15 forecloses Symeonides’s tolling argument.16 In Lively, a state case was removed 10 from California state court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction—the defendant held itself out to 11 be a citizen of Delaware and Colorado.17 But eight months into litigation, the court issued an 12 order to show cause why the case should not be remanded, noting that the defendant’s principal 13 place of business appeared to be California, not Colorado.18 The district court ultimately 14 remanded sua sponte, finding that the defendant had violated the forum-defendant rule.19

15 The Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that the forum-defendant rule is a procedural rule, not 16 a jurisdictional one, and is thus subject to waiver.20 So the panel concluded that the district court 17 18

13 ECF Nos. 130, 139. 19 14 ECF No. 133. 20 15 Lively, 456 F.3d 933. 21 16 ECF No. 139 at 5–6. 17 Lively, 456 F.3d at 936. 22 18 Id. 23 19 Id. at 936–37. 20 Id. at 939–41. 1 exceeded its authority by sua sponte remanding the case since the plaintiff didn’t raise that issue 2 within the 30-day time limit dictated by statute.21 3 The defendants contend that Lively bars applying equitable tolling to § 1447(c)’s 30-day 4 deadline. But Lively does not stand for that proposition. It merely confirmed that procedural 5 defects challenged under § 1447(c) are not jurisdictional, so a plaintiff waives the challenge if he

6 fails to raise it. The Ninth Circuit explained that “[a] procedural characterization of this rule” 7 honors the purpose of the rule—allowing “the plaintiff to regain some control over forum 8 selection”—“because the plaintiff can either move to remand the case to state court within the 9 30-day time limit, or allow the case to remain in federal court by doing nothing.”22 But the 10 Lively court did not address whether that purpose would still be fulfilled if the plaintiff was 11 prevented from learning information that would have supported a remand motion based on the 12 forum-defendant rule until after the 30-day time limit expired. So contrary to the defendants’ 13 assertions, the Ninth Circuit has not directly addressed whether § 1447(c)’s 30-day deadline to 14 raise procedural defects in removal is subject to equitable tolling.23

15 16

17 21 Id. at 942. 22 Id. at 940. 18 23 The Hotel defendants contend that the Lively plaintiff raised the argument that the defendant misrepresented its citizenship in her appellate brief, and because the Ninth Circuit didn’t address 19 that argument, I should presume that it impliedly rejected it. ECF No. 139 at 6. First, that contention drastically overstates the Lively plaintiff’s appellate argument. Though she 20 mentioned the misrepresentation in the background of her appellate brief, her arguments focused solely on whether § 1447(c)’s time limit is jurisdictional and whether the Ninth Circuit had 21 jurisdiction to review the district court’s remand order. See id. at 16–34 (Lively’s appellate brief). Second, the defendants’ misrepresentation was not at issue—the district court’s authority 22 to sua sponte remand to rectify that misrepresentation was the only issue that the Ninth Circuit evaluated. So I do not interpret the Ninth Circuit’s Lively opinion to express any opinion on 23 whether a misrepresentation of citizenship may be grounds to apply equitable tolling when the issue is properly raised by a plaintiff challenging removal after the § 1447(c) deadline lapsed. 1 “Statutory filing deadlines are generally subject to the defenses of waiver, estoppel, and 2 equitable tolling.”24 The United States Supreme Court recently confirmed that “nonjurisdictional 3 timing rules are presumptively subject to equitable tolling.”25 So the Lively court’s finding that 4 § 1447(c) is a nonjurisdictional, waivable time limit actually weighs in favor of concluding that it 5 is also subject to equitable tolling.

6 Several other courts have held that equitable tolling applies to § 1447(c), too. For 7 example, in Olson v. Lui, the District of Hawaii noted that the statute’s 30-day deadline “is not 8 absolute,” citing cases in which courts have tolled the deadline when a removing defendant 9 “fail[ed] to provide notice of the removal to the adverse parties as required under 28 U.S.C. 10 § 1446(d).”26 Because it wasn’t clear that the defendant properly notified one of the plaintiffs in 11 that case, the Olson court tolled the § 1447(c) deadline until the date upon which the plaintiff 12 received proper notice.27 In Nipponkos Ins. Co. v. GlobeGround Services, Inc., the Northern 13 District of Illinois found that, though a procedural challenge to removal must be raised within 30 14 days, because the removing defendant misstated its citizenship, the plaintiff “would still have

15 until 30 days after that information is first disclosed to move for a remand” based on the forum- 16 defendant rule.28 In Roe v. Donohue, the Seventh Circuit assumed “that the 30-day period [under 17 § 1447(c)] is subject to equitable tolling and estoppel, so that a defendant’s misrepresentation 18 19 24 United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 94 n.10 (1985). 20 25 Harrow v. Dep’t of Def., 601 U.S. 480, 489 (2024). 21 26 Olson v. Lui, 2011 WL 5330445, at *6 (D. Haw. Nov. 4, 2011) (citing Byfield v. Niaz, 2011 WL 25705 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2001); Doyle v. Staples, 2000 WL 194685 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 22 2000)); see also Shkolnik v. Citimortgage, Inc., 2011 WL 6001138, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2011) (collecting cases tolling § 1447(c)’s deadline under similar circumstances). 23 27 Id. at *8. 28 Nipponkos Ins. Co. v. GlobeGround Servs., Inc., 2006 WL 2861126 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2006). 1 may be challenged when the truth comes out.”29 And the Western District of Wisconsin held 2 that equitable tolling should apply to § 1447(c) because, if it didn’t, “a cagey defendant could 3 conceal defects in a notice of removal . . . with no consequence once the 30-day limit has 4 passed.”30 5 I adopt the reasoning of those courts and conclude that equitable tolling may apply to

6 extend the 30-day time limit under § 1447(c), and it does here. Otis’s notice of removal 7 indicated that counsel for the Hotel defendants, all of which were properly served at the time of 8 removal, did not contest the assertion that none of their members or owners were Nevada 9 citizens. The Hotel defendants also didn’t comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1’s 10 requirement that all parties in a case based on diversity jurisdiction must “file a disclosure 11 statement” that names “and identif[ies] the citizenship of . . . every individual or entity whose 12 citizenship is attributed to that party” when the action is removed to federal court.31 Indeed, their 13 original certificate provided no citizenship information at all.32 They corrected the misstatement 14 of their citizenship only after Symeonides filed a motion to remand based on the defendants’

15 inadequate proof of diversity jurisdiction. I find that the Hotel defendants’ failure to comply 16 with the rules of this court prevented Symeonides from learning the information that would have 17 permitted him to seek remand within the 30-day time limit. So that limit was tolled to August 4, 18 2025, the date the Hotel defendants filed an amended certificate of interested parties that 19 20

21 29 Roe v. O’Donohue, 38 F.3d 298, 302 (7th Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344 (1999). 22 30 Bank of New York Mellon v. Glavin, 2012 WL 13069923, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 15, 2012). 23 31 Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1(a)(2). 32 See ECF No. 7. 1|| properly identified the citizenship of each member of each defendant LLC.*? And because it is 2|| uncontested that two of those defendants share a member with Nevada citizenship, the forum- defendant rule applies and this case must be remanded back to state court. So I deny all remaining motions without prejudice to the parties’ ability to refile them in state court. 5 Conclusion 6 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Symeonides’s motion to remand [ECF No. 127] is 7||GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to REMAND this case back to the Eighth 8|| Judicial District Court, Department 27, Case No. A-23-868859-C, along with a copy of the 9|| complete public docket sheet for this case and a copy of this order, and CLOSE THIS CASE. 10 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all pending motions [90, 91, 92, 119] are DENIED without prejudice to the parties’ ability to refile them in state court. The Clerk of Court is 12|| directed to MAINTAIN THE SEAL on ECF No. 90. This case returns to state court with no 13]/ motions pending.

US. District Judge Jer(nifgr A. Dorsey 15 October 20, 2025 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 33 Symeonides raised this equitable-tolling issue just a week later. ECF No. 133.