Sebastian Independent School District v. Ballenger

297 S.W.2d 238, 1956 Tex. App. LEXIS 2431
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedDecember 12, 1956
Docket13114
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 297 S.W.2d 238 (Sebastian Independent School District v. Ballenger) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sebastian Independent School District v. Ballenger, 297 S.W.2d 238, 1956 Tex. App. LEXIS 2431 (Tex. Ct. App. 1956).

Opinion

POPE, Justice.

Sebastian Independent School District sued Ethel Ballenger and husband for taxes upon certain real estate, Mrs. Ballenger defeated the suit on the defense that she did not own a taxable interest in the surface estate to the realty. In 1927, C. P. Barreda conveyed the property to Cameron County by an instrument which raised the question as to whether the property is taxable. The instrument is found in the footnote. 1 De< *239 fendant Ethel Ballenger, about 1941, acquired by assignment from C. P. Barreda, the grantor to Cameron County, whatever rights she owns. She ' contends, and the trial court concluded, that she owns no taxable interest in the surface estate. She ad *240 mits, and the trial court correctly found, that she owns a taxable interest in the mineral estate.

The School District relies upon Article 7146 for its contention that defendant’s property is taxable as real estate. Article 7146, Vernon’s Annotated Civil Statutes, reads as follows:

“Real property for the purpose of taxation, shall be construed to include the land itself, whether laid out in town lots or otherwise, and all buildings, structures and improvements, or other fixtures of whatsoever kind thereon, and all the rights and privileges belonging or in any wise appertaining thereto, and all mines, minerals, quarries and fossils in and under the same.”

If the deed conveyed only an easement to Cameron County, then the real property was taxable to the defendants. City of Corpus Christi v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 155 S.W.2d 824.

In construing the deed, we shall look to the whole instrument. Sun Oil Co. v. Burns, 125 Tex. 549, 84 S.W.2d 442. The granting and habendum clauses, in our opinion, convey a determinable fee to the surface, “so long as” the property is used for stated purposes. The opening recitals in the deed that the lands are to be used by the County “solely for the control and carriage of excess flow from the Rio Grande in major floods,” conflict with the granting and habendum clauses as well as several other parts of the deed. The recitals would limit the grantee County to a single use, and yet the deed very clearly intends to define the reserved uses of the grantor to “rights of user only” and “in the nature of a tenancy under the county,” and for “grazing and agricultural purposes.” If the grantor reserved only that and the grantee received only what the recitals declare, what happened to the rest of the surface estate and the many other conceivable surface uses? However, paragraph 6 of the deed manifests an unmistakeable intent that the grantor intended to part with all taxable interest and intended to convey to the County for a public purpose, all real estate which otherwise would be taxable. Under these circumstances, we give effect to the granting and habendum clauses, the intent manifested by paragraph six, and the canon of construction which would confer upon the grantee the greatest estate that the terms of the instrument will permit. Stevens v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co., Tex.Com.App., 212 S.W. 639; Cartwright v. Trueblood, 90 Tex. 535, 39 S.W. 930, 931. When we do that, we conclude that the grantor conveyed the determinable fee. Whatever the grantor reserved, it was not a taxable interest in real estate under Article 7146.

The suit by the School District was for taxes upon real estate by force of assessments and levies made annually since 1941. Because defendant Ethel Ballenger did not own real estate, the court properly denied judgment for the School District. Whether defendant’s use of the lands is taxable under Article 5248, Vernon’s Ann.Civ. Stats., was not decided by the trial court. We find no assessment, levy or facts in this record which support a recovery for taxes by force of Article 5248.

The judgment is affirmed.

1

. “Know All Men By These Presents: That Whereas, the County of Cameron, a political subdivision of the State of Texas, has planned and is now engaged in *239 the construction of a system of flood control works to protect the counties of Cameron and Willacy from floods and overflows from the Rio Grande River, which works it proposes permanently to control and maintain for that purpose, a portion of which, known as its North Ploodway, crosses the lands of the grantor and is to be used by the said County of Cameron solely for the control and carriage of excess flow from the Rio Grande in major floods; and

“Whereas, the grantor has agreed with the said County of Cameron upon a price for his lands necessary to be taken for the construction and maintenance of levees, embankments and other protection works on each side of said North Plood-way, same to be conveyed separately from his lands taken by said floodway proper, (the latter being conveyed without monetary or other specific consideration) the grantor in both cases reserving certain limited rights to the use of the lands conveyed, etc:

“Now, Therefore, in consideration of the premises, the said grantor, C. P. Barreda, a resident of the County of Cameron, State of Texas, has granted, sold and conveyed, and by these presents does grant, sell and convey unto the County of Cameron, all and singular the following described premises, ⅜ ⅜ *.

(Description omitted.)

“To Have And To Hold The said premises, together with all and singular the rights and appurtenances thereto in anywise belonging, unto the said County of Cameron, so long as the same shall be maintained and used by said County as a floodway for the carriage of the excess flow from the Rio Grande River in major floods and controlled by levees, embankments and other protection works on each side thereof, the whole constituting a portion of its said ‘North Plood-way.’

“This conveyance is made upon the following reservations, covenants and limitations, to-wit:

“1. The said County shall, at its own expense, and within a reasonable time hereafter, clear and grub the lands hereby conveyed and erect on each side thereof adequate levees, embankments or other protection works for the confinement and carriage of flood water in said North Ploodway, and thereafter it shall maintain the same in good order and condition.

“2. The grantor reserves the right of prospecting for oil and other minerals, of drilling wells and of extracting the oil and other minerals, at his expense and risk and for his benefit to the extent that same may be done without interference will the use of premises by said County for the purposes for which same are hereby conveyed. This reservation shall operate in favor of the Roxana Petroleum Corporation, its successors and assigns, to the exent of the rights of that corporation under certain oil, gas and sulphur leases from grantor dated March 9, 1926, as amended by later agreement between them dated March SO, 1926.

“3. The grantor reserves the right, in the nature of a tenancy

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Satterlee v. Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Authority
561 S.W.2d 869 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1977)
Coastal States Crude Gathering Co. v. Cummings
415 S.W.2d 240 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1967)
Davis v. Andrews
361 S.W.2d 419 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1962)
Rittimann v. Rittimann
323 S.W.2d 86 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1959)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
297 S.W.2d 238, 1956 Tex. App. LEXIS 2431, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sebastian-independent-school-district-v-ballenger-texapp-1956.