SEAVIEW RETREAT, INC., & Others v. MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION & Another.
This text of SEAVIEW RETREAT, INC., & Others v. MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION & Another. (SEAVIEW RETREAT, INC., & Others v. MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION & Another.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-1272
SEAVIEW RETREAT, INC., & others1
vs.
MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION & another.2
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiffs, Seaview Retreat, Inc., Stephen B. Comley,
II, and Aseda Aborgah, appeal from a Superior Court judge's
order denying their cross motion for relief from judgment of
dismissal under Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b), 365 Mass. 828 (1974).
We affirm.
Background. On or around September 27, 2011, the
defendant, Michele A. Falzone, a former employee of Seaview
Retreat, Inc., filed a complaint against the plaintiffs with the
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD). Falzone
1 Stephen B. Comley, Second, and Aseda Aborgah.
2 Michele A. Falzone. alleged that her employment was terminated in retaliation for
making an internal complaint of sexual harassment after she
overheard another employee make a sexually explicit comment.3
Following an evidentiary hearing, an MCAD "single commissioner"
concluded that the plaintiffs were jointly and severally liable
for retaliation.4 The plaintiffs appealed to the full
commission, which affirmed the decision of the hearing officer.
The plaintiffs then filed a complaint in the Superior Court
seeking judicial review of the final agency decision pursuant to
G. L. c. 30A, § 14, and G. L. c. 151B, § 6, and declaratory
relief under G. L. c. 231A, §§ 1 and 2.
On July 25, 2019, the MCAD filed a copy of the
administrative record of the proceedings. Pursuant to Superior
Court Standing Order 1-96 (4) (2015), the plaintiffs were
required to file a motion for judgment on the pleadings within
thirty days of the filing of the administrative record. The
plaintiffs did not file the required motion within thirty days.
On April 8, 2021, after a status conference, a Superior Court
3 The facts described by the plaintiffs in their appellate brief differ in substance from the facts found by the hearing officer. Determinations of fact and credibility were already made by the single commissioner and have not been challenged on appeal as clearly erroneous.
4 The single commissioner ordered the plaintiffs to pay Falzone $25,000 in damages for emotional distress and $6,940 in damages for back pay.
2 judge extended the deadline to file a motion for judgment on the
pleadings to August 13, 2021. By that time, the plaintiffs
still had not filed the required motion. On October 14, 2021,
the judge issued an order for status review to the parties,
which stated that "if notice is not received by 11/15/2021 the
complaint will be dismissed." The plaintiffs did not respond to
the judge's order. On January 5, 2022, the judge issued another
order that "[t]he clerk will dismiss the case in 30 days absent
written communication from a plaintiff." No plaintiff
responded, and on February 15, 2022, the judge dismissed the
plaintiffs' complaint.
On September 12, 2022, the MCAD filed a motion to issue
separate amended judgments. The plaintiffs filed an opposition
to the motion along with a cross motion for relief from judgment
of dismissal pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b), 365 Mass. 828
(1974), requesting further leave to file a motion for judgment
on the pleadings. In the cross motion, the plaintiffs stated
that their counsel was suffering from "medical issues and
complications exacerbated by the COVID 19 pandemic during the
fall and winter of 2021-2022" and did not receive actual notice
of the October 14, 2021 order for status review. After a
hearing, a Superior Court judge allowed the MCAD's motion for
separate judgments and denied the plaintiffs' motion for relief
from judgment. This appeal ensued.
3 Discussion. The plaintiffs argue that the judge abused his
discretion in denying their cross motion for relief from
judgment of dismissal. "Rule 60 (b) (1) of the Massachusetts
Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the court to grant relief
from judgment in cases of 'mistake, inadvertence, surprise or
excusable neglect.'" Christian Book Distribs., Inc. v. Wallace,
53 Mass. App. Ct. 905, 906 (2001). Alternatively, relief under
rule 60 (b) (6) may be granted "when the vacating of judgment is
justified by some reason other than those stated in subdivisions
(1) through (5)" that presents "extraordinary circumstances"
(citations omitted). Owens v. Mukendi, 448 Mass. 66, 71 (2006).
The party seeking rule 60 (b) relief "bears the burden of
justifying failure to avoid the mistake or inadvertence"
(citation omitted). Tai v. Boston, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 220, 223
(1998). "[T]he denial of a motion under [r]ule 60 (b) will be
set aside only on a clear showing of an abuse of discretion"
(quotation and citation omitted). Atlanticare Med. Ctr. v.
Division of Med. Assistance, 485 Mass. 233, 247 (2020).
The plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate excusable neglect
or extraordinary circumstances warranting relief. The judge was
not required to credit counsel's assertion that he did not
receive notice of the October 14, 2021 order for status review,
as he acknowledged that he had received every other notice from
4 the Superior Court and neither his email nor his office address
had changed.5
Even assuming that counsel for the plaintiffs did not
receive actual notice, he does not deny that he was aware of the
August 13, 2021 deadline to file a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. His stand-alone claim that "medical issues and
complications" prevented him from "personally attending [c]ourt
hearings or appearing in any public venue" does not explain his
failure to file the required motion by the deadline or during
the several months between the deadline and dismissal. While a
failure to receive notice may justify a judge's decision to
exercise their discretion and allow a motion for relief from
judgment, it does not compel a ruling that the judge abused
their discretion in denying such a motion. See Bird v. Ross,
393 Mass. 789, 791 (1985). Indeed, where, as here, counsel was
provided with multiple notices of the Superior Court's intent to
dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint, yet did not respond, we
cannot discern any abuse of discretion. See L.L. v.
Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014) (abuse of
5 During a November 10, 2022 hearing, counsel suggested that emails from the court "sometimes get[] bounced into a spam folder . . . .
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SEAVIEW RETREAT, INC., & Others v. MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION & Another., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/seaview-retreat-inc-others-v-massachusetts-commission-against-massappct-2024.