Seat v. McWhirter

29 S.W. 220, 93 Tenn. 542
CourtTennessee Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 22, 1894
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 29 S.W. 220 (Seat v. McWhirter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Seat v. McWhirter, 29 S.W. 220, 93 Tenn. 542 (Tenn. 1894).

Opinion

McAlister, J.

This hi]] was.filed in the Chancery Court of Montgomery County by Mrs. S. M. Seat to cancel two deeds made by her to the defendants, A. J. and F., P. McWhirter. The grounds of the relief asked are incapacity upon the part of complainant and fraud practiced by the defendants.

The Chancellor found, upon the facts, that no fraud had been practiced by the defendants, but he ordered the deeds canceled, upon the ground that Mrs. Seat did not at the time understand what she had done, but meant to do a wholly different thing.

The complainant, Mrs. S. M. Seat, is the widow of S. B. Seat, who died intestate at Clarksville, Tenn., on Eebruai’y 5, 1893. The defendants, A. J. and E. P. McWhirter, are half-brothers of S. B. Seat, the intestate. The property conveyed in the two deeds from Mrs. Seat to the McWhirters is estimated to he worth about seventy thousand dollars, and consists of an orange grove in Florida, her residence in Clarksville, a pear orchard in Montgomery County, a lot in Clarksville, two tracts of land in Davidson County, and some shares of ■ slock in a turnpike company, and Union Wharf stock. The grounds of relief are thus stated in the bill, viz.:

[544]*544“When, these conveyances were made, she was in much trouble; her husband had been dead less than one week; she was incapable of reasoning intelligently and with any judgment about business matters; was unacquainted with business, having never attended to any before the death of her .husband. ■She was approached by the defendants, in whom ■she had implicit confidence; was told by them that this would be the best way - to wind up the estate of her husband, their brother; they manifested the greatest love and consideration for her, and made 'her believe that they were considering her interests, and were trying to do the best for her. She -did not have the advice of counsel or friends, •apart from these defendants, and did not understand what had been done until after it was all over. She was induced to say, in the conveyances named, that it was the expressed wish of her husband, when, as a matter of fact, no such wish was ■ever expressed by him to her, but she was told this ■by the defendants. These defendants had the paper prepared by their attorney, at his office, and, while it was read over to her, she did not understand it as she now does, and was at the time in•capable of understanding any thing of the magnitude and importance of these transactions. After these papers were prepared, and after they had been put to record, the defendants, evidently con•scious of the wrong that had been done her, came to her again, and said there had been much talk about these transactions, and said they wanted her [545]*545to acknowledge them again in the presence of some gentlemen, and again assured her that it would be best for her; that it was entirely to her interest; that they were interested in her welfare; that they were only trying to carry out the oft-expressed wish of her dead husband, and, to avoid any trouble, it would be well for her to say, in the presence of witnesses, that she was entirely satisfied with what had been done. Up to this time complainant had not fully understood just what had been done. She had not had the advice of an attorney. She did not know her rights in the premises, and would not have understood it ■even if at that time explained to her by a friend.
“ She again states to the Court that never in his life did her husband say to her that, in the event of his death before her, that she should do as the papers executed incited. This was a matter invented and gotten up entirely and wholly by these defendants. They obtained her confidence, as before stated, called her their dear sister, and made her believe that nothing was to be considered but her welfare. Complainant has realized how she has been defrauded and ,imposed upon by the defendants. She has had the transactions and their magnitude explained to her, and she again says to your Honor that all these transactions were at that time entirely misunderstood by her; that she did not know that she was divesting herself of all the property -she had; that she did not know any thing about it in fact, and that she had been de[546]*546ceived, has been defrauded out of nearly one hundred thousand dollars’ worth of property by these defendants, and that she desires the cancellation of these fraudulently obtained conveyances.”

The substance of the answer, as condensed by counsel', is that the property held by Mr. Seat in every capacity was really his; that he never received more than $16,000 of property by or for his wife, the complainant, and all over that Avas his; that he Avas heavily involved in debt,, mostly as surety or indorser, and,- in order' to protect his property, and effect advantageous compromises with his creditors, he covered up his property from the close of the war until about 1890, by assuming to hold it as “trustee” for his wife; that about 1890 or 1891 he had compromised all his debts, and forthwith began to take the property out from under the trust, and had done so as to most of it at the time of his death; that it was Mr. Seat’s wish and desire that the defendants, his only brothers, should have the property — except $7,200 — subject to a life estate for Mrs. Seat in the home-place, furniture, etc., and a proper support out of his estate — that is to say, that she should have the home-place, furniture, horses, coavs, carriage, etc., for life, $7,200 in money, and one-third of the income of all the property. It avers that this desire and purpose of Mr. Seat AArere Avell known to Mrs. Seat, and that she agreed and desired to carry them out; that, in pursuance of that agreement, she did execute the deeds; that she did have competent and hon[547]*547orable counsel, knew what she was doing, and intended and desired to do precisely what she did do; that a few days thereafter, being informed that certain of her expectant heirs were making trouble, and trying to make Mrs. Seat dissatisfied, they went to her, and proposed to make any alteration or change she desired — to cancel the deeds if she preferred; that ^he disclaimed that she was dissatisfied, and expressed no desire for any alteration or change whatsoever; that they left their proposition open, with the understanding that if she desired any change or cancellation, she should notify them, and they would make it; that she gave no notice, but the bill was filed five days thereafter,' their first intimation that she desired any thing being service of process in the case; that they acted throughout in absolute good faith, and did not overreach, mislead, or deceive her in any way; that what she did when she made the deeds was what she ought to have done, what Mr. Seat desired, what she knew he desired, and what she herself desired and intended, to do; and that the case is not her case, but really that of her relatives, the Andersons, who seek in this way to realize the expectations which were disappointed by the making of the two deeds.”

The Chancellor found that Mr. Seat died intestate, having real and personal property in his name as trustee for his wife, the complainant';, that the real estate in Florida descended to Mrs. Seat; that Mrs. Seat ,was old and infirm, and [548]

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Bluebook (online)
29 S.W. 220, 93 Tenn. 542, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/seat-v-mcwhirter-tenn-1894.