Sears v. Merrick

55 N.E. 476, 175 Mass. 25, 1899 Mass. LEXIS 995
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court·Decided December 6, 1899·Published·Cited by 12 cases

Opinion

Loring, J.

The defendants’ testatrix owned a building, called the Brimhall block, situated on the corner of High and Church Streets, in the town of Clinton; these streets run at right angles to each other, High Street running north and south, and Church Street east and west. The front line of the building on each street was-set back from the street line; the whole space from the face of the building to the curbing of the sidewalk was covered with concrete, and presented a uniform appearance, except for the bank or retaining wall just round the corner on Church Street, hereinafter described. On High Street the building was set back fifteen and thirty-four one-hundredths feet, the whole sidewalk being but one foot wider. On Church Street it was set back at the easterly end eleven and seventy-one one-hundredths feet, and at the westerly end ten and twenty-seven one-hundredths feet, the sidewalk outside of the defendants’ concreted area being seven and ninety-one one-hundredths feet in width; that is to say, on High Street the whole sidewalk, including the defendants’ concreted area and that within the side line of the street, was in round figures sixteen and one half feet wide, of which the defendants’ concreted area was fifteen and one half feet, and the town’s area was one foot; and on Church Street the whole sidewalk was twenty feet in width, of which the defendants’ area was twelve feet, and the town’s eight feet.

It is expressly found in the report that at the time of the accident the premises where the accident occurred were owned [28] and controlled by the defendants’ testatrix; that the area in front of her building on High Street, fifteen and one half feet wide, was “ wrought and prepared,” and that in front of her building on Church Street, twelve feet wide, was “ prepared and maintained,” by her; that the sidewalks on both streets, throughout their entire width, were covered with concrete, and presented a uniform appearance, there being nothing to distinguish the part maintained by the town from the part prepared by the defendants’ testatrix, and both parts were used openly and freely for public travel.

The corner of the defendants’ building at the junction of the two streets was rounded so as to admit of a window being placed in the round corner wall so made. There is a sharp descent in the grade of the High Street sidewalk, beginning at a point on the face of the defendants’ building on High Street, a few feet north qf the beginning of the rounded corner, and running thence across the concreted area to the southerly curbstone of the sidewalk of Church Street. Church Street also descends rapidly going west from High Street. The grade of the concreted area next the face of the building on Church Street is lower than the concreted area at the corner of the street; this difference in grade terminates abruptly at the point on Church Street where the curve of the round corner of the building begins. At that point the defendants’ concreted area on Church Street is two feet lower than the defendants’ concreted area on the round corner of the building; the two are separated- by a bank or retaining wall, which is two feet high where it begins on the face of Brimhall block, and which runs southerly toward the south curb of the Church Street sidewalk a distance of six and ninety one-hundredths feet, where it meets the grade of the sidewalk and ends. There was no fence or guard of any kind on this retaining wall.

About eight o’clock in the evening on February 2, 1897, the plaintiff in the first case, with her husband, who was the plaintiff in the second casé, came to Clinton for the first time. They went to the store of Lucius Field and Company, in Brimhall block, on business; the door of this store is on High Street, about forty-seven feet north from the corner of Church Street. On leaving this store they proceeded to walk to a building on [29] Church Street, known as the Dooley building, about one hundred and forty-five feet west from the corner of High Street. The night was dark. The plaintiff in the first case was walking beside her husband, who was on the street side of her and about ten inches distant. When she came to the retaining wall she stepped over it and fell, and was injured thereby; and it is for that injury that these two actions are brought. The point where she stepped over the retaining wall was about a foot from its outer end; that is to say, about six feet from the face of the building of the defendants’ testatrix on Church Street. No question was raised as to the exercise of due care on the part of the plaintiffs.

The defendants contend that the whole situation, the retaining wall, the fence at the west line of the premises of the defendants’ testatrix, and the buildings below coming out to the line of the sidewalk, showed that the open area was not a part of the public street, and effectually negative any implied invitation by the defendants’ testatrix to pass over her land, and that on that ground the ruling of the presiding justice was right.

It appears from the plans and photographs made part of the bill of exceptions that Brimhall block extends on Church Street about one hundred and five feet; then comes a thirteen foot way between Brimhall block and another building of the defendants’ testatrix, called the Courant building, twenty-five feet wide; beyond this building is a building known as the Dooley building, beyond that is an alley way, and beyond the alley way is a wooden building known as the Fitch building. The Courant building is set back on the same line as that of the Brim-hall block, and the Dooley building is set back a little farther still.

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Sears v. Merrick, 55 N.E. 476, 175 Mass. 25, 1899 Mass. LEXIS 995 (Mass. 1899).

55 N.E. 476 (Sears v. Merrick) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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