Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Menegay

907 S.W.2d 72, 1995 WL 572005
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedSeptember 29, 1995
Docket2-94-116-CV
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 907 S.W.2d 72 (Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Menegay) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Menegay, 907 S.W.2d 72, 1995 WL 572005 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).

Opinion

OPINION

LIVINGSTON, Justice.

Michael Menegay (“Mike”) incurred burns over 27% of his body when a propane tank stored under his gas grill exploded. The gas grill was sold by Sears, Roebuck and Company (“Sears”) and manufactured by Sunbeam Corporation (“Sunbeam”). Mike and his wife sued both Sears and Sunbeam on a variety of theories, and the jury returned a verdict in their favor. The jury also found the conduct of Sears and Sunbeam constituted gross negligence. The jury assessed exemplary damages of $140,000 against Sears and $35,000 against Sunbeam. On appeal, Sears and Sunbeam challenge only the award of exemplary damages. We reverse and render the exemplary damage award against Sears and affirm the exemplary damages award against Sunbeam.

In points of error one, two, and three, appellants argue the evidence was legally insufficient to support a finding of gross negligence upon which exemplary damages could be based. Appellants argue in point of error four that it was error for the trial court to admit the video tape deposition testimony of Everett Long (“Long”) because appellees failed to establish that the accident Long testified to was reasonably similar to the accident in this case.

PRIOR ACCIDENTS

Before reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence under points of error one through three, we will address point of error four regarding the admissibility of Long’s deposition. Before evidence of prior accidents can be introduced, the proponents of the evidence must lay a predicate showing that the “earlier accidents occurred under reasonably similar but not necessarily identical circumstances.” Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Cooper, 563 S.W.2d 233, 236 (Tex.1978). An instructive application of this rule can be found in Rush v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 646 S.W.2d 298, 301 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

Rush involved a wrongful death suit based on product liability and negligence claims. Id. at 299. Wesley Rush was a construction worker assigned to disassemble the boom of a crane manufactured by the Bucyrus-Erie Company. Id. While standing under the boom removing the splice pins to disassemble it, the boom fell on Rush and crushed him to death. Id. At trial, plaintiffs sought to introduce evidence of the other incident reports of workmen being killed while standing under the boom disassembling it. Id. The trial court refused to admit the evidence. Id.

The court of appeals reversed the case ordering a new trial because the evidence of other accidents involving workers killed while dismantling similar booms manufactured by the same company with the same type of splice pins was reasonably similar to the accident being litigated to warrant admission. Id. at 301-02. The court in Rush noted, “The requisite degree of similarity is plainly not very high.” Id. at 302 (quoting Mitchell v. Fruehauf Corp., 568 F.2d 1139, 1147 (5th Cir.1978) (citing Magic Chef, Inc. v. Sibley, 546 S.W.2d 851, 855 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).

In his deposition, Long testified that he received a Sunbeam propane gas grill, model 4477W, for Father’s Day in June 1986. Long used the grill many times between the *75 summer of 1986 and 1987. During this period, Long did not use the fuel tank that came with the new grill; instead, he always used the fuel tank from his old grill.

In July 1987, Long decided to fill and use the new tank that came with the Sunbeam grill. After having the tank filled, Long took it home. Long could smell fuel from the newly filled tank and left the tank outside for several days. When Long checked the tank again by smelling it and using soapy water to detect air bubbles, he determined that the tank was no longer venting.

Long stored the new tank under the left side of his grill. Long put the tank there because “it just seemed like it was an appropriate place.” Long’s first use of the grill after storing the spare cylinder underneath the grill was on July 19, 1987. Long began grilling around 1:00. or 2:00 in the afternoon, and the temperature outside was around ninety degrees. After the grill had been on for about twenty minutes, Long “heard something poof.” He could see a flame between the frame and the pit, and he opened the door underneath the grill. There was a flame coming out of the new tank. Long tried to put the flame out with a squirt can, but the flame leapt out. Long jumped off of the porch and began rolling in the grass. Long was burned on his arms and legs, and he was hospitalized for seven days.

Mike’s accident occurred on May 28, 1989, Memorial Day. It was very hot outside. About 6:80 that evening, Mike turned on his grill, a Sunbeam product marketed under the Kenmore name, and preheated the grill for ten to fifteen minutes. He had a spare propane tank stored underneath the grill. Mike’s wife, Paula, had experienced problems with one of the canisters venting when she had it filled in April. Based on assurances from the company that filled the canister that it was no longer venting, Mike stored the canister underneath the grill.

After Mike had been cooking about fifteen to twenty minutes, he pronounced dinner was ready, sent his kids inside to wash then-hands for dinner, and then “felt the combustion.” Mike sustained severe bums on 27% of his body, concentrated on his arms and legs.

We find that this prior accident occurred under reasonably similar circumstances to the accident in question to make Long’s testimony admissible. See Missouri Pac. R.R., 563 S.W.2d at 236. Accordingly, appellant’s fourth point of error is overruled.

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES

In points of error one, two, and three, appellants challenge the exemplary damage award arguing the evidence is legally insufficient to support the award. In determining a “no evidence” point, we are to consider only the evidence and inferences that tend to support the finding and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. T.O. Stanley Boot Co., Inc. v. Bank of El Paso, 847 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex.1992). “The evidence presented, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, must be such as to permit the logical inference [that the jury must reach].” Transportation Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 24 (Tex.1994) (op. on reh’g) (alteration in original) (quoting Lyons v. Millers Casualty Ins. Co., 866 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Tex.1993)). There must be a direct or inferential logical connection between the evidence offered and the fact to be proved. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 24.

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Bluebook (online)
907 S.W.2d 72, 1995 WL 572005, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sears-roebuck-and-co-v-menegay-texapp-1995.