Searcy v. Pfizer, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Alabama
DecidedSeptember 26, 2024
Docket2:23-cv-00750
StatusUnknown

This text of Searcy v. Pfizer, Inc. (Searcy v. Pfizer, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Searcy v. Pfizer, Inc., (M.D. Ala. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHERN DIVISION

KEVIN C. SEARCY, as Personal ) Representative and Administrator of the ) Estate of Isaiah Searcy, deceased, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:23-cv-750-ECM ) [WO] PFIZER, INC., et al., ) ) Defendants. )

O R D E R

I. INTRODUCTION This case arises out of the death of Isaiah Searcy (“Isaiah”), who died after receiving a COVID-19 vaccine. Plaintiff Kevin C. Searcy (“Plaintiff”), the administrator of Isaiah’s estate, brought this action in state court, asserting multiple claims under Alabama law. The case was removed to this Court on December 29, 2023. (Doc. 1). The Plaintiff has sued the following thirteen Defendants: Pfizer, Inc. and BioNTech (the “Pfizer Defendants”); Baptist Health, Baptist Medical Center South, Baptist Medical Center East, and Montgomery Baptist Hospital (the “Baptist Health Defendants”); ScribeAmerica, LLC (“ScribeAmerica”); Moderna US, Inc. and Moderna Services, Inc. (the “Moderna Defendants”); Johnson & Johnson and Janssen (the “J&J Defendants”); and the Department of Defense and the Secretary of Health and Human Services (the “Government”). Now pending before the Court are motions to dismiss filed by various Defendants. (Docs. 20, 23, 26, 28, and 71). Upon review of the record, and for the reasons that follow,

the Court finds that the complaint is due to be stricken as an impermissible shotgun pleading, with an opportunity for the Plaintiff to amend the complaint. II. LEGAL STANDARD A complaint must be pleaded in compliance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 10(b), as well as the Eleventh Circuit’s instructions on proper pleading of a complaint. Rule 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to “contain . . . a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Rule 10(b) requires a party to “state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances. . . . If doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence . . . must be stated in a separate count or defense.” The purpose of these rules is to allow the opposing party to “discern what [the plaintiff] is

claiming and frame a responsive pleading,” and to allow the Court to “determine which facts support which claims.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). “Complaints that violate either Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b), or both, are often disparagingly referred to as ‘shotgun pleadings.’” Id. The Eleventh Circuit has identified four types of shotgun pleadings, and “[t]he most

common type—by a long shot—is a complaint containing multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry all that came before and the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint.” Id. at 1321. The second type is a complaint which is “replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action.” Id. at 1322. The third type fails to “separat[e] into a different count each cause of action or claim for

relief.” Id. at 1322–23. The fourth and final type of shotgun pleading “assert[s] multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against.” Id. at 1323. “The unifying characteristic of all types of shotgun pleadings is that they fail to one degree or another, and in one way or another, to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.”

Id. “[A] district court that receives a shotgun pleading should strike it and instruct counsel to replead the case—even if the other party does not move the court to strike the pleading.” Est. of Bass v. Regions Bank, Inc., 947 F.3d 1352, 1358 (11th Cir. 2020).1 III. BACKGROUND The complaint alleges the following pertinent facts, which the Court assumes are

true at this stage: Isaiah was “mandated and coerced to take the [COVID-19] vaccine in November 2021” in order to “comply with one or more mandates, and to be able to work inside a Defendant hospital as an employee and/or intern.” (Doc. 1-2 at 6). On November 23, 2021, Isaiah presented to the Baptist East emergency room with chest pain and shortness of breath. Isaiah eventually passed away in the emergency room. According to

the complaint, an expert physician has opined that Isaiah died “as the direct and proximate result of a vaccine injury.” (Id.). Construing the complaint liberally, it is alleged that the

1 The Moderna Defendants argue that the complaint is a shotgun pleading. (E.g., doc. 24 at 31–34). Pfizer Defendants, the Moderna Defendants, and the J&J Defendants are manufacturers of COVID-19 vaccines. (E.g., id. at 11, para. 49).2 ScribeAmerica and the Baptist Health

Defendants are alleged to have exercised “supervisory control over Isaiah Searcy during his internship and/or part-time employment.” (Doc. 1-2 at 4, paras. 8–10). The Plaintiff brings the following twelve claims against all Defendants: a claim under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine (Count I); failure to warn (Count II); breach of warranty of merchantability (Count III); negligence (Count IV); wantonness (Count V); fraud—misrepresentation (Count VI); fraud—suppression (Count

VII); outrage and invasion of privacy (Count VIII); battery (Count IX); breach of contract (Count X); conspiracy (Count XI); and wrongful death (Count XII). Under each Count, the Plaintiff either “re-alleges, adopts and incorporates the preceding averments of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein” (e.g., id. at 13, para. 63), or “hereby adopts and incorporates by reference all the above allegations” (e.g., id. at 14, para. 69), or

substantially similar language. IV. DISCUSSION The Plaintiff’s complaint constitutes a shotgun pleading in violation of Rule 8(a)(2) and Rule 10(b) in at least two respects. First, the complaint “contain[s] multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive

count to carry all that came before and the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint.” See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321. As a result, “most of the counts (i.e., all but

2 The complaint alleges that the “Plaintiff is not certain of the precise covid-19 vaccine manufacturer.” (Doc. 1-2 at 13, para. 62). the first) contain irrelevant factual allegations and legal conclusions.” See Strategic Income Fund, L.L.C. v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Corp., 305 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 2002)

(parenthetical in original). For example, the battery claim (Count IX) incorporates by reference the allegations of eight other claims, including failure to warn, fraud, and invasion of privacy. Similarly, the breach of contract claim (Count X) incorporates by reference the allegations of nine other claims, including battery, failure to warn, fraud, and invasion of privacy. In this situation, all counts but the first “include[] allegations that are irrelevant to the cause(s) of action the count ostensibly states.” See Lumley v. City of Dade

City, 327 F.3d 1186, 1192 n.13 (11th Cir. 2003) (parenthetical in original).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Searcy v. Pfizer, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/searcy-v-pfizer-inc-almd-2024.