MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
WINGATE, District Judge.
Before the court are the plaintiffs’ objections to two Orders entered by the Magistrate-Judge. The first Order denied plaintiffs’ motion to remand this matter to the state court where it originated or, in the alternative, for the court to abstain. The second Order granted defendants’ motion for referral and motion to transfer venue, ordering that this entire action be transferred to the Bankruptcy Court in Houston, Texas. In reaching his conclusions, the Magistrate-Judge held that this lawsuit over the proceeds of natural' gas wells, between plaintiff royalty owners and one defendant presently in bankruptcy, is essentially a core bankruptcy proceeding as recognized by 28 U.S.C. § 157. The Magistrate-Judge further found that this entire action, which involves other defendants who are not in bankruptcy, should be transferred to the Bankruptcy Court in Houston, Texas, which presently is adjudicating the bankruptcy of defendant Knostman.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A),
a district court may modify or set aside any portion of the Magistrate-Judge’s Order relating to a nondispositive motion only if the Order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Rule 72(a)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure similarly states that a district court must apply the clearly erroneous standard, a deferential standard of review. Since the motions for review before this court concern transfer and remand, and thus are non-dispositive, they clearly fall under this deferential standard of review.
See City of Jackson v. Lakeland Lounge,
147 F.R.D. 122, 124 (S.D.Miss.1993) (a motion to remand is a nondispositive matter), and
Holmes v. TV-3, Inc., et al.,
141 F.R.D. 697, 699 (W.D.La. 1991) (standard of review for motion to transfer venue is controlled by Rule 72(a)). Cognizant of the applicable standard, this court finds that after a review of the memoranda of the parties, together with all attached exhibits, and after having heard oral arguments in this matter, the Magistrate-Judge's Orders are clearly erroneous and contrary to law and, thus, must be modified and set aside. Specifically, this court finds that this lawsuit is not a core proceeding and, further, that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) and § 1452(b) this lawsuit is ripe for abstention and should be remanded to the Mississippi state court from where it was removed here.
BACKGROUND
The plaintiffs’ lawsuit
sub judice
against the defendants is based on common-law breach of contract and tort principles. Plaintiffs are royalty owners of natural gas wells in the Johns Field located in Rankin County, Mississippi. The defendants, excluding Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corporation [hereinafter Transco], are lessees with working interests in plaintiffs’ wells who participate in the purchase and sale of the gas produced. Defendant Transco, a purchaser of natural gas, entered into a contract in 1982 called the “Transco contract” with defendant lessees for the purchase of gas from the wells in Rankin County, Mississippi. By 1989, Transco desired a release from the obligations under the 1982 contract and, as a consequence, filed a lawsuit against defendant Knostman and other lessees
alleging, in part, that events “force majeure” relieved it of its contractual duties.
The event which spawned this lawsuit and its various claims was a settlement agreement reached in 1991 between the defendant Transco and Knostman in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division.
The agreement, among other things, released Transco from its contractual duty to pay the lessees $9.00 per MCF and lowered the purchase price to approximately $3.00 per MCF.
The settlement also pro
vided substantial lump sum monies to the lessees.
The plaintiff royalty owners, although not parties to the litigation in the bankruptcy court, were dissatisfied with the terms of the settlement. Plaintiffs, as royalty owners, possessed certain financial interests in the compromise since plaintiffs’ profits depended upon Transco’s price paid for natural gas.
Aggrieved over the provisions of the settlement reducing Transco’s purchasing commitment, plaintiffs filed the present lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Rankin County, Mississippi. Defendants then removed the matter to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a)
and § 1334(b).
Plaintiffs in their complaint seek recovery against the lessees and Transco for breach of the “Transco contract”; for breach of division order contracts between lessees and royalty owners; for breach of implied obligations; for failure to pay royalties; and for tortious breach and interference with contractual relations. The plaintiffs request that this court award them compensatory and punitive damages resulting from the alleged breach of the various contracts or, in the alternative, plaintiffs desire a payment of royalties under the terms of the 1982 Transco contract.
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1452 states that “a party may remove a claim or cause of action in a civil action ... to the district court for the district where such civil action is pending, if such district has jurisdiction of such claim or cause of action under section 1334 of this title.” Title 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) provides that "... the district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or
related to
cases under title 11.” (emphasis added). Thus, this court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case removed from state court if the controversy is at least “related to” a case under Title 11. For an action to be “related to” a case under Title 11, the test applied by the Fifth Circuit is “ ‘whether the outcome of that proceeding [the state court action] could
conceivably
have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy.’ ”
Matter of Wood,
825 F.2d 90, 93 (5th Cir.1987) (quoting
Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins,
743 F.2d 984, 994 (3rd Cir.1984)).
E.g., Matter of Majestic Energy Corp.,
835 F.2d 87, 90 (5th Cir.1988);
Da Silva v. American Sav.,
145 B.R. 9, 11 (S.D.Tex.1992).
Accord In re Marcus Hook Development Park, Inc.,
943 F.2d 261, 264 (3rd Cir.1991);
In re A.H. Robins Co.,
788 F.2d 994,1002 n. 11 (4th Cir.),
cert, denied,
479 U.S. 876, 107 S.Ct. 251, 93 L.Ed.2d 177 (1986);
In re Dogpatch, U.S.A., Inc.,
810 F.2d 782, 786 (8th Cir. 1987);
In re Fietz,
852 F.2d 455, 457 (9th Cir.1988);
In re Gardner,
913 F.2d 1515, 1518 (10th Cir.1990);
Matter of Lemco Gypsum, Inc.,
910 F.2d 784, 788 (11th Cir.
1990). The present suit, in part, attacks a settlement agreement reached in the Bankruptcy Court in Houston, Texas, between defendant Knostman and defendant Tran-sco. Any monetary judgment and/or in-junctive relief that may be obtained by the plaintiffs in the present case would clearly have an impact on the estate being administered in bankruptcy. Plaintiffs could seek enforcement of a judgment against Knost-man in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, and such action certainly would affect the affairs in bankruptcy. Accordingly, the jurisdictional prerequisites under § 1334(b) have been satisfied.
Plaintiffs, however, contend that this court is without jurisdiction to hear this case because the defendants improperly filed their removal petition with the district court instead of with the bankruptcy court clerk. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a) states that a state court case may be removed “to the
district court
for the district where such civil action is pending.” The plain language of the statute supports removal of a case related to bankruptcy to the district court for filing with the district court clerk. The district court may then refer the action to the bankruptcy court in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 157(a).
Although some jurisdictions have interpreted bankruptcy statutes to support removal directly to the bankruptcy court,
Hendersonville Condominium Homes, Inc. v. Contractors Performance Corp.,
84 B.R. 510, 511 (M.D.Tenn.1988), this court is in agreement with those jurisdictions which hold that removal should be to the district court clerk for possible referral to the bankruptcy court.
Centrust Savings Bank v. Love,
131 B.R. 64, 65-66 (S.D.Tex.1991), and
Helena Chemical Co. v. Manley,
47 B.R. 72, 75 (N.D.Miss.1985).
CORE/NON-CORE DISTINCTION
The Magistrate-Judge’s Order transferring this lawsuit to the Bankruptcy Court in Houston, Texas, relies upon the implicit finding that the proceedings before this court are “core” bankruptcy proceedings. The significant distinction between “core” and “non-core” lawsuits is that in a “core” case, the bankruptcy judge may enter a final judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1)
subject to review on appeal by the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a).
In a “non-core” case, the role of the bankruptcy judge is similar to that
of a magistrate in that, without consent of the parties, the bankruptcy judge may only submit proposed findings of fact and conclusion of law to the district court.
See
28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1);
see also In re Cinematronics, Inc.,
916 F.2d 1444, 1449 (9th Cir. 1990).
Title 28 U.S.C. § 157 does not define what constitutes a “core” proceeding and, thus, the courts have attempted to carve out a workable meaning. Under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2),
the statute does contain a nonexhaustive list of “core” proceedings. Such matters include allowance or disallowance of claims; proceedings to determine, avoid or recover preferences; motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay; confirmations of plans; and objections to discharges. Title 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) also provides two “catch-all” categories of “core” proceedings which are: (1) matters concerning the administration of the estate; and (2) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate.
See
Title 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) and (O).
Plaintiffs’ suit, which is premised on state claims, clearly does not fall within any of the statute’s specific examples of core proceedings.
So, next we turn to the definitional tests for core proceedings enunciated by the federal courts. The leading case defining core proceeding in the Fifth Circuit is
Matter of Wood,
825 F.2d 90 (5th Cir.1987). Initially, the Fifth Circuit determined that the “catch-all” provisions in the statutory list of core proceedings, specifically § 157(b)(2)(O), should not be given a broad reading. The court found that such provisions must not be liberally applied because Congress, when enacting the 1984 amendments to the bankruptcy statutes, “intended to conform the bankruptcy statutes to the dictates of
Marathon.” Id.
at 95. Of course, in the landmark case of
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Company,
458 U.S. 50,102 S.Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982), the United States Supreme Court held that “Congress could not vest the whole of bankruptcy jurisdiction in bankruptcy courts because the jurisdictional grant encompassed proceedings too far removed from the “core” of traditional bankruptcy powers to allow them to be adjudicated by non-Article III judges.”
Matter of Wood,
825 F.2d at 93, citing
Marathon,
458 U.S. at 71, 102 S.Ct.
at 2871, 73 L.Ed.2d at 615. The Fifth Circuit in
Matter of Wood
went on to hold that:
A proceeding is core under section 157 if it invokes a substantive right provided by-title 11 or if it is a proceeding that, by its nature, could arise only in the context of a bankruptcy case. The proceeding before us does not meet this test and, accordingly, is a non-core proceeding. The plaintiffs suit is not based on any right created by the federal bankruptcy law. It is based on state created rights, [footnote omitted]. Moreover, this suit is not a proceeding that could arise only in the context of a bankruptcy. It is simply a state contract action that, had there been no bankruptcy, could have proceeded in state court.
Matter of Wood,
825 F.2d at 97;
accord Howell Hydrocarbons, Inc. v. Adams,
897 F.2d 183, 189-90 (5th Cir.1990) (citing
Matter of Wood
with approval). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held similarly: “[A]ctions which do not depend on the bankruptcy laws for their existence and which could proceed in another court are not core proceedings.”
In re Gardner,
913 F.2d 1515, 1518 (10th Cir.1990) (citing
Matter of Wood
with approval).
These guideposts, applied to the present case, clearly reveal that the parties here are engaged in a non-core proceeding. Plaintiffs are not suing on a right created by the federal bankruptcy laws, nor could this suit only survive in bankruptcy court. This case, as in
Matter of Wood,
is based on state-created rights of action, namely contract and tort, and could proceed in state court.
Cf. In re Manville Forest Products Corp.,
896 F.2d 1384, 1389 (2nd Cir.1990) (when party filed proof of claim in bankruptcy court under bankruptcy rules, such an adversary proceeding is a core proceeding even though the underlying claim is based on a state-created cause of action). Accordingly, this court finds that this case is non-core,
Thus, this court holds that the Magistrate-Judge’s decision which finds, or at least implies, to the contrary is clearly erroneous.
TRANSFER OF VENUE UNDER TITLE 28 U.S.C. § 1412 OR § 1404(a)
Both the plaintiffs and the defendants have argued to this court that 28 U.S.C. § 1412 applies to the current dispute over venue. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1412 provides:
A district court may transfer a case or proceeding
under title 11
to a district court for another district, in the interest of justice
or
for the convenience of the parties, (emphasis added)
The plain meaning of this statute dictates that in order to transfer under this statute, the district court first must have jurisdiction of a case
under
Title 11. Since this court has jurisdiction over this non-core matter under the “related to” jurisdictional basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), the question raised, therefore, is whether a “related to” proceeding for purposes of jurisdiction is a case “under” Title 11, for purposes of § 1412, the transfer statute.
At least four lower federal courts have held that a “related to” proceeding is not one that is “under” Title 11 and, thus, that § 1412 would not control a transfer issue in such cases.
See Murray, Wilson and Hunter v. Jersey Boats, Inc., et al.,
No. 91-7733, 1992 WL 37516, at *3, 1992 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 1986, at *9 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 21, 1992);
In re Thomson McKinnon Securities, Inc.,
126 B.R. 833, 834-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1991);
Goldberg Holding Corp. v. NEP Productions, Inc.,
93 B.R. 33, 34 (S.D.N.Y.1988);
United States for the Use of Metal Trims Industries, Inc. v. Klein Construction Co., et al.,
No. 83 C 2146, Slip Opinion, 1985 WL 3020 (Oct. 9, 1985). These courts instead opted to proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the general venue statute to the issue of transfer.
The reasoning of these decisions is convincing. Specifically, the above courts point out that the predecessor to § 1412, 28 U.S.C. § 1475, stated:
A bankruptcy court may transfer a ease under title 11 or a proceeding arising under
or related to such a case
to a bankruptcy court for another district, in the interest of justice and for the convenience of the parties, (emphasis added)
The phrase “related to such a case” is deleted from the current rendition of § 1412 which, according to these cases, evidences an intent by Congress to follow the pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court in the
Marathon
case to limit the authority of an Article I bankruptcy court.
See e.g., Jersey Boats,
1992 WL 37516, at *3, 1992 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 1986, at *8-9. This court concurs with this reasoning and this perspective on the statute. Hence, this court holds that the plain meaning of the omission in § 1412 supports the conclusion that § 1412 no longer applies to “related to” proceedings.
This court further agrees with the aforementioned authorities that disputes relative to change of venue in “related to” proceedings should be governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),
the general change of venue provision for all civil actions.
Jersey Boats,
1992 WL 37516, at *4, 1992 U.S.Dist. LEXIS, at *8-9. One can easily discern that the two statutes,
see infra
n. 17 for § 1404(a) and
supra
p. 706 for § 1412, are strikingly similar. Indeed, at least one court has stated that there is little reason for distinguishing between the two statutes.
In re Thomson McKinnon Securities, Inc.,
126 B.R. 833, 834-35 (S.D.N.Y.1991), quoting
In re Spillane,
884 F.2d 642, 645 n. 6 (1st Cir.1989).
A. TRANSFER UNDER 1404(a)
The court now focuses its attention on § 1404(a), as the proper statute under which to view defendants’ motion to transfer this action to the Bankruptcy Court in Houston, Texas.
Transfer under § 1404(a)
may properly be made only where the court to which transfer is sought would have been a proper venue and would have had personal jurisdiction over all the defendants if it had been the original forum.
Frazier v. Commercial Credit Equipment Corp.,
755 F.Supp. 163, 165 (S.D.Miss.1991), citing
Shutte v. Armco Steel Corporation,
431 F.2d 22, 24 (3rd Cir.1970),
cert. denied,
401 U.S. 910, 91 S.Ct. 871, 27 L.Ed.2d 808 (1971). In deciding whether to transfer an action under § 1404(a) to another district or division, where it “might have been brought,” the court must consider whether the interests of the convenience of the witnesses and parties, as well as the interest of justice are served thereby. The movant seeking transfer pursuant to § 1404(a) has the burden of establishing, by reference to particular circumstances and by a preponderance of the evidence, that the transferee forum is clearly more convenient and that transfer is proper.
Davidson v. Exxon Corporation,
778 F.Supp. 909, 911 (E.D.La. 1991). “[T]he defendant must make a convincing showing of the right to have the case transferred since § 1404(a) provides for transfer ‘to a more convenient forum, not to a forum likely to prove equally convenient or inconvenient.’ ”
Southern Investors II v. Commuter Aircraft Corporation,
520 F.Supp. 212, 218 (M.D.La.1981), quoting
Van Dusen v. Barrack,
376 U.S. 612, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964). When considering a motion to transfer pursuant to § 1404(a), federal courts have considered a number of factors outside the three enumerated in the statute. Some of these factors are: location of counsel; the location of books and records;
ease of
access to proof; where the case can be tried expeditiously and inexpensively; the cost of obtaining attendance of witnesses and other trial expenses; the place of the alleged wrong, the possibility of delay and prejudice if transfer is granted; and the plaintiff’s choice of forum. This last factor is very influential and should rarely be disturbed unless the balance is strongly in the defendant’s favor.
Eddy v. Inland Bay Drilling & Workover, Inc.,
784 F.Supp. 370, 375 n. 10 (S.D.Tex.1992);
see also Sorrels Steel Company, Inc. v. Great Southwest Corp.,
651 F.Supp. 623, 628 (S.D.Miss.1986). However, the general rule that the plaintiff’s choice of forum is not to be disturbed does not obtain where it is clearly outweighed by other factors.
Howell v. Tanner,
650 F.2d 610, 616 (5th Cir.1981),
cert. denied,
456 U.S. 919, 102 S.Ct. 1777, 72 L.Ed.2d 180 (1982).
Once the court determines that transfer to a district other than that selected by the plaintiff would be more convenient for the parties and witnesses, the court must still determine whether transfer would be in the interests of justice.
Frazier v. Commercial Credit Equipment Corp.,
755 F.Supp. 163, 167 (S.D.Miss.1991), citing
Ferens v. John Deere Co.,
494 U.S. 516, 521-23, 110 S.Ct. 1274, 1279, 108 L.Ed.2d 443 (1990) (§ 1404(a) “permits a transfer only when convenient and ‘in the interests of justice’ ”). The “interests of justice” component of § 1404(a) may, in itself, be determinative of the decision to allow a transfer, even where the convenience of the parties and witnesses would call for a different result.
Frazier,
755 F.Supp. at 167, citing
Lemke v. St. Margaret Hospital,
594 F.Supp. 25, 28 (N.D.Ill. 1983). One significant element relating to “the interest of justice” is the desire to avoid a multiplicity of litigation from a single transaction.
Continental Grain Company v. The FBL
—585, 364 U.S. 19, 24-26, 80 S.Ct. 1470, 1474, 4 L.Ed.2d 1540 (1960). Another important factor is the efficient administration of the court system,
Coffey v. Van Dorn Iron Works,
796 F.2d 217, 221 (7th Cir.1986).
Accord Ferens,
494 U.S. 516, 529, 110 S.Ct. 1274, 1283, 108 L.Ed.2d 443 (1990) (consideration of the interests of justice “must include the convenience of the court”).
In the case
sub judice,
the defendants, as movants, have simply not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiffs’ choice of a Mississippi forum should be disturbed. Significantly, defendants have provided little, if any, factual support for their position other than unverified statements of counsel. In oral arguments before this court, counsel’s primary argument for transfer was that the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas is intimately familiar with the bankruptcy proceedings which are implicated here. Defendants aver that because the bankruptcy case has been in existence since 1984, the bankruptcy judge has acquired valued experience and expertise. But, while the bankruptcy court in Houston does have particular knowledge about defendant Knostman’s matter in bankruptcy, and is perhaps familiar with the settlement agreement entered into by the defendant, the defendants have not explained how the bankruptcy court might be more competent to hear a state cause of action against non-bankrupt defendants. In response to this concern, defendants merely say that they “can stand on their own” in bankruptcy court. If plaintiffs had pursued defendant Knostman alone, the argument for transfer to the bankruptcy court would be more persuasive, particularly since that court has overseen the Knostman settlement agreement that eventually lead to the instant action. However, with added defendants, a balancing of the requisite factors clearly tips in favor of the plaintiffs’ choice of forum.
Plaintiffs, all Mississippi residents, have shown that they would be financially burdened if compelled to litigate in Houston, Texas. Many of whom may be called as witnesses, plaintiffs have filed affidavits attesting to the substantial financial hardship which would occur if this case is transferred. Contrari-wise, all of the defendants are currently, or have previously, litigated oil and gas suits in Mississippi. Further, the defendants have not demonstrated to this court that company books,
records and other proof are more accessible in the foreign forum. Nor have defendants offered proof of possible prejudice in a forum, delay and convenience of counsel which would show that the Houston bankruptcy court should hear this case. The place of the alleged wrong is indeed in Houston, Texas, and defendant Knostman resides there. However, these facts alone do not undermine the weight of facts in support of maintaining the lawsuit in the present forum.
The “interest of justice” prong also militates against transfer pursuant to § 1404(a). Most importantly, as mentioned previously, seven defendants in the present case are not in bankruptcy and defendants fail to explain why these parties should be required to litigate in the bankruptcy court. In fact, counsel for the defendants, in oral arguments, conceded that the non-bankrupt defendants may have to be dismissed if the case is transferred. Thus, the threat of multiple litigation warrants retaining jurisdiction in this state.
Further, all of the defendants have litigated or currently are litigating suits in Mississippi. Plaintiffs point out that defendant Knostman has previously removed seven cases to this court and all have been remanded to state court. Defendants, however, attempt to distinguish this case from the others by arguing that this case, unlike the earlier suits, does not involve well blowouts. In oral arguments, defendants characterized the well blowout cases as suits which involved a separate and distinct tortious act unrelated to a bankruptcy proceeding. This case, says the defendants, is different because it is a “core” proceeding that concerns a claim to a pre-petition asset, namely the 1982 Transco contract.
Firstly, defendants erroneously argue that this case is a “core” proceeding.
See supra,
pp. 704-06. Next, defendants seemingly fail to acknowledge that plaintiffs have alleged the state causes of actions of tort and contract which arose in 1991 and, thus, are based on post-petition events. Plaintiffs are not simply suing on the 1982 Transco contract but also for breach of division order contracts, breach of implied obligations, failure to pay royalties, and tortious breach and interference with contract. Significantly, the 1982 contract was not only executed between the bankrupt trustee, Knostman, and Transco. The other defendant lessees, including the seven defendants herein, also were parties to the agreement. Thus, the defendants have not shown that a suit which asserts state, actions against several non-bankrupt defendants is the type of case which should be heard in bankruptcy court.
Thus, without substantial facts to support a claim for transfer under § 1404(a), this court finds that defendants’ arguments for transfer are unpersuasive and the Magistrate-Judge’s decision to transfer this lawsuit to the Bankruptcy Court in Houston, Texas, is clearly erroneous.
ABSTENTION AND REMAND UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) AND § 1452(b)
Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) and § 1452(b), plaintiffs argue that the peculiar circumstances of this dispute counsel this court to abstain and remand this matter to state court. The court agrees.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) states that:
Nothing in this section prevents a district court in the interest of justice, or in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for State law, from abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1452(b) provides that:
The court to which such claim or cause of action is removed may remand such claim or cause of action on any equitable ground. An order entered under this subsection remanding a claim or cause of action, or a decision to not remand, is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise by the court of appeals under section 158(d), 1291, or 1292 of this title or by the Supreme Court of the United States under section 1254 of this title.
Under § 1334(c)(1) and § 1452(b), the federal courts have carved out several factors which should be considered on the question of abstention. These factors include:
(1) the effect or lack thereof on the efficient administration of the estate if the Court recommends abstention;
(2) extent to which state law issue predominate over bankruptcy issues;
(3) difficulty or unsettled nature of the applicable law;
(4) presence of related proceeding commenced in state court or other nonbank-ruptcy proceeding;
(5) jurisdictional basis, if any, other than § 1334;
(6) degree of relatedness or remoteness of proceeding to main bankruptcy case;
(7) the substance rather than the form of an asserted core proceeding;
(8) the feasibility of severing state law claims from core bankruptcy matters to allow judgments to be entered in state court with enforcement left to the bankruptcy court;
(9) the burden of the bankruptcy court's docket;
(10) the likelihood that the commencement of the proceeding in bankruptcy court involves forum shopping by one of the parties;
(11) the existence of a right to a jury trial;
(12) the presence in the proceeding of nondebtor parties;
(13) comity; and
(14) the possibility of prejudice to other parties in the action.
See In re Tucson Estates, Inc.,
912 F.2d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir.1990);
Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. v. Vigilant Insurance Co.,
130 B.R. 405, 407-08 (S.D.N.Y.1991); and
Western Helicopters, Inc. v. Hiller Aviation, Inc.,
97 B.R. 1, 2 (E.D.Cal.1988).
These factors, applied to the case
sub judice,
persuade this court that this case should be remanded to state court. The reasons are apparent, as amply demonstrated by the foregoing discussion. This case involves questions of state law. Although both Texas and Mississippi law may apply, the Mississippi state courts are certainly capable of hearing and resolving issues under the law of her sister state. Next, this action mainly concerns parties who have no connection to the bankruptcy court. This matter is but “related to” the bankruptcy case in Houston, Texas, and jurisdiction would not exist in this court but for the defendant who is a trustee in bankruptcy, i.e., no independent basis for federal jurisdiction exists. Then, plaintiffs quite possibly might be deprived of a jury trial in Texas and defendants have made no persuasive argument that a remand to state court would disrupt the efficient administration of the bankrupt estate. In sum, defendants have simply offered no factual proof justifying retention by this court of the current action, and since many of the factors support a state court adjudication of this case, this court is persuaded that equity favors a remand to state court.
Finally, this court has considered the option of transferring only the claims against defendant Knostman to the bankruptcy court. However, after careful consideration, this court declines to separate the claims and parties because such action could result in inconsistent judgments, in
vade the right to a jury trial, and would not promote the efficient administration of justice.
CONCLUSION
This court finds that the decision of the Magistrate-Judge to transfer this matter to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas is clearly erroneous and contrary to law. Further, this court determines that this entire action, including all of the claims and parties, should be remanded to the Circuit Court of Rankin County, Mississippi, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1452(b).
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED.