Sean Richard, individually, and on behalf of other members of the general public similarly situated v. St. Jude Medical, Cardiology Division, Inc., a Delaware corporation; Abbott Laboratories, an Illinois corporation; and Does 1 through 100, inclusive

Opinion

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10 Case No. 2:25-cv-11795-WLH-SK 11 SEAN RICHARD, individually, and on behalf of other members of the general ORDER RE MOTION TO REMAND 12 public similarly situated; [26]

13 Plaintiff,

14 v.

15 ST. JUDE MEDICAL, 16 CARDIOLOGY DIVISION, INC., a Delaware corporation; ABBOTT 17 LABORATORIES, an Illinois corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, 18 inclusive,

19 Defendants. 20

21 The Court is in receipt of Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (the “Motion”). (Mot., 22 Dkt. No. 26), No party filed a written request for oral argument stating that an attorney 23 with five years or less of experience would be arguing the matter. (See Standing 24 Order, Dkt. No. 16 at 16). Further, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 25 and Local Rule 7-15, the Court finds this matter appropriate for decision without oral 26 argument. The hearing calendared for February 27, 2026, is VACATED and the 27 28 1 matter taken off calendar. For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s Motion is 2 DENIED. 3 I. BACKGROUND 4 To resolve the Motion, the Court must determine whether the case’s removal 5 from state court complied with the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”). The only 6 issue in dispute is whether Defendants have met their burden to establish that the 7 amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. 8 On September 30, 2025, Plaintiff Sean Richard (“Plaintiff”) filed a class action 9 complaint in the Superior Court of California for Los Angeles County. (Ex. A to 10 Declaration of Michele J. Beilke in Support of Notice of Removal (“Complaint”), Dkt. 11 No. 3-1). The Complaint asserts ten causes of action against Defendants St. Jude 12 Medical, Cardiology Division, Inc. (“St. Jude”) and Abbott Laboratories for: 13 (1) Violation of California Labor Code §§ 510 and 1198 (Unpaid Overtime); 14 (2) Violation of California Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512(a) (Unpaid Meal Period 15 Premiums); (3) Violation of California Labor Code § 226.7 (Unpaid Rest Period 16 Premiums); (4) Violation of California Labor Code §§ 1194, 1197, and 1197.1 17 (Unpaid Minimum Wages); (5) Violation of California Labor Code §§ 201 and 202 18 (Final Wages Not Timely Paid); (6) Violation of California Labor Code § 204 (Wages 19 Not Timely Paid During Employment); (7) Violation of California Labor Code 20 § 226(a) (Non-Compliant Wage Statements); (8) Violation of California Labor Code 21 § 1174(d) (Failure To Keep Requisite Payroll Records); (9) Violation of California 22 Labor Code §§ 2800 and 2802 (Unreimbursed Business Expenses); and (10) Violation 23 of California Business & Professions Code § 17200, et seq. (See generally id.). 24 Plaintiff brings the suit on behalf of himself and a putative class of “[a]ll current and 25 former hourly-paid or non-exempt employees who worked for any of the Defendants 26 within the State of California at any time during the period from four years preceding 27 the filing of this Complaint to final judgment.” (Id. ¶ 14). 28 1 On December 12, 2025, Defendants removed the case to this Court, pursuant to 2 the CAFA. (Notice of Removal, Dkt. No. 1). Defendants allege that Plaintiff’s 3 complaint put into controversy over $5,000,000, and estimates the amount in 4 controversy to exceed $30,000,000. (Notice of Removal ¶¶ 27, 52). In support of 5 their removal, Defendants submitted a declaration of Charlene Chua, an HR 6 Generalist employed by Defendant Abbott Laboratories, who declared the following 7 based on a review of business records relating to employees of Abbott and its 8 subsidiaries and affiliates, including St. Jude: 9 a. During the Class Period, Defendants collectively employed more 10 than 100 Putative Class Employees; 11 b. During the Class Period, the Putative Class Employees were or are 12 fulltime employees, meaning they were scheduled to work, and 13 regularly did work, at least eight hours per day, five days per week; 14 c. The Putative Class Employees worked an aggregate of more than 15 175,000 workweeks during the Class Period and earned an average 16 hourly rate of $29.57/hour and a weighted hourly rate of $30.80/hour during the Class Period. At all times during the Class 17 Period, Defendants paid their respective Putative Class Employees 18 at least the minimum wage; 19 d. More than 466 Putative Class Employees had their employment end 20 on or after September 30, 2022; as to those 466 employees, the 21 average hourly rate of pay was $28.90/hour and the weighted hourly rate was $30.27/hour; and 22

23 e. During the Class Period, the Putative Class Employees have been 24 paid on a weekly basis and issued weekly wage statements. Between September 30, 2024, and the present, Defendants 25 collectively employed at least 814 Putative Class Employees for at 26 least one pay period, and at least 629 of those Putative Class Employees each received 41 or more wage statements during this 27 time. The remaining 185 Putative Class Employees received a 28 1 collective total of 2,931 wage statements during the same time 2 period.

3 (Declaration of Charlene Chua in Support of Notice of Removal (“Chua Decl.”), Dkt. 4 No. 4). Based on these factual assertions, Defendant outlined several assumptions and 5 estimates related to the amount in controversy. (See generally Notice of Removal). 6 As to Plaintiff’s unpaid overtime claims, Defendants assumed at least one hour of 7 unpaid overtime per week per employee. With 175,000 workweeks at issue at an 8 average hourly rate of $29.57 per hour (see Chua Decl. ¶ 5c), multiplied by the 9 overtime rate in California (1.5 times the regular rate for hours over eight per day or 10 forty per week), Defendants estimate the overtime claim puts at least $7,762,1255 in 11 controversy. (Notice of Removal at 9). This assumption hinged on Plaintiff’s 12 allegation that Defendants engaged in “a pattern and practice” of “intentionally and 13 willfully fail[ing]” to pay overtime wages, despite being “required to work” overtime- 14 eligible hours. (Compl. ¶¶ 26, 40, 57-58). Also relevant is Plaintiff’s allegation that 15 he and other class members were “required” to work (see id. ¶ 40) more than eight (8) 16 hours in a day and/or forty (40) hours in a week during their employment with 17 Defendants, and that they in fact did work to that extent. (Id. ¶ 25). 18 On January 23, 2026, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion. (Mot.). Defendant filed 19 a timely opposition brief (“Opp’n,” Dkt. No. 28) and an accompanying Request for 20 Judicial Notice (“RJN,” Dkt. No. 29-1). Plaintiff did not file a reply in support of the 21 Motion. 22 II. LEGAL STANDARD 23 CAFA evinces “a strong preference that interstate class actions should be heard 24 in a federal court if properly removed by any defendant.” Jauregui v. Roadrunner 25 Transportation Servs., Inc., 28 F.4th 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing Dart Cherokee 26 Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014)). As such “no 27 antiremoval presumption attends cases invoking CAFA[.]” Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. 28 at 89. Still, a case may only be removed pursuant to CAFA when certain 1 jurisdictional requirements are met. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). As relevant to the pending 2 Motion, a defendant may only remove a Class Action to federal court when the 3 amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).1 The amount in 4 controversy is “an estimate of the entire potential amount at stake in litigation,” rather 5 than the likely or probable liability of a given defendant. Jauregui, 28 F.4th at 994 6 (emphasis in the original). 7 A defendant’s notice of removal “need include only a plausible allegation that 8 the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee, 574 9 U.S. at 89. When a plaintiff disputes the allegation, both sides may submit proof and 10 “the court decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the amount-in- 11 controversy requirement has been satisfied.” Id. at 88.2 A defendant “must be able to 12 rely ‘on a chain of reasoning that includes assumptions to satisfy its burden to prove 13 by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 14 million,’ as long as the reasoning and underlying assumptions are reasonable.” 15 Jauregui, 28 F.4th at 993 (quoting LaCross v. Knight Transp. Inc., 775 F.3d 1200, 16 1201 (9th Cir. 2015)). A defendant’s assumptions, however, “cannot be pulled from 17 thin air but need some reasonable ground underlying them.” Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., 18 Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1199 (9th Cir. 2015). 19 III. DISCUSSION 20 The disposition of Plaintiff’s Motion hinges on whether the action meets 21 CAFA’s $5,000,000 amount in controversy requirement. The Court therefore must 22 determine whether Defendants’ assumptions justifying their amount in controversy 23

24 1 While CAFA imposes requirements beyond the greater than $5,000,000 amount in controversy, the disputed issue in the instant Motion is whether Defendants met their 25 burden as to the amount in controversy. (See generally Mot.; Opp’n). 2 When a plaintiff, as here, makes a factual attack on a motion to remand, Plaintiff is 26 not required to submit evidence and “need only challenge the truth of the defendant’s 27 jurisdictional allegations by making a reasoned argument as to why any assumptions on which they are based are not supported by evidence.” Harris v. KM Indus., Inc., 28 980 F.3d 694, 700 (9th Cir. 2020). 1 estimates are reasonable—namely, the calculations of (1) unpaid overtime, (2) meal 2 and rest break premiums and (3) waiting time penalties incurred by Defendants. 3 However, because Defendants’ reasonable calculations of the damages stemming from 4 alleged unpaid overtime, and associated attorneys’ fees, far exceed the requisite 5 amount in controversy, the Court need not delve into the remaining assumptions. 6 Accordingly, the Court addresses only Plaintiff’s objections to the competency of 7 Defendants’ evidence supporting their Notice of Removal and the reasonableness of 8 Defendants’ overtime violation assumptions. 9 A. Competency of Evidence Underlying Defendants’ Assumptions 10 Plaintiff primarily disputes the competency of Defendants’ proffered evidence 11 underlying their estimates in support of their Notice of Removal. Specifically, 12 Plaintiff contends that “Defendants fail[ed] to submit any declaration from an actual 13 custodian of records,” failed to “identify which payroll or timekeeping databases were 14 queried, the individuals who input or maintain data, or why those records are accurate 15 and complete.” (Mot. at 7). 16 To the extent Plaintiff lodges an evidentiary objection, those are inapplicable at 17 this juncture. In ruling on a motion to remand, courts “may ‘view whatever evidence 18 has been submitted on the issue to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction 19 exists,’ including summary judgment-type evidence.” Cardroom Int'l LLC v. 20 Scheinberg, No. 12–02870 MMM (AGRx), 2012 WL 2263330, at *4 n.12 (C.D. Cal. 21 June 18, 2012) (internal quotation omitted). The evidence considered on a motion to 22 remand should not be conflated with that which is actually admissible at trial (or at the 23 summary judgment stage) pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Johnson v. 24 Sunrise Senior Living Mgmt., Inc., No. CV1600443BRORAOX, 2016 WL 917888, at 25 *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2016). 26 The Court nevertheless finds Ms. Chua’s declaration sufficient for purposes of 27 this Motion. Ms. Chua specifically attests that her declaration is based on her personal 28 knowledge and a review of company records including “personnel information, 1 payroll records (including wage statements), and time records of current and former 2 employees of Abbott or its subsidiaries, including St. Jude, including those regarding 3 Plaintiff.” (Chua Decl. ¶¶ 2-3). Ms. Chua is familiar with and has “access to the 4 electronic payroll system and electronic database regarding employees of Abbott or its 5 subsidiaries, including St. Jude.” (Id.). 6 Although Plaintiff additionally claims “it is unclear whether Defendants’ 7 representatives made their own calculations based on records they reviewed, simply 8 recited information already in existence, or obtained these figures from some other 9 undisclosed source,” (Mot. at 8), Ms. Chua specifically attests in her declaration the 10 precise sources of these calculations and where these figures were obtained. (See 11 Chua Decl. ¶ 4 (“Those systems, using various search and filter functions, are able to 12 determine the number of employees holding hourly, non-exempt positions for a 13 specific time period, the number of terminated employees during a specific time 14 period, number of workweeks for a specific time period, and the number of pay 15 periods for a specific time period”)). Moreover,this Court has found similar 16 declarations from human resources professionals to be competent evidence for 17 purposes of calculating the CAFA amount in controversy requirement. See, e.g., Oda 18 v. Gucci Am., Inc., No. 2:14–CV–07469–SVW, 2015 WL 93335, at *3–5 (C.D.Cal. 19 Jan. 7, 2015) (considering employment data asserted in corporate employee’s 20 declaration to establish the amount in controversy); Hess v. Valero Services, Inc., No. 21 2:23-cv-04578-WLH-SK, 2023 WL 5401505, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2023) 22 (accepting declaration from senior payroll lead establishing relevant CAFA 23 controversy calculations). The Court finds the same to be true here; Ms. Chua’s 24 declaration is competent evidence to support Defendants’ Notice of Removal. 25 B. Assumptions Related to Uniform Violations of Overtime Pay 26 The Ninth Circuit “distinguishes between complaints of ‘uniform’ violations 27 and those alleging a ‘pattern and practice’ of labor law violations.” Dobbs v. Wood 28 Grp. PSN, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 1184, 1188 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (quoting LaCross v. 1 Knight Transp. Inc., 775 F.3d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 2015)). Here, Plaintiff alleges a 2 “pattern and practice” violation—or in their words, that Defendant “engaged in a 3 policy and practice of failing to pay Plaintiff and the class members for all overtime 4 hours, resulting in unpaid wages.” (Compl. ¶¶ 26, 40, 57-58). A pattern and practice 5 theory “does not necessarily mean always” violating the Labor Code, so the 6 “defendant seeking removal bears the burden to show a preponderance of the 7 evidence” of the CAFA-required amount in controversy. Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., 8 Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015). But the Ninth Circuit this year clarified 9 that, as it relates to assumed Labor Code violation rates, “it makes little sense to 10 require a CAFA defendant to introduce evidence of the violation rate—really, 11 the alleged violation rate—because the defendant likely believes that the real rate is 12 zero and thus that the evidence does not exist.” Perez v. Rose Hills Co., 131 F.4th 13 804, 808 (9th Cir. 2025). For those reasons, this Circuit permits CAFA defendants to 14 assume a violation rate in light of the plaintiff’s complaint. Considering Plaintiff’s 15 allegations in the instant action, Defendants’ estimates of alleged unpaid on-call and 16 overtime wages are reasonable. 17 Defendants specifically interpret Plaintiff’s unpaid overtime allegations to mean 18 one hour of overtime per week per putative class member.3 Plaintiff contests the 19 reasonableness of Defendants assuming one hour of unpaid overtime work per week, 20 that every putative class member worked long enough shifts to trigger overtime pay, 21 and that no lawful overtime compensation was ever paid by Defendants on the 22 assumed overtime hours. (Mot. at 9, 11-12). 23 The Court views Defendants’ assumptions as eminently reasonable given that 24 Plaintiff alleges a “pattern and practice” of Labor Code violations in their Complaint 25 3 Defendants note in their Notice of Removal that they utilized “the more conservative 26 average employee hourly rate only, as opposed to the weighted average hourly rate, 27 which considers the number of workweeks worked by each employee at that employee’s individual hourly rate. The weighted average hourly rate is $30.80/hour.” 28 Accordingly, such a calculation “underestimates the amount in controversy.” 1 related to Defendants “failing to pay them for all regular and/or overtime wages 2 earned.” (Compl. ¶ 26). Plaintiff further alleges that he and other class members 3 were “required” to work (see id. ¶ 40) more than eight (8) hours in a day and/or forty 4 (40) hours in a week during their employment with Defendants, and that they in fact 5 did work to that extent. (Id. ¶ 25). It therefore follows that an assumption of at least 6 one hour of unpaid per work week is properly “founded on the allegations of the 7 complaint.” Perez, 131 F. 4th at 808. “[A]ssumptions made part of the defendant’s 8 chain of reasoning need not be proven.” Id. Holding otherwise would require 9 defendants to “prove [they] actually violated the law at the assumed rate” while 10 simultaneously maintaining they did not commit the alleged violations. Id.; see also 11 Franklin v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 5:25-CV-03657-BLF, 2025 WL 1983036, at 12 *5 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2025) (noting that “with regard to assumed violation rates, 13 since the violations are merely alleged and the defendant presumably believes that 14 evidence of the violation rate ‘does not exist.’”). 15 Defendants ascertained their unpaid overtime calculations by assuming that at 16 least one hour of overtime per workweek per putative class member went unpaid. It is 17 wholly reasonable for Defendants to derive such an estimate from the imprecise 18 “pattern and practice” allegation by Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶ 26); see also Ray v. Wells 19 Fargo Bank, N.A., 2011 WL 1790123, *67 (C.D. Cal. May 9, 2011) (finding that 20 defendant’s estimates based on one hour of unpaid overtime per class member were 21 reasonable given allegation of regular failure to pay overtime); Stevenson v. Dollar 22 Tree Stores, Inc., 2011 WL 4928753, *4 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (finding that because the 23 complaint did not “lend itself to precise calculations,” defendants’ conservative 24 calculations were reasonable). Moreover, the Court must square its reasoning with 25 Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Perez. 131 F.4th 804 at 808. That opinion 26 admonishes lower courts against requiring Defendants to introduce evidence of an 27 alleged violation rate—which is in effect, a concession of liability. Id. A court, 28 however, can require a defendant to “provide information derived from [their 1 employment] records” as to the number of employees in a putative class. Id. That is 2 precisely what Defendant has provided here to support their calculations. (See Chua 3 Decl. ¶ 5). 4 The Court therefore estimates the amount in controversy as to Plaintiff’s unpaid 5 overtime claims to stand at $7,762,125 without factoring in damages associated with 6 wage statement and waiting time penalties and related attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff may 7 dispute the meaning of “pattern and practice” in their Complaint, but this Court is 8 bound by the language of the complaint upon removal and the logical inferences that 9 flow from it. Plaintiff was “free to use some more specific phrase . . . when drafting 10 the complaint.” Perez, 131 F.4th at 810; see also Eleazar Santos v. The Pictsweet Co., 11 et al., No. 2:25-CV-03181-AB-SSC, 2025 WL 2424357, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 12 2025). Accordingly, the Court accepts Defendants’ estimated violation rate and 13 unpaid overtime calculations. 14 C. Attorney’s Fees 15 Attorney’s fees are “properly included in calculations of the amount in 16 controversy. Garibay, 539 F. App’x at 764. In this Circuit, 25% of the total recovery 17 is the “benchmark” level for reasonable attorney’s fees. Id. The Court accepts 18 Defendants’ proposed 25% recovery for attorney’s fees. That proportion of the 19 estimated $7,762,125 in unpaid overtime hours alone—deemed reasonable by the 20 Court for the foregoing reasons—yields $1,940,531.25 in attorney’s fees. 21 Because the amount in controversy associated with Plaintiff’s unpaid overtime 22 claim—and estimated attorneys’ fees associated with that claim only—far exceeds 23 CAFA’s requirement of $5,000,000, the Court declines to scrutinize Defendants’ 24 assumptions underlying Plaintiff’s remaining claims and related damages. 25 D. Total Amount in Controversy Estimate 26 The Court’s accepted amount in controversy estimates are as follows: 27 28 1 Alleged Unpaid Overtime $7,762,125 2 Alleged Wage Statement Penalties 3 $1,940,531.25 4 Dither Causes of Action

‘ TOTAL At least $9,702,656.25

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Remand.

9 Because the Court need not rely on the documents for which Defendants seek judicial 10 notice, Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice is DENIED as moot.

11 IT IS SO ORDERED. _ 13 Dated: February 25, 2026 14 HON. WESLEY L. HSU 15 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 | 4 The Court need not evaluate the reasonableness of Defendants’ estimates related to 2% alleged penalties relating to meal and rest breaks, wage statements, and waiting time As discussed in this Order, Defendants’ reasonable assumptions as to the other 27 | components of the amount in controversy are sufficient to overcome the CAFA amount in controversy requirement, and it is reasonable to assume that some amount 28 | can be attributed to those penalties. 11