Sean Price v. Natasha Clayborn

Opinion

Opinion issued August 11, 2026

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

he called a petition for bill of review in the trial court. Appellant contends that the challenged orders conflict with the parties’ Mediated Settlement Agreement, as incorporated into the August 11, 2023 Agreed Final Decree of Divorce. The trial court denied relief, and appellant appealed. Appellee now moves to dismiss, arguing that appellant’s purported bill-of-review appeal is an untimely appeal from the post- judgment orders. We agree and dismiss for want of jurisdiction.

A bill of review is an independent equitable action asking a trial court to set aside a final judgment that is no longer subject to challenge by ordinary motions for new trial or appellate remedies. See In re D.L.S., No. 05-08-00173-CV, 2009 WL 1875579, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 1, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). To obtain a bill of review, a petitioner must show: (1) a meritorious claim or defense to the cause of action alleged to support the judgment; (2) which the petitioner was prevented from making by the fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the opposing party; and (3) unmixed with any fault or negligence of the petitioner's own. Id. Although appellant here labeled his trial court filing a bill of review, “[w]e look to the substance of a plea for relief to determine the nature of the pleading, not merely at the form of the title given to it.” See Tex. Med. Res., LLP v. Molina Healthcare of Tex., Inc., 659 S.W.3d 424 (Tex. 2023).

We conclude that the record does not support construing appellant’s motion to vacate as a bill of review. Appellant is not advancing a theory that, if vindicated,

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would result in the trial court setting aside the parties’ August 11, 2023 Agreed Final Decree of Divorce. Rather, he argues that the June 4, 2024 post-decree enforcement and receivership orders violate the decree’s terms. Far from asking that the decree be vacated, he contends that it should be enforced according to his interpretation and that the post-judgment orders are inconsistent with it.

Accordingly, appellant’s purported bill of review was, in substance, a motion to set aside the June 4, 2024 post-judgment orders, the denial of which is not independently appealable. See id. (substance of motion controls); see also Fazzolari v. Fazzolari, No. 01-26-00019-CV, 2026 WL 1139715, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 28, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.); Anassi v. Office of the Att’y Gen. of Tex., No. 01-21-00296-CV, 2021 WL 4733235, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 12, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that denials of motions to set aside a judgment are not independently appealable).

Even if we construe the notice of appeal as a direct appeal of the June 4, 2024 orders – an order appointing a receiver is an appealable interlocutory order – appellant filed his notice of appeal on March 18, 2026, well-after the deadline. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(1); TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1. We therefore lack jurisdiction under any construction of appellant’s appeal.

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Accordingly, we grant appellees’ motions to dismiss and dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f). Any pending motions are dismissed as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams, Justices Rivas-Molloy and Guiney.

Footnotes

1. NO. 01-26-00260-CV ——————————— SEAN PRICE, Appellant V. NATASHA CLAYBORN, Appellee On Appeal from the 308th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2025-82421 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant challenges two post-divorce orders regarding the parties’ former marital residence, both signed on June 4, 2024: (1) an Order Granting Petition for Enforcement of Property Division and (2) an Order Appointing Receiver. On November 6, 2025 – over a year after these orders were signed – appellant filed what