Sean Piatt v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 8, 2019
• Docket: 18A-CR-2294
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any Apr 08 2019, 10:50 am

court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals and Tax Court estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Anna Onaitis Holden Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

Caroline G. Templeton Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Sean Piatt, April 8, 2019 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-2294 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Helen Marchal, Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49G15-1802-F6-6557

Bradford, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2294 | April 8, 2019 Page 1 of 4 Case Summary [1] In February of 2018, Sean Piatt forcibly opened the door of a restroom stall

occupied by N.T. and ordered her to remove her clothes. After N.T. refused,

Piatt told N.T. that he was a police officer and again ordered her to remove her

clothes. Piatt left the restroom after N.T. demanded that he leave. Piatt was

charged with Level 6 felony criminal confinement, Level 6 felony

impersonation of a public servant, and Class B misdemeanor battery. In July of

2018, a jury found Piatt guilty as charged. Piatt contends that the State

produced insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for impersonation of a

public servant. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] On February 25, 2018, N.T.’s grandfather dropped her off at the Greyhound

bus station in Indianapolis. After purchasing a ticket, N.T. went into the

women’s restroom and entered the last stall, closing the door behind her. As

N.T. began to pull down her pants, she noticed a person looking at her through

the gap created by the hinges on the door. The person, later identified as Piatt,

forcefully pulled open the door. N.T. pulled up her pants and attempted to

leave but was stopped when Piatt grabbed her arm. As he stood blocking the

doorway, Piatt ordered N.T. to remove her clothes and demanded to know

what was in her bags. When N.T. refused Piatt’s orders, Piatt told her that he

was a police officer and again ordered her to remove her clothes. The encounter

ended when Piatt left the restroom after N.T. demanded he leave.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2294 | April 8, 2019 Page 2 of 4 [3] On February 25, 2018, the State charged Piatt with Level 6 felony criminal

confinement, Level 6 felony impersonation of a public servant, and Class B

misdemeanor battery. On July 25, 2018, a jury trial was held after which Piatt

was found guilty as charged. On August 23, 2018, Piatt received an aggregate

sentence of 910 days of incarceration.

Discussion and Decision [4] Piatt contends that the State produced insufficient evidence to convict him of

Level 6 felony impersonation of a public servant. When reviewing the

sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, we consider only probative

evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the factfinder’s decision. Young

v. State, 973 N.E.2d 1225, 1226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. It is the role

of the factfinder, not ours, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence.

Id. We will affirm a conviction unless “no reasonable fact-finder could find the

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. To convict Piatt

of Level 6 felony impersonation of a public servant, the State was required to

prove that Piatt intended to induce compliance with his instructions, orders, or

requests by falsely representing that he was a law enforcement officer. Ind.

Code § 35-44.1-2-6. “Intent is a mental state, and the trier of fact often must

infer its existence from surrounding circumstances when determining whether

the requisite intent exists.” Goodner v. State, 685 N.E.2d 1058, 1062 (Ind. 1997).

[5] We conclude that there is sufficient evidence to sustain Piatt’s conviction. The

record indicates that Piatt demanded that N.T. remove her clothes and tell him

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2294 | April 8, 2019 Page 3 of 4 what was inside her bags. After N.T. refused, Piatt told N.T. that he was a

police officer and again ordered her to remove her clothes. A reasonable

factfinder could conclude that Piatt’s intention in telling N.T. that he was a

police officer was to induce her to comply with his orders. Whether N.T.

believed Piatt is inconsequential. See Poole v. State, 559 N.E.2d 1214, 1216 (Ind.

Ct. App. 1990) (“Whether the hospital staff believed him and submitted to his

misrepresentation of authority or otherwise acted to their detriment, is not the

relevant inquiry.”). Piatt argues that his impersonation of a police officer was

“too shoddy” and “slapdash” to establish intent. Appellant’s Br. p. 9–10. His

argument, however, is nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence,

which we will not do. Young, 973 N.E.2d at 1226. Piatt has failed to establish

that the State produced insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for Level

6 felony impersonation of a public servant.

[6] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Crone, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2294 | April 8, 2019 Page 4 of 4