Case: 14-11360 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 14-11360 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-23077-WJZ
SEAN P. REILLY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
GUELSY HERRERA, individual capacity, ERIC ABRAHAMSEN, individual capacity, JENNIFER CHRISTINE DAVIS, JIM H. DAVIS, CARMEN I. GONZALEZ, et. al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida _______________________
(July 27, 2015) Case: 14-11360 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 2 of 7
Before TJOFLAT, JORDAN and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Mr. Sean P. Reilly, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s sua sponte
dismissal of his civil rights complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Because we agree that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477 (1994), bars Mr. Reilly’s claims, we affirm.
I
On August 26, 2013, Mr. Reilly filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against probation officers Guelsy Herrera and Carmen Gonzalez, private citizens
Jim and Jennifer Davis, State Attorney William Meggs, and Assistant State
Attorney Eric Abrahamsen. He alleged that Ms. Davis harbored animosity toward
him due to a prior failed relationship between them, and Ms. Davis and her father
conspired with the other named defendants to send him to jail for a supervised
release violation. Mr. Reilly claimed that the defendants’ unlawful actions led to
the revocation of his supervised release and a sentence of imprisonment of 60
months, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Mr. Reilly was released from
prison on the supervised release violation on December 1, 2013, after serving three
years, and is currently serving a new sentence for an unrelated crime in the Leon
County Jail.
2 Case: 14-11360 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 3 of 7
Pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the district court dismissed Mr. Reilly’s
complaint, ruling that Heck’s favorable-termination requirement barred the
complaint because it challenged the revocation of supervised release. The district
court also ruled that the defendants either acted within the scope of their authority
and were entitled to absolute immunity, or did not act under color of state law.
Further, the district court concluded that Mr. Reilly did not raise a cognizable
conspiracy claim because he failed to show the existence of an agreement between
the defendants and improperly brought a § 1983 action for state tort claims.
On appeal, Mr. Reilly asserts that the district court erred in its determination
that Heck barred his § 1983 action because an alleged Fourth Amendment violation
would not necessarily impugn the validity of his conviction. Mr. Reilly also argues
that Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 18-21 (1998), provides an exception to Heck
that allows him to challenge his supervised release revocation under § 1983
without satisfying the favorable-termination requirement because he is no longer
“in custody,” and therefore not entitled to seek habeas relief. Finally, Mr. Reilly
raises several other arguments regarding the merits of the district court’s order.
II
A district court may dismiss a case filed in forma pauperis at any time if it
“fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). “A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
3 Case: 14-11360 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 4 of 7
unless it appears beyond doubt that the prisoner can prove no set of facts in support
of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Harmon v. Berry, 728 F.2d 1407,
1409 (11th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). “Pro se pleadings are held to a less
stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be
liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir.
1998) (per curiam) (citations omitted). “We review a district court’s sua sponte
dismissal of a suit for failure to state a claim for relief under [§ 1915] de novo.”
Harden v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
III
Heck generally bars any challenges to a previous conviction unless the
conviction “has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or
called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck,
512 U.S. at 487. This is known as the “favorable-termination” requirement.
In a concurring opinion in Spencer, Justice Souter, joined by three other
Justices, suggested an exception to Heck’s general rule. The exception would allow
plaintiffs who are no longer “in custody” to bring actions under § 1983 without
having to satisfy the favorable-termination requirement. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at
20-21. As he had earlier explained in his Heck concurrence:
4 Case: 14-11360 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 5 of 7
If [those] individuals (people who were merely fined, for example, or who have completed short terms of imprisonment, probation, or parole, or who discover (through no fault of their own) a constitutional violation after full expiration of their sentences), like state prisoners, were required to show the prior invalidation of their convictions or sentences in order to obtain § 1983 damages for unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, the result would be to deny any federal forum for claiming a deprivation of federal rights to those who cannot first obtain a favorable state ruling. The reason, of course, is that individuals not “in custody” cannot invoke federal habeas jurisdiction, the only statutory mechanism besides § 1983 by which individuals may sue state officials in federal court for violating federal rights. That would be an untoward result.
Heck, 512 U.S. at 500 (Souter, J., concurring).
Drawing from Justice Souter’s concurrence in Spencer, Mr. Reilly argues
that Heck does not apply to his case because he has been released from custody and
cannot pursue post-conviction relief, thereby making Heck’s favorable-termination
requirement irrelevant. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 21 (Souter, J., concurring) (“[A]
former prisoner, no longer “in custody,” may bring a § 1983 action establishing the
unconstitutionality of a conviction or confinement without being bound to satisfy a
favorable-termination requirement that it would be impossible as a matter of law
for him to satisfy.”).
We have not explicitly ruled on whether a plaintiff may bring a § 1983
action in the event that habeas relief is unavailable, even if success on the merits
would call into question the validity of a conviction. We decline to do so here
5 Case: 14-11360 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 6 of 7
because Mr. Reilly’s case does not fit within the framework of scenarios
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Case: 14-11360 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 14-11360 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-23077-WJZ
SEAN P. REILLY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
GUELSY HERRERA, individual capacity, ERIC ABRAHAMSEN, individual capacity, JENNIFER CHRISTINE DAVIS, JIM H. DAVIS, CARMEN I. GONZALEZ, et. al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida _______________________
(July 27, 2015) Case: 14-11360 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 2 of 7
Before TJOFLAT, JORDAN and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Mr. Sean P. Reilly, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s sua sponte
dismissal of his civil rights complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Because we agree that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477 (1994), bars Mr. Reilly’s claims, we affirm.
I
On August 26, 2013, Mr. Reilly filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against probation officers Guelsy Herrera and Carmen Gonzalez, private citizens
Jim and Jennifer Davis, State Attorney William Meggs, and Assistant State
Attorney Eric Abrahamsen. He alleged that Ms. Davis harbored animosity toward
him due to a prior failed relationship between them, and Ms. Davis and her father
conspired with the other named defendants to send him to jail for a supervised
release violation. Mr. Reilly claimed that the defendants’ unlawful actions led to
the revocation of his supervised release and a sentence of imprisonment of 60
months, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Mr. Reilly was released from
prison on the supervised release violation on December 1, 2013, after serving three
years, and is currently serving a new sentence for an unrelated crime in the Leon
County Jail.
2 Case: 14-11360 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 3 of 7
Pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the district court dismissed Mr. Reilly’s
complaint, ruling that Heck’s favorable-termination requirement barred the
complaint because it challenged the revocation of supervised release. The district
court also ruled that the defendants either acted within the scope of their authority
and were entitled to absolute immunity, or did not act under color of state law.
Further, the district court concluded that Mr. Reilly did not raise a cognizable
conspiracy claim because he failed to show the existence of an agreement between
the defendants and improperly brought a § 1983 action for state tort claims.
On appeal, Mr. Reilly asserts that the district court erred in its determination
that Heck barred his § 1983 action because an alleged Fourth Amendment violation
would not necessarily impugn the validity of his conviction. Mr. Reilly also argues
that Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 18-21 (1998), provides an exception to Heck
that allows him to challenge his supervised release revocation under § 1983
without satisfying the favorable-termination requirement because he is no longer
“in custody,” and therefore not entitled to seek habeas relief. Finally, Mr. Reilly
raises several other arguments regarding the merits of the district court’s order.
II
A district court may dismiss a case filed in forma pauperis at any time if it
“fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). “A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
3 Case: 14-11360 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 4 of 7
unless it appears beyond doubt that the prisoner can prove no set of facts in support
of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Harmon v. Berry, 728 F.2d 1407,
1409 (11th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). “Pro se pleadings are held to a less
stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be
liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir.
1998) (per curiam) (citations omitted). “We review a district court’s sua sponte
dismissal of a suit for failure to state a claim for relief under [§ 1915] de novo.”
Harden v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
III
Heck generally bars any challenges to a previous conviction unless the
conviction “has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or
called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck,
512 U.S. at 487. This is known as the “favorable-termination” requirement.
In a concurring opinion in Spencer, Justice Souter, joined by three other
Justices, suggested an exception to Heck’s general rule. The exception would allow
plaintiffs who are no longer “in custody” to bring actions under § 1983 without
having to satisfy the favorable-termination requirement. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at
20-21. As he had earlier explained in his Heck concurrence:
4 Case: 14-11360 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 5 of 7
If [those] individuals (people who were merely fined, for example, or who have completed short terms of imprisonment, probation, or parole, or who discover (through no fault of their own) a constitutional violation after full expiration of their sentences), like state prisoners, were required to show the prior invalidation of their convictions or sentences in order to obtain § 1983 damages for unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, the result would be to deny any federal forum for claiming a deprivation of federal rights to those who cannot first obtain a favorable state ruling. The reason, of course, is that individuals not “in custody” cannot invoke federal habeas jurisdiction, the only statutory mechanism besides § 1983 by which individuals may sue state officials in federal court for violating federal rights. That would be an untoward result.
Heck, 512 U.S. at 500 (Souter, J., concurring).
Drawing from Justice Souter’s concurrence in Spencer, Mr. Reilly argues
that Heck does not apply to his case because he has been released from custody and
cannot pursue post-conviction relief, thereby making Heck’s favorable-termination
requirement irrelevant. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 21 (Souter, J., concurring) (“[A]
former prisoner, no longer “in custody,” may bring a § 1983 action establishing the
unconstitutionality of a conviction or confinement without being bound to satisfy a
favorable-termination requirement that it would be impossible as a matter of law
for him to satisfy.”).
We have not explicitly ruled on whether a plaintiff may bring a § 1983
action in the event that habeas relief is unavailable, even if success on the merits
would call into question the validity of a conviction. We decline to do so here
5 Case: 14-11360 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 6 of 7
because Mr. Reilly’s case does not fit within the framework of scenarios
mentioned in Justice Souter’s Spencer concurrence.
During his three-year term of imprisonment, Mr. Reilly had ample time to
pursue an appeal or other post-conviction remedies on the supervised release
revocation, yet he did not avail himself of any of them. We doubt that Justice
Souter intended to propose a broad exception to include prisoners who had the
opportunity to challenge their underlying convictions but failed to do so. See
Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 705 (9th Cir. 2003) (ruling that a defendant
“cannot now use his ‘failure timely to pursue habeas remedies’ as a shield against
the implications of Heck.”). Consequently, we conclude that Justice Souter’s
proposed Heck exception in Spencer, even if adopted, does not apply to Mr.
Reilly’s case.
Additionally, Mr. Reilly’s claim that the allegations in the complaint did not
necessarily impugn the validity of his revocation fails. Mr. Reilly alleged that he
never violated the conditions of his supervised release, and that the defendants
engaged in a conspiracy to fabricate an arrest warrant and unlawfully seize him out
of spite. If the defendants did engage in such actions, then the arrest would be
unlawful and the revocation itself would be invalid. Such a claim falls squarely
within the purview of Heck. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of
Mr. Reilly’s complaint.
6 Case: 14-11360 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 7 of 7
IV
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Mr.
Reilly’s complaint.
AFFIRMED.