Seamon v. Acree

236 S.E.2d 688, 142 Ga. App. 662, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 427, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 1441
CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia
DecidedJune 13, 1977
Docket53934
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 236 S.E.2d 688 (Seamon v. Acree) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Seamon v. Acree, 236 S.E.2d 688, 142 Ga. App. 662, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 427, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 1441 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977).

Opinion

Shulman, Judge.

Appellee brought suit on two checks, drawn by appellant, which were dishonored by the drawees. Each check had printed on it the name of a corporation, but each *663 was signed by appellant with no further indication of a representative capacity. This appeal is from the lower court’s holding following trial before the judge alone that appellant is personally liable on the checks.

Submitted May 10, 1977 Decided June 13, 1977 Rehearing denied June 28, 1977. Martin L. Fierman, for appellant. Moulton, Carriere, Davan & Maloof, Bryan M. Cavan, for appellees.

Only one issue is presented for decision by this court: when an instrument which has the name of a corporation printed on it is signed by an individual without additional language setting forth a representative capacity, is the individual personally liable on the obligation evidenced by the instrument? Our short answer is, yes.

Code Ann. § 109A-3—403 (2) provides as follows: "An authorized representative who signs his own name to an instrument . . . (b) except as otherwise established between the immediate parties, is personally obligated if the instrument names the person represented but does not show that the representative signed in a representative capacity. . .”

The "... except as otherwise established...” clause in the quoted Code section has been held to authorize the admission of parol evidence to prove the signature was made in a representative capacity. Kramer v. Johnson, 121 Ga. App. 848 (2) (176 SE2d 108). However, there was no such evidence tendered here. In the absence of proof that the signature was made as a representative, the provisions of Code Ann. § 109-3—403 (2) (b) apply. The inescapable result is personal liability.

Judgment affirmed.

Quillian, P. J., and Banke, J., concur.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
236 S.E.2d 688, 142 Ga. App. 662, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 427, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 1441, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/seamon-v-acree-gactapp-1977.