UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
GABRIEL SEALE, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 25-79 (RC) : v. : Re Document No.: 11 : DOWNTOWNDC BID, : : Defendant. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
I. INTRODUCTION
Gabriel Seale (“Plaintiff”) filed this suit pro se against his former employer
DowntownDC BID (“Defendant” or “DowntownDC”), alleging that Defendant engaged in
discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin and retaliation in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Am. Compl. at 4, ECF No. 7-1. Defendant moves to
dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss at 3–5
(“MTD”), ECF No. 11. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 1
In December 2023, Plaintiff applied for a posted “Safety Maintenance Ambassador”
position with Defendant via email. Am. Compl. at 7. After not receiving a response to his
1 For purposes of deciding this Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts all facts alleged in the Amended Complaint as true. See e.g., Jackson v. Modly, 949 F.3d 763, 767 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (quoting True the Vote, Inc. v. IRS, 831 F.3d 551, 555 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). application for a period of weeks, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s headquarters to inquire about his
application’s status. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the receptionist, after listening to the inquiry,
“shout[ed]” at him and told him that the posting should have been removed because the job was
unavailable. Id. When Plaintiff asked for the hiring manager’s contact information, the
receptionist asserted that “[e]ven though there’s a lot of blacks working here the hiring manager
is [S]panish so don’t think you[’re] getting hired.” Id.
In January 2024, Plaintiff approached a group of DowntownDC’s staff on a street corner,
including Lukas Umana, an Operations Director of DowntownDC. Id. Plaintiff told Mr. Umana
of the receptionist’s statement. Id. at 7–8. Mr. Umana asked Plaintiff to send him a resume to
his direct email, and in March 2024, Plaintiff was invited to interview for the Safety
Maintenance Ambassador position at the organization. Id. at 8. Around April 2, 2024, Plaintiff
was hired by Defendant and began work on April 8, 2024. Id.
After completing training with other employees, Plaintiff alleges that the other newly
trained employees were given tasks at the start of each day while he was asked to sit in the break
room and wait for an assignment. Id. While sitting in the breakroom, Plaintiff alleges that he
overheard three employees discussing that he “forged [his] way into the company” because he
complained of the receptionist’s actions to Mr. Umana. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that he was never issued a radio phone. Id. at 9–10, 12. Without a radio
phone, Defendant could not monitor Plaintiff’s location and Plaintiff was prevented from
requesting more supplies and contacting his supervisors. Id. at 10. Plaintiff’s manager told him
that he “should have had [a radio phone] weeks before” and did not know why Plaintiff did not
yet have one. Id.
2 On May 3, 2024, Plaintiff had an altercation with a female coworker. Id. at 10–11.
Plaintiff, his female coworker, and one other employee were directed to go to work in “zone 8”,
but Plaintiff believed that his female coworker led them to “zone 7” instead. Id. at 10. Plaintiff
asserted that the coworker went against supervisor instructions and ignored his insistence that the
group was in the wrong location, so Plaintiff contacted the supervisor on his phone to report the
female coworker. Id. at 10–11. Plaintiff tapped the coworker on the shoulder to inform her that
the group was not in the correct location, and she began “cursing [at Plaintiff] in public” for
touching and reporting her. Id. Hearing of the confrontation, Plaintiff’s supervisors contacted
the group minutes later and directed them to return to headquarters. Id. at 11. There, Plaintiff’s
supervisors asked him to file an incident report and told him that he would receive a warning for
the unapproved contact he made with the female coworker, but that he was expected to “return to
work the next morning in uniform.” Id. On May 7, 2024, Plaintiff was brought into
headquarters and fired. Id. at 12.
Plaintiff filed discrimination and retaliation claims with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, which declined to investigate in November 2024 and informed
Plaintiff of his right to sue. Id. at 13; Ex. to Am. Compl. at 1, ECF No. 7-2. In January 2025,
Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant. 2 Am. Compl. at 1. Plaintiff alleges that he was
discriminated against on the basis of race, color, and national origin. Id. at 4. He further alleges
retaliation. Id. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the Amended Complaint fails
2 In the original complaint, Plaintiff also named as defendants two employees of DowntownDC: Human Resources Manager Christian Romero and Director of Operations Lukas Umana. See Compl. at 2. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss these charges on April 2, 2025, arguing that supervisors cannot be held individually liable under Title VII suits. MTD at 5–6. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his claims against both individuals, leaving only the claims against Defendant to be addressed here. See Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, ECF No. 13.
3 to state a claim on which relief can be granted. See MTD at 3–5; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Plaintiff maintains that the facts described in the Amended Complaint provide sufficient
evidence that the receptionist’s statements were discriminatory and that no nexus is required
under Title VII between the adverse employment action and the discrimination. Pl.’s Opp’n
Mot. Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 11, ECF No. 14. Plaintiff also argues that the facts presented in
the Amended Complaint are sufficient to make his retaliation claim plausible. Id. at 3–6.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss does not test a plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits, but
rather “tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C.
Cir. 2002). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A plaintiff’s factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true
(even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). While the Court takes
all alleged facts to be true when deciding a motion to dismiss, statements that “are conclusory
[are] not entitled to be assumed true.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.
When considering a motion to dismiss, the complaint must be construed “liberally in the
plaintiff’s favor with the benefit of all reasonable inferences derived from the facts alleged.”
Stewart v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 471 F.3d 169, 173 (D.C. Cir. 2006). While a pro se
complaint “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (internal citation omitted) (quoting
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)) pro se plaintiffs must still meet the requirements of
4 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co. v. Henderson, 862
F.3d 29, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court first considers Plaintiff’s discrimination claim and then his retaliation claim.
As discussed below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim, and grants
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
A. Discrimination Claim
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to “provide any information showing how an
adverse employment action gives rise to an inference of discrimination.” Def.’s Reply Pl.’s
Opp’n Mot. Dismiss at 1, ECF No. 16. While Defendant concedes that Plaintiff, an African
American, has sufficiently alleged that he is a member of a protected class, and that his
termination was an adverse employment action, Defendant asserts that the statement of the
receptionist is insufficient to support an inference of discrimination for Plaintiff’s termination
because the statement “occurred months prior to [Plaintiff] being hired at DowntownDC.” Id. at
1–2. And Defendant maintains that Plaintiff’s “list of perceived slights and grievances . . . make
no reference whatsoever” to “race, color, or national origin,” so they too fail to support his claim.
MTD at 4.
To successfully plead a claim of discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that “(1) []he is a member of a protected class; (2) []he suffered an adverse
employment action; and (3) the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of discrimination.”
Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 364 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). “[P]laintiff must
allege some facts that demonstrate that his race was the reason for [a] defendant’s actions.”
Ndondji v. InterPark Inc., 768 F. Supp. 2d 263, 274 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Middlebrooks v.
5 Godwin Corp., 722 F. Supp. 2d 82, 88 (D.D.C. 2010)) (second alteration in original). An
inference of discriminatory motivation for “Title VII claims may be proven by direct or
circumstantial evidence.” Abdelhamid v. Lane Constr. Corp., 744 F. Supp. 3d 10, 19 (D.D.C.
2024) (quoting Oviedo v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 299 F. Supp. 3d 50, 59 (D.D.C.
2018), aff’d 948 F.3d 386 (D.C. Cir. 2020)). “While courts have not precisely defined what
constitutes direct evidence, it is clear that at a minimum, direct evidence does not include stray
remarks in the workplace, particularly those made by nondecision-makers or statements made by
decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process itself.” Sun v. D.C. Gov’t, 133 F. Supp. 3d
155, 164 (D.D.C. 2015), aff’d, 686 F. App’x 5 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Hajjar–Nejad v. George
Wash. Univ., 37 F. Supp. 3d 90, 125 (D.D.C. 2014)). In the absence of direct evidence, plaintiffs
can demonstrate discriminatory motivation through circumstantial evidence, such as by alleging
that they were “treated differently from similarly situated employees who are not part of the
protected class.” George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 412 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to make his
discrimination claim plausible. The only mention of race, color, or national origin in the
Amended Complaint was made by the receptionist when she told Plaintiff that “the hiring
manager is [S]panish so don’t think you[’re] getting hired.” Am. Compl. at 7. Plaintiff does not
describe any further interaction with Defendant where race, color, or national origin are
addressed, nor does Plaintiff provide additional facts which might support that his race was
related to his termination. See id. at 12; Doe #1 v. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., 554 F. Supp. 3d
75, 102 (D.D.C. 2021) (“[P]laintiff must ‘allege some facts that demonstrate [his] race was the
reason for defendant’s actions’ and cannot merely ‘invoke his race in the course of a claim’s
narrative.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Bray v. RHT, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 3, 5
6 (D.D.C. 1990))); Tovihlon v. Allied Aviation, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 3d 6, 16–17 (D.D.C. 2018)
(finding that one usage of a slur by a supervisor long before the plaintiff’s termination “was too
remote to give rise to an inference of discrimination”). There are no facts alleged that
demonstrate the receptionist was a decision maker or otherwise influenced Plaintiff’s
termination. See Am. Compl. at 7, 12. Because of this, it is only “speculative” that the
receptionist’s statements illustrate discriminatory motivation for Plaintiff’s termination. See
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level”) (citations omitted). Even if it was possible that the receptionist influenced
Plaintiff’s work experience, her statement was “unrelated to the decisional process” of Plaintiff’s
termination. See Sun, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 164 (quoting Hajjar–Nejad, 37 F. Supp. 3d at 125).
This discriminatory comment was made four months before Plaintiff’s termination. See Am.
Compl. at 7–8, 12–13. Altogether, it is not plausible that the discriminatory views of a
receptionist with no further interaction with Plaintiff affected Plaintiff’s employment outcomes
months later. As a result, Plaintiff has not pleaded facts that would directly support that
Defendant had a discriminatory motive.
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint also does not support an inference of discrimination on
the basis of comparison to other employees. Plaintiff does not describe the race, color, or
national origin of his co-workers in his Amended Complaint. See id. at 8. Plaintiff, however,
includes facts suggesting that the majority of the individuals working for Defendant, like
Plaintiff, are African American. Id. at 7. The D.C. Circuit recently held that, to overcome a
motion to dismiss for Title VII racial discrimination claims, comparators should be described in
more than a superficial manner. See Joyner v. Morrison & Foerster LLP, No. 23-7142, 2025
WL 1717402, at *4 (D.C. Cir. June 20, 2025). Work experience, qualifications, supervisors,
7 availability of work, and similarity of work to a plaintiff are factors that can justify comparison
and support an inference of discrimination. See id. at *5–6. Plaintiff has not detailed any of
these traits for his differently treated coworkers, let alone the key fact necessary to make his
claim plausible: that his comparator coworkers were a different race. See Am. Compl. at 7. As
such, Plaintiff provides no apt comparator by which discriminatory motive can be inferred.
More importantly, Plaintiff’s claim is not plausible because he was hired after the
receptionist’s discriminatory statement was made. Id. at 7–8. Because Plaintiff still received the
position, the racially discriminatory perspective of the receptionist had no impact on Plaintiff’s
ability to obtain employment from Defendant once he connected with Mr. Umana. See id. There
is no factual allegation supporting that the receptionist’s discriminatory statement interfered with
Plaintiff’s employment after he was granted an interview with the company. See id. at 8–13.
Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege that the receptionist, who allegedly harbored the
discriminatory animus, played any role in his termination. See id. at 11–12. It is implausible
that Plaintiff’s termination by his managers was the result of the discriminatory perspective of a
receptionist months before Plaintiff was hired by Defendant. Indeed, Plaintiff does not even
allege that his termination was motivated by his race, color, or national origin in his opposition
brief. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 2–4. The Court does not find that the allegations of discrimination rise
beyond “threadbare recitals of a cause of action’s elements, supported by mere conclusory
statements.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. As a result of these insufficiencies, Defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss is granted as to Plaintiff’s discrimination claim.
B. Retaliation Claim
Defendant further maintains that Plaintiff’s retaliation claim must be dismissed because
Plaintiff fails to allege (1) that he participated in protected activity under Title VII and (2) a
8 causal link existed between his termination and reporting the receptionist’s statement to Mr.
Umana. See MTD at 4–5. Plaintiff counters that “reporting the receptionist’s discriminatory
statement” was protected activity and that dissatisfaction with this action contextualized his
employment going forward. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 4; Am. Compl. at 9. While the Court believes
that Plaintiff’s report of the receptionist’s statement to Mr. Umana might constitute protected
activity under Title VII, the Court agrees that Plaintiff failed to present sufficient facts to make it
plausible that retaliation for this activity was a cause of Plaintiff’s termination.
To state a retaliation claim, “plaintiffs must show (1) that an employee engaged in
statutorily protected activity; (2) that the employee suffered a materially adverse action by the
employee’s employer; and (3) that a causal link connects the two.” Howard R.L. Cook & Tommy
Shaw Found. ex rel. Black Emps. of Libr. of Cong., Inc. v. Bullington, 737 F.3d 767, 772 (D.C.
Cir. 2013). Protected activity encompasses both official and unofficial actions “oppos[ing] any
practice made an unlawful employment practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Filing a complaint
with an administrative agency or in court constitutes protected activity for the purposes of Title
VII. See Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 903 (D.C. Cir. 2006). However, “utilizing informal
grievance procedures such as complaining to management or human resources about the
discriminatory conduct” can also be protected activity. Peters v. District of Columbia, 873 F.
Supp. 2d 158, 200 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Richardson v. Gutierrez, 477 F. Supp. 2d 22, 27
(D.D.C. 2007)). When an informal complaint “in some way allege[s] unlawful discrimination,
not just frustrated ambition[,]” it can be protected activity under Title VII. Broderick v.
Donaldson, 437 F.3d 1226, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
Here, Plaintiff’s statements to Mr. Umana about the receptionist’s discriminatory remarks
and representations during the hiring process are plausibly protected activity under Title VII.
9 See Fennell v. AARP, 770 F. Supp. 2d 118, 127 (D.D.C. 2011) (“The pleading burden is not
great, and courts in this Circuit have consistently recognized the ‘ease with which a plaintiff
claiming employment discrimination can survive a . . . motion to dismiss.’”) (quoting Rouse v.
Berry, 680 F. Supp. 2d 233, 236 (D.D.C. 2010)). However, whether Plaintiff’s actions were
protected activity is not outcome determinative for this motion. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
does not plausibly establish that any adverse employment action was causally related to reporting
the receptionist’s behavior. Plaintiff alleges, based in part on overhearing conversations between
employees, that he was being granted fewer opportunities and less favorable terms, such as
deprivation of a radio locator phone, because he reported the receptionist. See Am. Compl. at 8–
11. He further speculates that making the report was the cause of him not immediately receiving
assignments at the start of every workday. See id. at 8–9. But Plaintiff does not connect these
purported “retaliations” to his report of the receptionist’s comments with any non-speculative
factual allegations. See id. 7–13. Nor does he connect his complaint about the receptionist to his
termination. See id. at 12.
Most importantly, Plaintiff’s employment timeline prevents his claims from being
plausible. There was a period of three months between Plaintiff reporting the incident with the
receptionist and his invitation to interview, and there were four months between Plaintiff’s report
of the receptionist and his termination. Id. at 7–8, 12. This extended period makes it implausible
that reporting the receptionist was the cause of his alleged mistreatment or termination. See
Greer v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of D.C., 113 F. Supp. 3d 297, 311 (D.D.C. 2015) (“When relying on
temporal proximity . . . three months is perceived as approaching the outer limit.”); Keys v.
Donovan, 37 F. Supp. 3d 368, 372 (D.D.C. 2014) (recognizing that courts relying on temporal
proximity to establish causality “uniformly hold that the temporal proximity must be ‘very
10 close’”) (quoting Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001)). Because Plaintiff
was hired after he reported the receptionist, the activity appeared to have no effect on his
employment possibilities, breaking the causal chain.
Further, Defendant alleges no facts in the Amended Complaint that make it plausible that
Defendant hired Plaintiff for the purpose of retaliating against him for reporting the
discriminatory statement. See Vatel v. All. of Auto. Mfrs., 627 F.3d 1245, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(“‘[W]hen the person who made the decision to fire was the same person who made the decision
to hire, it is difficult to impute to [that person] an invidious motivation that would be inconsistent
with the decision to hire,’ especially ‘when the firing has occurred only a short time after the
hiring.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 298 F.3d
989, 996 (D.C. Cir. 2002))); Moreno-Livini v. AFL-CIO Hous. Inv. Tr., No. 24-cv-1392, 2024
WL 4144112, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2024) (dismissing racial discrimination claim as
implausible where plaintiff alleged the same people who hired her discriminated against her as
soon as she arrived). Plaintiff fails to create a plausible causal link between the report he made
in January 2024 and his work conditions and termination months later. See Am. Compl. at 7–13.
Even accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim does not plead
sufficient “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Motion to Dismiss
is thus granted as to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.
11 V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED without
prejudice. The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to file an Amended Complaint on or before
August 6, 2025, that cures the deficiencies identified by the Court in this Memorandum Opinion.
An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.
Dated: July 7, 2025 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge