SCUTERI v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

District Court, S.D. Indiana·Decided March 28, 2025·No. 2:23-cv-00103·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

MICHAEL ANDREW SCUTERI, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 2:23-cv-00103-MJD-JMS ) PABLO PEREZ Dr., et al., ) ) Defendants. )

ORDER Michael Andrew Scuteri, an inmate of the Indiana Department of Correction ("IDOC"), is incarcerated at the Putnamville Correctional Facility in Greencastle, Indiana ("Putnamville"). [Dkt. 38; Dkt. 40.] He is proceeding pro se in this matter on two Eight Amendment claims of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. [Dkt. 29.] The issue now before the Court for resolution is the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. I. Background Mr. Scuteri filed his initial complaint on March 8, 2023, [Dkt. 1], which he amended on April 4, 2023, [Dkt. 12]. Mr. Scuteri claims that on May 7, 2021, he was severely injured when he drove his vehicle into a wall at sixty-five to seventy miles per hour. [Dkt. 30 at 2.] Mr. Scuteri was incarcerated following the crash and has remained so ever since. The claimed injuries include fractures to and the narrowing and bulging of multiple vertebrae. Id. Despite this, Mr. Scuteri claims that he never received "proper medical treatment or rehabilitation" for his injuries, was refused the use of his back and neck braces, was unable to acquire the prescribed dosage of pain medication,1 was refused accommodations and "Medical Lay-In" status, and was required to work a physical job. [Dkt. 30 at 3.] The Court screened the amended complaint and dismissed all claims except Mr. Scuteri's claim for "injunctive relief against Centurion to ensure proper medical care for Mr. Scuteri's back

and spine injuries consistent with the requirements of the Eighth Amendment." [Dkt. 17 at 3-5.] Mr. Scuteri moved to amend his complaint a second time on June 29, 2023, seeking to add damages claims against Centurion employees, IDOC employees, and other defendants. [Dkt. 28.] The Court screened the second amended complaint and Mr. Scuteri is now proceeding under the following claims: 1. An Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need against Centurion Health Services, LLC (injunctive and declaratory relief only); and 2. Eighth Amendment claims for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need against Dr. Pablo Perez and Unit Team Member Jade Reedy, in their individual capacities (compensatory and punitive damages).

[Dkt. 29.] Initially, each Defendant asserted the affirmative defense that Mr. Scuteri failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing this lawsuit as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. As this defense must be resolved before reaching the merits of this case, see Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2008), and Perez v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 536 (7th Cir. 1999), the Court issued an Entry Directing Development of Exhaustion Defense and Issuing Partial Stay on October 11, 2023, [Dkt. 41].

1 The Court granted a preliminary injunction with respect to this concern on January 13, 2025, requiring Defendants Centurion and Perez to provide Plaintiff with 500mg of Tylenol three times per day. [Dkt. 140.] On August 2, 2024, the Court denied Defendant Reedy's motion for summary judgment, [Dkt. 45], and notified Defendant Reedy of the Court's intention to grant summary judgment in Mr. Scuteri's favor. [Dkt. 82.] Defendant Reedy withdrew his exhaustion defense on August 8, 2024, [Dkt. 86]. In the same Order, the Court denied Defendants Centurion and Dr. Perez's

motion for summary judgment, [Dkt. 51], and gave those parties (hereinafter referred to as "Defendants") seven days to either request a Pavey hearing or withdraw their exhaustion defense. [Dkt. 82.] On Defendants' motion, [Dkt. 84], the Court granted leave to depose Mr. Scuteri and ordered Defendants to withdraw their exhaustion defense or request a Pavey hearing within three business days of the deposition. [Dkt. 85.] Defendants notified the Court that they wished to proceed with a hearing in this matter pursuant to Pavey v. Conley on September 10, 2024, [Dkt. 96]. The Pavey hearing was held on February 14, 2025, and the Court took the matter under advisement. [Dkt. 151.] For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Defendants have failed to prove that Mr. Scuteri did not exhaust the administrative remedies available to him.

II. Applicable Law The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") requires a prisoner to exhaust his available administrative remedies before bringing a suit concerning prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002). The statutory exhaustion requirement is that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions . . . by a prisoner . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). "[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong." Porter, 534 U.S. at 532. "To exhaust administrative remedies, a prisoner must comply strictly with the prison's administrative rules by filing grievances and appeals as the rules dictate." Reid v. Balota, 962 F.3d 325, 329 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006)). A "prisoner must submit inmate complaints and appeals 'in the place, and at the time, the prison's

administrative rules require.'" Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 655 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002)). While the exhaustion requirement is strict, it "hinges on the availability of administrative remedies: An inmate, that is, must exhaust available remedies, but need not exhaust unavailable ones." Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016) (internal quotation omitted). "[T]he ordinary meaning of the word 'available' is 'capable of use for the accomplishment of a purpose,' and that which 'is accessible or may be obtained.'" Id. The Supreme Court recognizes at least three circumstances where an administrative remedy is "not capable of use" and is thus unavailable: (1) where "it operates as a simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates," Ross, 578 U.S. at 643; (2) where the "administrative scheme" is "so opaque" as to be practically

"incapable of use," id.; and (3) where "administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation." Id. at 644. Thus, for example, "exhaustion is not required when the prison officials responsible for providing grievance forms refuse to give a prisoner the forms necessary to file an administrative grievance." Hill v. Snyder, 817 F.3d 1037, 1041 (7th Cir. 2016).

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Related

Porter v. Nussle
534 U.S. 516 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Woodford v. Ngo
548 U.S. 81 (Supreme Court, 2006)
Curtis L. Dale v. Harley G. Lappin
376 F.3d 652 (Seventh Circuit, 2004)
Pavey v. Conley
544 F.3d 739 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)
Darreyll Thomas v. Michael Reese
787 F.3d 845 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Asher Hill v. Jerry Snyder
817 F.3d 1037 (Seventh Circuit, 2016)
Ross v. Blake
578 U.S. 632 (Supreme Court, 2016)
Elijah Reid v. Marc Balota
962 F.3d 325 (Seventh Circuit, 2020)