Scully Signal Co. v. Olson

217 F. Supp. 737, 137 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 470, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10042
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedApril 2, 1963
DocketNo. 62-707
StatusPublished

This text of 217 F. Supp. 737 (Scully Signal Co. v. Olson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Scully Signal Co. v. Olson, 217 F. Supp. 737, 137 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 470, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10042 (D. Mass. 1963).

Opinion

WYZANSKI, District Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), plaintiff, as assignee of Rowell’s U. S. Patent No. 2,900,915, filed this action complaining that defendants had infringed it. Defendants, in addition to denying validity and infringement, prayed, by way of counterclaim that the patent be declared invalid, that defendants be declared not to have infringed, and that they recover attorneys’ fees as well as costs. The corporate defendant also sought an injunction restraining plaintiff from notifying prospective customers of the alleged infringement. Despite the breadth of the pleadings, no evidence was offered with respect to claim 2 of the patent, and this Court regards any dispute with respect to it as moot.

The invention set forth in claim 1 relates to an automatic engine cut-off for pump-equipped tank-truck vehicles, such as the ordinary oil truck which delivers fuel to buildings for heating.

Originally fuel oil was delivered from trucks by simple gravity feed systems. Later, pumps were installed. At first, positive displacement pumps were used. To speed delivery of the fuel and to reduce maintenance costs, those in the trucking business wished to use, instead of positive displacement pumps, the familiar centrifugal pump, which would receive its power from the truck engine. But there were dangers of serious destruction from the use of the centrifugal pump if the operator ever accidentally [738]*738“reved up” the engine or drove away inadvertently with the power take-off engaged. The problem was to cut off the power when danger threatened, and promptly thereafter to restore the current to the engine.

Rowell devised a simple pressure-actuated switch operating a circuit in parallel with the low voltage side of the engine ignition system. At a given maximum pressure the switch closed and thereby short circuited the low voltage side of the ignition system. Rowell contemplated two modes of operation: under one (which may be ignored) the pressure sensitive switch would completely stop the engine; and under the other (which is relevant in this case) a faster switch would momentarily interrupt the engine, but, after the danger point had passed and while the engine was still rotating, would re-engage it.

Claim 1 of the Rowell patent reads as follows:

“In a vehicle for transporting and dispensing fluids having a tank and an internal combustion engine for propelling said vehicle provided with an ignition system having a pair of make and break contacts in the primary circuit thereof, the combination comprising a power take-off mechanism, a fluid pump driven by said power take-off mechanism having the inlet thereof connected to said tank and the outlet thereof connected to a fluid discharge conduit, means for selectively actuating said power take-off mechanism by said engine, a pressure sensitive switch connected to said fluid discharge conduit and actuated by the discharge pressure of said pump to close its contacts, fluid flow control means positioned in the connection between said pressure sensitive switch and said fluid discharge conduit, means for adjusting said switch to vary the pressure operating range thereof, means electrically connecting said pressure sensitive switch in parallel to said make and break contacts, whereby during operation of said pump and predetermined continuance of a preselected pressure in said fluid discharge conduit, said pressure sensitive switch is actuated to short circuit said make and break contacts to interrupt the operation of said ignition system.”

The first issue in this case is what is the meaning of this claim.

Analytically it covers a combination of 7 elements:

(1) a power take-off mechanism;

(2) a fluid pump driven by the power take-off and connected to the tank and the fluid discharge conduit;

(3) means for selectively activating the power take-off mechanism;

(4) a pressure sensitive switch connected to the fluid discharge conduit and activated by the fluid discharge pressure of the pump to close its contacts;

(5) fluid flow control means positioned in the connection between the pressure sensitive switch and the fluid discharge conduit;

(6) means for adjusting the switch to vary the pressure operating range; and

(7) means electrically connecting the pressure sensitive switch in parallel to the make and break contacts.

If, for the moment, item 5 above be disregarded, the meaning of the rest of the claim is not difficult or disputed. What it describes is an engine (element 1) which can be put on and off (element 3), which rotates a pump (element 2), such engine being governed by a switch responsive to fluid pressure (element 4), the switch being adjustable (element 6), and the switch being electrically connected in parallel with the ignition system so that it makes and breaks the contacts necessary for the engine to operate (element 7).

What is in dispute is whether the “fluid flow control means” (element 5) refers to a valve or like adjustable control or [739]*739refers to anything whatsoever which retards the rapid flow or prevents all flow of fluid from the fluid discharge conduit toward the sensitive switch.

Plaintiff’s position is that a control means does not necessarily contemplate adjustable control or moving parts, but embraces any means which by friction retards a rapid flow, or prevents all flow, of fluid. Thus in the plaintiff’s view it, for example, includes a “pin hole” orifice operating on viscosity friction or any other purely frictional prevention of flow. Defendants’ view is that the phrase “fluid flow control means” as used in the patent contemplates some adjustability, as is indicated by the snubbing valve described in the patent specifications, (Column 4, lines 46-47).

We may assume that in ordinary lay usage and in ordinary scientific usage “control” has not necessarily the narrow connotation advocated by defendants. In lay usage a means is a “control” means if it exercises restraint, or dominates, or holds in check, or represses, even if it is quite inflexible, and not responsive to any adjustment. The scientific usage is equally broad according to Dr. Finston, plaintiff’s expert. He expressly said the term did not imply “a moving part” (Tr. 122).

But the question is whether as used in claim 1 of this patent the phrase “fluid flow control means” has a connotation or interpretation narrower than would be suggested by the usual lay or scientific usage of the word “control.” It is in this connection that defendants properly draw attention to the patentee’s statement in his specification that “Another necessary requirement is the adjustable provision disclosed by the snubbing valve.” (Column 4, lines 46-47). From this declaration that an “adjustable provision” in “the fluid flow control means” is a “necessary requirement”, we can have no doubt that this patentee used, and this patent uses, the term “fluid flow control means” in claim 1 of the patent to mean “adjustable control”, not mere control by inertia or friction. To ignore this restrictive usage would be to depart from the familiar rule not merely of patent law but of documentary construction that “A patent must be read as a whole.” Progressive Engineering, Inc. v. Machinecraft, Inc., 1st Cir., 273 F.2d 593, 598; Lincoln Stores, Inc. v.

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Related

Progressive Engineering, Inc. v. MacHinecraft, Inc.
273 F.2d 593 (First Circuit, 1960)
Lincoln Stores, Inc. v. Nashua Mfg. Co.
157 F.2d 154 (First Circuit, 1946)
Brock v. Brown
138 F. Supp. 628 (D. Maryland, 1956)

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Bluebook (online)
217 F. Supp. 737, 137 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 470, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10042, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/scully-signal-co-v-olson-mad-1963.