Scruggs v. Memphis & Charleston Railroad

108 U.S. 368, 2 S. Ct. 780, 27 L. Ed. 756, 1883 U.S. LEXIS 1048
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedApril 30, 1883
Docket116
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 108 U.S. 368 (Scruggs v. Memphis & Charleston Railroad) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Scruggs v. Memphis & Charleston Railroad, 108 U.S. 368, 2 S. Ct. 780, 27 L. Ed. 756, 1883 U.S. LEXIS 1048 (1883).

Opinion

Me. Justice "Woods

delivered the opinion of the court.

Mrs. Scruggs now complains of the decree,.so far as it concerns the railroad company, on the sole ground that it directed the value of the rents and occupancy of the hotel and improve- *374 inputs to be credited upon the decree in her favor against the railroad company.

She also insists that the decree against her in favor of Yiser was erroneous,,for reasons which will be found stated hereafter.

Her contention is, that having obtained a decree for the value of the hotel and improvements- built by John W. Scruggs upon .the lands of the-railroad company, with damages for the appeal, and interest, to be paid upon the surrender by her of the hotel and improvements to the railroad company, she was entitled to the payment of her decree with interest, and as long as the railroad company failed to pay the decree, was not chargeable with the rents or the value of the occupancy of the premises while she retained possession.

We cannot assent to this claim. It appears from the agreement to submit to arbitrators, that both parties,’ the railroad company on the one hand, and John W. Scruggs and Narcissa, his wife, to-whom he had conveyed his leasehold and improvements, on the other, had agreed that the property should be surrendered to the railroad company, and that, in pursuance of the original contract between John W. Scruggs and the railroad company, the latter was to pay the value of the improvements. -It was mairfly to fix the value of these improvements that the reference to arbitrators was made, and it was agreed that on the payment of the sum so fixed Scruggs and his wife should surrender the property to the railroad company, and the amount so fixed should “ be a hen on said .property.” '

The arbitrators decided that on the payment of the sum awarded by them, Mrs. Scruggs should deliver the possession of the hotel to the railroad company.

In her bill filed to enforce this award, Mrs. Scruggs prays that, the railroad company maybe compelled to pay the award, and that “ her hen for the same on said property may be enforced.”

The court in which her bih was filed made a decree to the effect that Mrs. Scruggs had a hen on the property for the amount of said award, with interest thereon from January 21st, 1871, ordered-its payment within thirty days, and in default of payment, directed that the property should be sold and the *375 proceeds applied to the payment of the amount due on the award. ■ This decree was in all respects affirmed by the Supreme Court of Mississippi.

"We think that upon these facts Mrs. Scruggs must in equity be treated as if she was a mortgagee in possession. All the parties and the chancery and supreme courts have treated the sum awarded Mrs. Scruggs as a lien upon the property, and it was decreed, and no one disputed, that she Was entitled to retain possession until her lien was discharged.

Treating her as a mortgagee in possession, she is accountable for the net rents and profits of the estate. If her possession was by tenant, she is accountable for such net rents and profits as she could with reasonable diligence have received. Moore v. De Graw, 1 Halst. Ch. 346; Benham v. Rowe, 2 Cal. 387; Kellogg v. Rockwell, 19 Conn. 446; Harrison v. Wyse, 24 Conn. 1; Reitenbaugh v. Ludwick, 31 Penn. St. 131; Breckenridge v. Brooks, 2 A. K. Marsh, 335; Tharp v. Feltz, 6 B. Mon. 6; Anthony v. Rogers, 20 Missouri, 281.

There is no equity in the contention of Mrs. Scruggs, that she should receive interest on the debt secured by her hen, and not account for the rents and profits of the property on which her hen rested while it was in her possession.

She says that the railroad company might have had immediate possession by paying the amount of the award. So any mortgagee in possession might say the mortgagor could take possession on paying off the mortgage debt, but this does not excuse the mortgagee from accounting for the rents and profits of the mortgaged property received by him.

It appears that the railroad company had ground for refusing to pay the sum awarded by the arbitrators as the value of the property. The only question submitted to the arbitrators was the true construction of the contract between John W. Scruggs and the railroad, company, and the value of the property, or rather, as the arbitrators understood it, the value of the improvements placed by John W. Scruggs on the land of the railroad company. They were not authorized to adjust and settle the accounts between the railroad company and Scruggs. "When, therefore, Mrs. Scruggs filed her bill to eh- *376 force the award, it was admitted by her counsel that the. matter of the ground rent was not included in the award, and that the same ought to be deducted from the amount awarded by the arbitrators, and that she should be permitted to set off as against such rents any amount due by the railroad company for board of employees, the said amount to be -adjusted by reference to the master of the court.

The- award did not, therefore, settle the controversy between the parties. The railroad company was justified in refusing to pay the award until the deductions therefrom, to which it was admitted that it was entitled, should be ascertained, and in defending the suit brought by Mrs. Scruggs to enforce the payment of the entire award. 'While this litigation was pending, the rents and profits actually received in cash by her were $10,514, and she herself occupied the premises in person for two years.

The court below found that there was due the railroad company, by reason. of rents incurred by Mrs. Scruggs and the occupancy of the premises by her, the sum of $17,414.50. • The testimony in the record fully sustains this finding. As Mrs. Scruggs insisted that she should have interest on the amount decreed her by the Chancery and Supreme Courts of Mississippi, she was not entitled also to claim the rents of the premises.

The case, therefore, stands thus: The railroad company was indebted to Mrs. Scruggs in the sima of $31,666, which was a lien upon the premises, and Mrs. Scruggs was in possession. On the other hand, the amount of the decree and interest, it was admitted, were subject to be reduced by the ground rents due to the railroad company. Mrs. Scruggs, who was shown to be insolvent, was proceeding to collect by execution the full amount of her decree, with interestthe railroad company was compelled,, in order to protect itself from loss, to file the .bill in this case to halve the decree credited with the amount due for the ground rents. While this litigation was pending, Mrs. Scruggs received in cash rents to the amount of $10,514, and occupied the premises herself two years.

She. .was clearly liable to account for the rents received by her, and for a reasonable rental while the premises were actually occupied by her. The court below did not charge her *377 with a dollar for which she was not accountable.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
108 U.S. 368, 2 S. Ct. 780, 27 L. Ed. 756, 1883 U.S. LEXIS 1048, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/scruggs-v-memphis-charleston-railroad-scotus-1883.