USCA4 Appeal: 21-2284 Doc: 39 Filed: 02/13/2024 Pg: 1 of 6
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-2284
SCRATCH GOLF, LLC,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
BEAUFORT COUNTY; BEAUFORT COUNTY COUNCIL,
Defendants – Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Beaufort. Richard Mark Gergel, District Judge. (9:20-cv-01962-RMG)
Argued: October 26, 2023 Decided: February 13, 2024
Before NIEMEYER, QUATTLEBAUM, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Rushing wrote the opinion, in which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Quattlebaum joined.
ARGUED: Jeffrey Scott Tibbals, BYBEE & TIBBALS, LLC, Mount Pleasant, South Carolina, for Appellant. William Hewitt Cox, III, HOWELL, GIBSON & HUGHES, PA, Beaufort, South Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Evan P. Williams, BYBEE & TIBBALS, LLC, Mount Pleasant, South Carolina, for Appellant.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 21-2284 Doc: 39 Filed: 02/13/2024 Pg: 2 of 6
RUSHING, Circuit Judge:
The Beaufort County Council denied Scratch Golf, LLC’s rezoning application.
Scratch Golf then sued in federal court, alleging that Beaufort County and the Council
violated its constitutional rights. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a claim, and we affirm.
I.
Scratch Golf owns Hilton Head National Golf Club, an approximately 300-acre
property in Beaufort County, South Carolina. The property is currently zoned for rural and
mixed use and, as the name suggests, is primarily used as a golf course. Scratch Golf
sought to rezone the property to accommodate a large mixed-use development project that
would include 500 homes, 700 hotel rooms, a theme park, and other commercial uses.
In Beaufort County, rezoning requests must be approved by the County Council, so
Scratch Golf submitted a rezoning application for the Council’s consideration. The
rezoning process for Scratch Golf’s property cleared various administrative hurdles and
seemed headed toward approval when the Council sent the application to a subcommittee
for further review. Around this time, residents voiced their opposition to the project and
progress stalled. Ultimately, the Council voted 9-2 against rezoning.
Scratch Golf then sued the County and the Council under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
violations of its substantive due process, procedural due process, and equal protection
rights. Scratch Golf also asserted a Fifth Amendment takings claim and a claim for
estoppel under state law. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss all
2 USCA4 Appeal: 21-2284 Doc: 39 Filed: 02/13/2024 Pg: 3 of 6
the federal claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and declined
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim.
II.
We review de novo a district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See E. Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd.
P’ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. A “formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “While we must take the
facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we need not accept the legal conclusions
drawn from the facts.” E. Shore Mkts., Inc., 213 F.3d at 180.
We begin with Scratch Golf’s claims that the County Council violated its
substantive and procedural due process rights under the United States Constitution. To
adequately plead either, Scratch Golf must allege a property interest in approval of its
rezoning application that is cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. See Sunrise Corp. of Myrtle Beach v. City of Myrtle Beach, 420 F.3d 322, 328 (4th
Cir. 2005) (elements of substantive and procedural due process claims). “To have a
property interest in a benefit, a person . . . must have more than a unilateral expectation of
it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Bd. of Regents of State
3 USCA4 Appeal: 21-2284 Doc: 39 Filed: 02/13/2024 Pg: 4 of 6
Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). In the context of land-use decisions, whether a
person “possesses a legitimate claim of entitlement to a permit or approval turns on
whether, under state and municipal law, the local agency lacks all discretion to deny
issuance of the permit or to withhold its approval.” Gardner v. City of Baltimore Mayor
& City Council, 969 F.2d 63, 68 (4th Cir. 1992). If the local agency retains significant
discretion to refuse approval, then the plaintiff has no legitimate claim of entitlement and
therefore no cognizable property interest. See id. at 69.
Beaufort County’s Community Development Code commits rezoning decisions to
the discretion of the County Council. The Code identifies factors to be considered but does
not require the Council to approve any rezoning application. Scratch Golf makes much of
the fact that the County Council had previously designated this property as a “Village Place
Type,” which is a parcel suitable for higher-density mixed-use development. That
designation gave Scratch Golf an opportunity to seek a comprehensive zoning amendment,
but it did not entitle Scratch Golf to rezoning; the Council retained discretion under the
Code to deny Scratch Golf’s application. Because Scratch Golf did not have a cognizable
property interest in approval of its rezoning application, it cannot state a substantive or
procedural due process claim.
We turn next to Scratch Golf’s allegation that the County Council treated it
differently from similarly situated property owners and developers in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. A zoning authority’s decision “must be upheld against equal protection
challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational
basis for the classification.” Pulte Home Corp. v. Montgomery Cnty., 909 F.3d 685, 693
4 USCA4 Appeal: 21-2284 Doc: 39 Filed: 02/13/2024 Pg: 5 of 6
(4th Cir. 2018); see Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (plaintiff must
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USCA4 Appeal: 21-2284 Doc: 39 Filed: 02/13/2024 Pg: 1 of 6
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-2284
SCRATCH GOLF, LLC,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
BEAUFORT COUNTY; BEAUFORT COUNTY COUNCIL,
Defendants – Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Beaufort. Richard Mark Gergel, District Judge. (9:20-cv-01962-RMG)
Argued: October 26, 2023 Decided: February 13, 2024
Before NIEMEYER, QUATTLEBAUM, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Rushing wrote the opinion, in which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Quattlebaum joined.
ARGUED: Jeffrey Scott Tibbals, BYBEE & TIBBALS, LLC, Mount Pleasant, South Carolina, for Appellant. William Hewitt Cox, III, HOWELL, GIBSON & HUGHES, PA, Beaufort, South Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Evan P. Williams, BYBEE & TIBBALS, LLC, Mount Pleasant, South Carolina, for Appellant.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 21-2284 Doc: 39 Filed: 02/13/2024 Pg: 2 of 6
RUSHING, Circuit Judge:
The Beaufort County Council denied Scratch Golf, LLC’s rezoning application.
Scratch Golf then sued in federal court, alleging that Beaufort County and the Council
violated its constitutional rights. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a claim, and we affirm.
I.
Scratch Golf owns Hilton Head National Golf Club, an approximately 300-acre
property in Beaufort County, South Carolina. The property is currently zoned for rural and
mixed use and, as the name suggests, is primarily used as a golf course. Scratch Golf
sought to rezone the property to accommodate a large mixed-use development project that
would include 500 homes, 700 hotel rooms, a theme park, and other commercial uses.
In Beaufort County, rezoning requests must be approved by the County Council, so
Scratch Golf submitted a rezoning application for the Council’s consideration. The
rezoning process for Scratch Golf’s property cleared various administrative hurdles and
seemed headed toward approval when the Council sent the application to a subcommittee
for further review. Around this time, residents voiced their opposition to the project and
progress stalled. Ultimately, the Council voted 9-2 against rezoning.
Scratch Golf then sued the County and the Council under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
violations of its substantive due process, procedural due process, and equal protection
rights. Scratch Golf also asserted a Fifth Amendment takings claim and a claim for
estoppel under state law. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss all
2 USCA4 Appeal: 21-2284 Doc: 39 Filed: 02/13/2024 Pg: 3 of 6
the federal claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and declined
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim.
II.
We review de novo a district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See E. Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd.
P’ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. A “formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “While we must take the
facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we need not accept the legal conclusions
drawn from the facts.” E. Shore Mkts., Inc., 213 F.3d at 180.
We begin with Scratch Golf’s claims that the County Council violated its
substantive and procedural due process rights under the United States Constitution. To
adequately plead either, Scratch Golf must allege a property interest in approval of its
rezoning application that is cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. See Sunrise Corp. of Myrtle Beach v. City of Myrtle Beach, 420 F.3d 322, 328 (4th
Cir. 2005) (elements of substantive and procedural due process claims). “To have a
property interest in a benefit, a person . . . must have more than a unilateral expectation of
it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Bd. of Regents of State
3 USCA4 Appeal: 21-2284 Doc: 39 Filed: 02/13/2024 Pg: 4 of 6
Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). In the context of land-use decisions, whether a
person “possesses a legitimate claim of entitlement to a permit or approval turns on
whether, under state and municipal law, the local agency lacks all discretion to deny
issuance of the permit or to withhold its approval.” Gardner v. City of Baltimore Mayor
& City Council, 969 F.2d 63, 68 (4th Cir. 1992). If the local agency retains significant
discretion to refuse approval, then the plaintiff has no legitimate claim of entitlement and
therefore no cognizable property interest. See id. at 69.
Beaufort County’s Community Development Code commits rezoning decisions to
the discretion of the County Council. The Code identifies factors to be considered but does
not require the Council to approve any rezoning application. Scratch Golf makes much of
the fact that the County Council had previously designated this property as a “Village Place
Type,” which is a parcel suitable for higher-density mixed-use development. That
designation gave Scratch Golf an opportunity to seek a comprehensive zoning amendment,
but it did not entitle Scratch Golf to rezoning; the Council retained discretion under the
Code to deny Scratch Golf’s application. Because Scratch Golf did not have a cognizable
property interest in approval of its rezoning application, it cannot state a substantive or
procedural due process claim.
We turn next to Scratch Golf’s allegation that the County Council treated it
differently from similarly situated property owners and developers in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. A zoning authority’s decision “must be upheld against equal protection
challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational
basis for the classification.” Pulte Home Corp. v. Montgomery Cnty., 909 F.3d 685, 693
4 USCA4 Appeal: 21-2284 Doc: 39 Filed: 02/13/2024 Pg: 5 of 6
(4th Cir. 2018); see Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (plaintiff must
allege “that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment”). The zoning
authority’s actual motivation is irrelevant. Pulte Home Corp., 909 F.3d at 693.
Rational bases for denying Scratch Golf’s rezoning application leap off the pages of
its complaint. For example, the Council cited the unreasonable size and scope of the
proposed project, its impact on nearby land, public health and safety concerns, and the
absence of a demonstrated community need, among other things. These reasons amply
justify denying Scratch Golf’s application even if the Council approved a different
rezoning request from an allegedly similarly situated developer. Contrary to Scratch Golf’s
argument, it is not the business of federal courts “to second-guess the wisdom of elected
local officials in making inherently discretionary zoning decisions.” Id. at 694. The
Council provided rational reasons for denying Scratch Golf’s application, and that is the
end of our inquiry.
Moving to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Scratch Golf alleges that
the denial of its rezoning application amounted to a regulatory taking of its property
without just compensation. The parties direct our attention to the Penn Central balancing
test, which “requires us to consider, at least, three factors of ‘particular
significance’: (1) ‘the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant’; (2) ‘the extent
to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations’; and
(3) ‘the character of the governmental action.’” Blackburn v. Dare Cnty., 58 F.4th 807,
812 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
124 (1978)).
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All three factors weigh in the defendants’ favor here. First, regarding economic
impact, Scratch Golf alleges that the rezoning denial prohibits certain economically viable
uses of its property, but it has not alleged facts establishing that the zoning decision caused
a “substantial diminution” in the value of its property. Id. Second, investment-backed
expectations must be “reasonable given the current use of the property” and “founded ‘on
a preexisting property right.’” Id. at 813 (quoting Clayland Farm Enters., LLC v. Talbot
Cnty., 987 F.3d 346, 354 (4th Cir. 2021)). We have already determined that Scratch Golf
lacks a property right in a change of zoning. And although Scratch Golf has a property
right in its land, the rezoning decision did not interfere with its ability to continue its
preexisting use of that land as a golf course. Third, as for the character of the governmental
action, development restrictions “based on density and other traditional zoning concerns”
adjust “the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good” and so are
“less likely to be considered a taking.” Quinn v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs for Queen Anne’s
Cnty., 862 F.3d 433, 443 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Pulte
Home Corp., 909 F.3d at 696. Weighing these three factors, Scratch Golf has failed to
plausibly state a claim for relief under Penn Central.
Finally, the district court acted within its discretion when it declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Scratch Golf’s state-law estoppel claim after it dismissed
all the federal claims. See Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995).
For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.