Scovern v. County of Northumberland
This text of 664 A.2d 1073 (Scovern v. County of Northumberland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Catherine Scovem (Scovem) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County (trial court) that granted the preliminary objections of the Defendants1 and dismissed her action which had sought to set aside the tax sales of three tracts of real property and the corresponding mineral rights due to the lack of proper statutory notice regarding said sales.
By deed dated April 10, 1962 and filed April 11, 1962, Scovern acquired title to an undivided one-third Qk) interest as a tenant-in-common with Oscar 0. Salter (Salter) and Wilfred W. Ermert (Ermert) in three tracts of real property and the corresponding mineral rights thereto.2 On September 24,1969, pursuant to delinquent tax sales conducted by the Treasurer for Northumberland County (Treasurer), the Commissioners for Nor-thumberland County (Commissioners), as trastees for the County of Northumberland (County), purchased two of the three tracts of real property owned by Scovem (TMT 75-106 and TMT 75-107).3 Scovern never received notice, either actual or constructive, of any delinquent taxes owed or of the proposed tax sale of said properties.
On September 30, 1970, pursuant to a delinquent tax sale conducted by the Treasurer, the Commissioners, as trustees for the County, purchased the third remaining tract of real property owned by Scovem (TMT 75-29).4 Scovem never received notice, either actual or constructive, of any delinquent taxes owed or of the proposed tax sale of said property.
[1075]*1075On February 18, 1971, pursuant to delinquent tax sales conducted by the Treasurer, the Commissioners, as trustees for the County, purchased the corresponding coal and mineral rights existing under the previously purchased tracts of real property.5 Scovem never received notice, either actual or constructive, of any delinquent taxes owed or of the proposed tax sales of said mineral tracts.
Beginning in 1971 and continuing up until and through May of 1994, the County, the Commissioners, and the Engineering Depart ment for Northumberland County (Engineering Department) entered into several lease agreements with various coal companies to mine the mineral tracts.6 Under the terms of the various lease agreements, the County, the Commissioners, and the Engineering Department received royalties for each long ton of coal removed from the mineral tracts for a total amount of at least $8188.10.7
Between 1971 and 1986, the Tax Claim Bureau for Northumberland County (Tax Claim Bureau), acting as trustee and agent for the County and the Commissioners, sold to private individuals eighteen (18) separate parcels of real property from TMT 76-106 and TMT 75-107. The sold property consisted of eighty (80) acres of land with a combined selling price of $14,351.00. Scovern never received notice by certified mail of any of the aforementioned eighteen (18) sales as required by statute.
On March 9, 1993, Scovern received notice by certified mail that the Tax Claim Bureau, acting as trustee and agent for the County and the Commissioners, had filed a petition for private sale of a parcel of TMT 75-107. Scovern filed a response and answer to the petition for private sale; however, prior to a hearing on the matter, the trial court granted the motion of the Tax Claim Bureau to withdraw said petition.
On November 10, 1993, Scovem initiated a civil action against the Defendants by filing a praecipe for writ of summons. On May 9, 1994, Scovem filed a seven count, one-hundred ten (110) paragraph complaint8 which alleged that the tax sales of the three tracts of real property and the corresponding mineral rights thereto were invalid for failure to give proper notice as required by statute and that all subsequent transactions by the Defendants were conducted without legal right resulting in direct injury to Seovem’s property rights.
The Defendants filed preliminary objections to the complaint in the form of 1) a demurrer based upon, amongst other things, governmental immunity and the applicable twenty-one (21) year statute of limitations, 2) a challenge to jurisdiction due to the failure to join indispensable parties, 3) a motion to strike for lack of conformity to law or rule of court, and 4) a challenge on the basis of lack of standing.9 The trial court disposed of the preliminary objections as follows:
AND NOW, this 30th day of November, 1994, after argument held, and upon con[1076]*1076sideration of briefs submitted by Counsel, it is hereby ORDERED AND DIRECTED that the Defendants (sic) Preliminary Objections are GRANTED, and the Plaintiffs (sic) action is DISMISSED.
(R.R. 66a.) We note that the trial court’s order, on its face, appears to grant and/or sustain all of the preliminary objections of the Defendants; however, a review of the opinion filed in support of the trial court’s order reveals that the trial court predicated its dismissal of Scovem’s action on two grounds only,10 i.e., that 1) her claims were barred by the twenty-one (21) year statute of limitations and 2) she had failed to join indispensable parties.11
As did the trial court, we will first address whether the statute of limitations acts as a bar to her causes of action in this matter. The trial court correctly notes that a review of the complaint reveals that the tax sales of the land and corresponding minerals rights thereto occurred in the years 1969, 1970, and 1971. Additionally, since September 24, 1969, and continuing up until the filing of the complaint, the Defendants have exercised care, custody and control over the subject land. Also, Scovem did not initiate her action against the Defendants until November 30, 1993.
Where, as here, the action is for the possession of real property it must be commenced within twenty-one (21) years. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5530(a)(1). Scovern, by her own pleadings, concedes that the period within which her claim must be brought, twenty-one (21) years, has run. Instead, Scovern alleges that the doctrine of “fraudulent concealment” effectively tolled the statute of limitations. See Schaffer v. Larzelere, 410 Pa. 402, 189 A.2d 267 (1963) (if fraud or concealment by defendant causes plaintiff to relax vigilance or deviate from right of inquiry, defendant is estopped from invoking bar of limitation). Scovem, however, fails to aver any concealment or fraud on the part of the Defendants. Scovem merely avers that the Defendants failed, for reasons whatsoever, to give her proper notice of the tax sales as required by statute. Lack of notice only does not constitute fraud or concealment.
We note that this is not a situation where the alleged injury was undiseoverable until 1993 since the property in question was mined during various periods from 1971 up and until the filing of the complaint. Sco-vern fails to aver in her complaint that the mining activity as such could not be discovered prior to 1990 through the exercise of due diligence.12 The trial court therefore did not err in concluding that Scovem’s cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations. Having so determined, we need not address the other issues raised by Scovem.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
664 A.2d 1073, 1995 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 393, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/scovern-v-county-of-northumberland-pacommwct-1995.