Scovel v. Shadyside Co.

69 So. 745, 137 La. 918, 1914 La. LEXIS 1958
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedOctober 19, 1914
DocketNo. 20324
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 69 So. 745 (Scovel v. Shadyside Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Scovel v. Shadyside Co., 69 So. 745, 137 La. 918, 1914 La. LEXIS 1958 (La. 1914).

Opinions

SOMMERVILLE, J.

Mrs. Barnett was-one of the original plaintiffs in this cause; but, having died, her three sons and sole heirs, who were coplaintiffs with her, have-been made parties in her place.

J. W. Barnett, the husband and father of plaintiffs, erected a building upon Shadysideplantation, in the year 1808, in which he and his family lived. The house was very complete in all of its parts, and was elegantly furnished. 1-Ie mortgaged all of the property and its appurtenances; and subsequently he-sold the plantation, together with the residence, in 1903, to the Shadyside Sugar Company, of which he and his family were the principal stockholders. That company also-mortgaged the property and its appurtenances. It became involved, and was placed in the hands of a receiver, a sale took place under an order from the federal court, and the whole property was adjudicated to C. A. Farwell, who subsequently sold it to theShadyside Company, Limited, defendant in this cause, April 7, 1904. Mr. Barnett died August 7, 1904.

The mortgages and sales referred to were made by Mr. Barnett without reserving to-himself the household fixtures sued for by his heirs in this case.

Mrs. Barnett and some of her sons continued to live in the house until September, 1910. Subsequently they made demands upon the defendant company to turn over to them combination gas and electric light chandeliers and brackets which were in the house,, together with bathtubs, toilets, stationary washstands, a complete double outfit for heating purposes, a complete gas outfit, mantel pieces, and certain grillwork. This suit was-instituted therefor November 2, 1911.

[921]*921Defendant answered, denying that the articles referred to were the personal effects of plaintiffs, and alleged that they, the articles, had been permanently attached to the house, for the service and improvement thereof, by the owner, and that they were parts of the building, and that the building, as a residence, would be incomplete without them.

Since the filing of this suit the Legislature has declared that the things here sued for are immovable by their nature. Act No. 51 1912, p. 60.

[1-3] The evidence shows that the articles mentioned were placed in the house at the time it was erected by Mr. J. W. Barnett; and it is clear that his intention was that they should be permanently attached thereto for the service and convenience of the house and its occupants.

Article 468, G. C., is as follows:

“Things which the owner of a tract of land has placed upon it for its service and improvement, are immovable by destination. * * * All such movables as the owner has attached permanently to the tenement or to the building, are likewise immovable by destination.”

And article 469 provides:

“The owner is supposed to have attached to his tenement or building forever such movables as are affixed to the same with plaster, or mortar, or such as cannot be taken off without being broken or injured, or without breaking or injuring the part * * * to which they are attached.”

In considering the two articles just quoted, in the case of Mackie v. Smith, 5 La. Ann. 717, 52 Am. Dec. 615, we hold that two valuable mirrors found in one of the rooms of a dwelling house, which had been sold in that case, were immovable by destination.

We there say that the only matter before the court to decide is whether or not the mirrors had been attached permanently to the building by the deceased. If they had been, the purchaser of the house had acquired them. It was shown that they were not affixed to the building with plaster or mortar, and that they could be moved without being broken or injured. ' It was contended by the appellee that the mirrors might have been removed without breaking or injuring the parts of the building to which they were attached, and that, as the case would come under none of the provisions of the Code, the judgment in her favor should be affirmed. We there hold that the cases specified in article 469 do not limit the general disposition contained in article 468. Article 468 provides that all such movables as the owner has placed for the service and improvement of the land and those which are attached permanently to the building are immovable by destination: it embraces all cases in which the movable has been placed by the owner ad integrandum domum; and, when none of the presumptions established by article 468 exist, the fact may be shown by any competent evidence. 2 Toullier, No. 16: 4 Duranton, p. 63, No. 68.

In the Mackie Case it was shown that after the owner of the property purchased the mirrors recesses 4y2 inches deep were cut in the walls of the room to receive them; that they were placed in those recesses and secured in their places by means of architraves or large wooden frames, which were nailed to plugs of hardwood fastened to the wall. The frames of the mirrors had grooves in them corresponding to a tongue in the architrave, and nails were driven from one to the other to make the glasses more secure. The recesses were left rough and unfinished; the glasses and architraves being clearly intended as a permanent finishing of the walls. It is difficult to conceive a case more strictly within the letter and spirit of article 468 of the Code.

And it is shown in this case that Mr. Barnett, in having bathtubs, toilets, stationary washstands, radiators, mantelpieces, and grillwork placed in the house which he was then erecting, caused holes to be made in the ceilings, walls, and floors for the intro-[923]*923Auction of gas, water, and waste pipes with the view and intention of attaching all the fixtures permanently to the building, thereby, in the language of the Code, making them immovable by destination. The evidence further shows that the moldings in the rooms were cut for the placing of the stationary washstands; that the mantel pieces were made of wood and tiles; that the removal of these things would not only leave holes in the walls, ceilings, and floors, but that the rooms would be left rough, unfinished and in an injured condition; and that repairs would have to be made to the house. The same is true of the grillwork, claimed by the plaintiffs, and which was put in the openings or doorways leading from one room into another throughout the house, for the purposes of ornamenting and beautifying the same.

The complete double outfit for heating purposes and the complete gas generating outfit are established under the building, several feet below the surface of the earth. They were clearly placed there for the service of the house, and were connected with the fixtures in the house, and were to be used therewith permanently or so long as they might last. They were attached permanently to the building, and they are declared to be immovable by destination.

The combination gas and electric light chandeliers and brackets fall within the same category as do the other things mentioned above. It is argued on behalf of plaintiffs that gas chandeliers have been held by the court to be movables, and that they do not usually form part of the premises in which they have been hung. Reference is made to the decision of the court in L’Hote v. Fulham, 51 La. Ann. 780, 25 South. 655.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
69 So. 745, 137 La. 918, 1914 La. LEXIS 1958, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/scovel-v-shadyside-co-la-1914.