Scottsdale Insurance Company v. Hamerslag

S.D. California

Scottsdale Insurance Company v. Hamerslag

DecidedJanuary 28, 2025

Docket3:23-cv-00780

StatusUnknown

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Scottsdale Insurance Company v. Hamerslag, (S.D. Cal. 2025).

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SCOTTSDALE INSURANCE Case No.: 23-CV-780 JLS (AHG) COMPANY, 12 ORDER (1) DENYING JOINT Plaintiff, 13 MOTION TO SEAL PLAINTIFF v. SCOTTSDALE INSURANCE 14 COMPANY’S REQUEST FOR STEVEN HAMERSLAG; and 15 JUDICIAL NOTICE, AND (2) SUA PERSPECTIUM CORP., SPONTE STRIKING PLAINTIFF’S 16 Defendants. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 17 (ECF No. 40-2) 18 (ECF Nos. 40-2, 42) 19 20 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Scottsdale Insurance Company and Defendant 21 Steven Hamerslag’s Joint Motion to Seal Plaintiff Scottsdale Insurance Company’s 22 Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (“Joint 23 Mot.,” ECF No. 42). Having carefully considered the Parties’ Joint Motion, the relevant 24 filings, and the law, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the Joint Motion and 25 sua sponte STRIKES Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN,” ECF No. 40-2). 26 On December 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings with 27 an attached RJN. See ECF No. 40. Recognizing that Exhibit 4 to the RJN was attached in 28 error, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Errata on January 23, 2025, replacing the erroneously filed 1 Exhibit 4 with the correct Exhibit 4. See ECF No. 41. The next day, the Parties filed the 2 instant Joint Motion asking the Court to seal the entire RJN because it “was inadvertently 3 filed with a confidential document and information.” See Joint Mot. at 2. The Parties also 4 filed an Amended Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Motion for Judgment on the 5 Pleadings (“Am. RJN,” ECF No. 43), this one containing the corrected Exhibit 4. 6 “[T]he courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public 7 records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner 8 Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (footnote omitted). “Unless a particular court 9 record is one ‘traditionally kept secret,’ a ‘strong presumption in favor of access’ is the 10 starting point.” Kamakana v. City & County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 11 2006) (quoting Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 12 2003)). “The presumption of access is ‘based on the need for federal courts, although 13 independent—indeed, particularly because they are independent—to have a measure of 14 accountability and for the public to have confidence in the administration of justice.’” Ctr. 15 for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting United 16 States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995)). 17 A party seeking to seal a judicial record bears the burden of overcoming this strong 18 presumption of access. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178 (citing Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135). The 19 showing required to meet this burden depends upon whether the documents to be sealed 20 relate to a motion that is “more than tangentially related to the merits of the case.” Ctr. for 21 Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1102. As relevant here, the “compelling reasons” standard 22 typically applies to seal requests filed alongside motions for judgment on the pleadings. 23 See Malig as Tr. for Malig Fam. Tr. v. Lyft, Inc., No. 19-cv-02690-HSG, 24 2021 WL 3709162, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2021). 25 “In general, ‘compelling reasons’ sufficient to outweigh the public’s interest in 26 disclosure and justify sealing court records exist when such ‘court files might have become 27 a vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote 28 public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Kamakana, 1 447 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598). For instance, “the common-law right 2 of inspection has bowed before the power of a court to ensure that its records are not 3 used . . . as sources of business information that might harm a litigant’s competitive 4 standing.” Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598; Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1097. However, “[t]he 5 mere fact that the production of records may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, 6 incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to 7 seal its records.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (citing Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1136). 8 Under the “compelling reasons” standard, the party seeking protection must “present 9 ‘articulable facts’ identifying the interests favoring continued secrecy and . . . show that 10 these specific interests overc[o]me the presumption of access by outweighing the ‘public 11 interest in understanding the judicial process.’” Id. at 1181 (emphasis in original) (internal 12 citations omitted) (first quoting Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1136; and then quoting Hagestad v. 13 Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995)). “The movant must make this required 14 particularized showing for each document it seeks to seal.” Avnet, Inc. v. Avana Techs. 15 Inc., No. 2:13-CV-00929-GMN, 2014 WL 4181831, at *1 (D. Nev. Aug. 20, 2014) (citing 16 San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999)). And 17 if the movant wishes to seal an entire document, they must show that their compelling 18 interest cannot be protected by redacting only the sensitive portions of said document. See 19 In re Roman Cath. Archbishop, 661 F.3d 417, 425 (9th Cir. 2011); Foltz, 331 F.3d 20 at 1136–37. If, by contrast, compelling reasons do not support sealing an entire document, 21 the movant must offer compelling reasons to seal each portion of the documents they 22 believe should be sealed. See Apex.AI, Inc. v. Langmead, No. 5:23-CV-02230-BLF, 23 2023 WL 4157629, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2023); see also In re Roman Cath. 24 Archbishop, 661 F.3d at 425. 25 The decision to seal documents is “one best left to the sound discretion of the trial 26 court” upon consideration of “the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case.” 27 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599. “[T]he court must ‘conscientiously balance[] the competing 28 interests’ of the public and the party who seeks to keep certain judicial records secret.” 1 || Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135). 2 Besides submitting the conclusory assertion that the originally filed RJN contains 3 ||confidential information, the Parties do not otherwise inform the Court what information 4 confidential or why public disclosure of the originally filed RJN harms either Party’s 5 ||interest such that it satisfies the “compelling reasons” standard for sealing a document or 6 || portion thereof. Further, requests to seal must be narrowly tailored such that a party may 7 ||not seek to seal an entire document where redaction would suffice. See Apex.Al, 8 WL 4157629, at *1 (granting a request to seal where the moving party, rather than 9 || seek to seal declarations in their entirety, identified specific paragraphs and exhibits that 10 should be sealed); see also In re Roman Cath. Archbishop, 661 F.3d at 425. Because the 11 Parties have provided nothing more than a hollow request to seal with no apparent 12 justification, nor have they narrowly tailored their request, the Court DENIES WITHOUT 13 || PREJUDICE the Joint Motion to Seal (ECF No. 42). 14 However, a district court “has discretion and the inherent power to strike a filing.” 15 || United States v. Alvarez, No. 18CR1653-GPC, 2021 WL 2290787, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Cal. 16 || June 4, 2021), aff'd, No. 21-55826, 2024 WL 1693360 (9th Cir. Apr.

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SCOTTSDALE INSURANCE Case No.: 23-CV-780 JLS (AHG) COMPANY, 12 ORDER (1) DENYING JOINT Plaintiff, 13 MOTION TO SEAL PLAINTIFF v. SCOTTSDALE INSURANCE 14 COMPANY’S REQUEST FOR STEVEN HAMERSLAG; and 15 JUDICIAL NOTICE, AND (2) SUA PERSPECTIUM CORP., SPONTE STRIKING PLAINTIFF’S 16 Defendants. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 17 (ECF No. 40-2) 18 (ECF Nos. 40-2, 42) 19 20 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Scottsdale Insurance Company and Defendant 21 Steven Hamerslag’s Joint Motion to Seal Plaintiff Scottsdale Insurance Company’s 22 Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (“Joint 23 Mot.,” ECF No. 42). Having carefully considered the Parties’ Joint Motion, the relevant 24 filings, and the law, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the Joint Motion and 25 sua sponte STRIKES Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN,” ECF No. 40-2). 26 On December 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings with 27 an attached RJN. See ECF No. 40. Recognizing that Exhibit 4 to the RJN was attached in 28 error, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Errata on January 23, 2025, replacing the erroneously filed 1 Exhibit 4 with the correct Exhibit 4. See ECF No. 41. The next day, the Parties filed the 2 instant Joint Motion asking the Court to seal the entire RJN because it “was inadvertently 3 filed with a confidential document and information.” See Joint Mot. at 2. The Parties also 4 filed an Amended Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Motion for Judgment on the 5 Pleadings (“Am. RJN,” ECF No. 43), this one containing the corrected Exhibit 4. 6 “[T]he courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public 7 records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner 8 Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (footnote omitted). “Unless a particular court 9 record is one ‘traditionally kept secret,’ a ‘strong presumption in favor of access’ is the 10 starting point.” Kamakana v. City & County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 11 2006) (quoting Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 12 2003)). “The presumption of access is ‘based on the need for federal courts, although 13 independent—indeed, particularly because they are independent—to have a measure of 14 accountability and for the public to have confidence in the administration of justice.’” Ctr. 15 for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting United 16 States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995)). 17 A party seeking to seal a judicial record bears the burden of overcoming this strong 18 presumption of access. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178 (citing Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135). The 19 showing required to meet this burden depends upon whether the documents to be sealed 20 relate to a motion that is “more than tangentially related to the merits of the case.” Ctr. for 21 Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1102. As relevant here, the “compelling reasons” standard 22 typically applies to seal requests filed alongside motions for judgment on the pleadings. 23 See Malig as Tr. for Malig Fam. Tr. v. Lyft, Inc., No. 19-cv-02690-HSG, 24 2021 WL 3709162, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2021). 25 “In general, ‘compelling reasons’ sufficient to outweigh the public’s interest in 26 disclosure and justify sealing court records exist when such ‘court files might have become 27 a vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote 28 public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Kamakana, 1 447 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598). For instance, “the common-law right 2 of inspection has bowed before the power of a court to ensure that its records are not 3 used . . . as sources of business information that might harm a litigant’s competitive 4 standing.” Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598; Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1097. However, “[t]he 5 mere fact that the production of records may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, 6 incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to 7 seal its records.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (citing Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1136). 8 Under the “compelling reasons” standard, the party seeking protection must “present 9 ‘articulable facts’ identifying the interests favoring continued secrecy and . . . show that 10 these specific interests overc[o]me the presumption of access by outweighing the ‘public 11 interest in understanding the judicial process.’” Id. at 1181 (emphasis in original) (internal 12 citations omitted) (first quoting Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1136; and then quoting Hagestad v. 13 Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995)). “The movant must make this required 14 particularized showing for each document it seeks to seal.” Avnet, Inc. v. Avana Techs. 15 Inc., No. 2:13-CV-00929-GMN, 2014 WL 4181831, at *1 (D. Nev. Aug. 20, 2014) (citing 16 San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999)). And 17 if the movant wishes to seal an entire document, they must show that their compelling 18 interest cannot be protected by redacting only the sensitive portions of said document. See 19 In re Roman Cath. Archbishop, 661 F.3d 417, 425 (9th Cir. 2011); Foltz, 331 F.3d 20 at 1136–37. If, by contrast, compelling reasons do not support sealing an entire document, 21 the movant must offer compelling reasons to seal each portion of the documents they 22 believe should be sealed. See Apex.AI, Inc. v. Langmead, No. 5:23-CV-02230-BLF, 23 2023 WL 4157629, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2023); see also In re Roman Cath. 24 Archbishop, 661 F.3d at 425. 25 The decision to seal documents is “one best left to the sound discretion of the trial 26 court” upon consideration of “the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case.” 27 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599. “[T]he court must ‘conscientiously balance[] the competing 28 interests’ of the public and the party who seeks to keep certain judicial records secret.” 1 || Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135). 2 Besides submitting the conclusory assertion that the originally filed RJN contains 3 ||confidential information, the Parties do not otherwise inform the Court what information 4 confidential or why public disclosure of the originally filed RJN harms either Party’s 5 ||interest such that it satisfies the “compelling reasons” standard for sealing a document or 6 || portion thereof. Further, requests to seal must be narrowly tailored such that a party may 7 ||not seek to seal an entire document where redaction would suffice. See Apex.Al, 8 WL 4157629, at *1 (granting a request to seal where the moving party, rather than 9 || seek to seal declarations in their entirety, identified specific paragraphs and exhibits that 10 should be sealed); see also In re Roman Cath. Archbishop, 661 F.3d at 425. Because the 11 Parties have provided nothing more than a hollow request to seal with no apparent 12 justification, nor have they narrowly tailored their request, the Court DENIES WITHOUT 13 || PREJUDICE the Joint Motion to Seal (ECF No. 42). 14 However, a district court “has discretion and the inherent power to strike a filing.” 15 || United States v. Alvarez, No. 18CR1653-GPC, 2021 WL 2290787, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Cal. 16 || June 4, 2021), aff'd, No. 21-55826, 2024 WL 1693360 (9th Cir. Apr. 19, 2024); see also 17 || Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Hercules Inc., 146 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 1998) 18 is well established that ‘[d]istrict courts have inherent power to control their 19 dockets ....’” (first alteration in original) (quoting Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 20 || 138 F.3d 393, 398 (9th Cir. 1998))). Thus, because Plaintiff has filed an Amended RJN 21 ||superseding the original in its entirety, thereby obviating any threat to the transparency of 22 ||these proceedings from removing the originally filed RJN from public view, the Court sua 23 || sponte STRIKES Plaintiff's originally filed Request for Judicial Notice (ECF No. 40-2) 24 || filed alongside Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. 25 IT IS SO ORDERED. 26 || Dated: January 28, 2025 peach Jt, oe waited 27 on. Janis L. Sammartino 28 United States District Judge

Debbie Foltz, Consumer Action United Policyholders Texas Watch, Intervenors, and Tierney Adamson Kevin Snead Daniel P. Johnson, Intervenors-Appellants. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, an Illinois Corporation California Institute of Medical Research & Technology, Inc., a Foreign Corporation Dba Comprehensive Medical Review Ralph Householder Steven Becker v. April Jean Ho Jim Mathis, Plaintiffs-Intervenors. Debbie Foltz, and Tierney Adamson Kevin Snead Daniel P. Johnson, Intervenors-Appellants v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, an Illinois Corporation, and California Institute of Medical Research & Technology, Inc., a Foreign Corporation Dba Comprehensive Medical Review Ralph Householder Steven Becker v. April Jean Ho Jim Mathis, Plaintiffs-Intervenors. Debbie Foltz, April J. Ho Jim Mathis Tierney Adamson Kevin Snead Daniel P. Johnson, Intervenors, and Consumer Action United Policy-Holders Texas Watch, Intervenors-Appellants v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, an Illinois Corporation, and Steven Becker

331 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2003)

Center for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Group, LLC

809 F.3d 1092 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)

Hernandez v. City of El Monte

138 F.3d 393 (Ninth Circuit, 1998)

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