Scott v. Western State Hospital

658 F. Supp. 593, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1290, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3243
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Virginia
DecidedApril 7, 1987
DocketCiv. A. 83-0050-C
StatusPublished

This text of 658 F. Supp. 593 (Scott v. Western State Hospital) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Scott v. Western State Hospital, 658 F. Supp. 593, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1290, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3243 (W.D. Va. 1987).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MICHAEL, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, Wanda O. Scott and Jerry L. Wall, two black former employees of Western State Hospital, brought this action against the Hospital under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Scott alleges that the Hospital discriminated against her because of her race when it failed to promote her to a Clinical Social Worker C position. Wall alleges that he was harassed by Hospital staff members because of his race. For the reasons discussed below the court finds that Scott and Wall have failed to prove their allegations, and the court will therefore enter judgment for the Hospital.

Plaintiff Wanda O. Scott

Wanda O. Scott, a black female, was hired by Western State Hospital on December 2, 1968, as a Social Service Aide B. From 1973 to 1975, Scott attended graduate school on a state scholarship, earning a master’s degree in social work. She returned to fulltime work at Western State Hospital in March 1975 as a Case Worker, a position classified as a Clinical Social Worker B.

On July 1, 1976, the Shenadoah Geriatric Treatment Center (SGTC) was established as a separate unit within Western State Hospital. Scott was appointed as Director of Social Work of SGTC. This new position involved supervisory responsibilities beyond those of a Clinical Social Worker B. *595 Scott continued in this position until October 27, 1980, when she resigned from the director’s duties as part of a protest by social workers at the Hospital. These resignations were part of a pattern of actions conceived by social worker Brendan Bus-chi. The concerted activity, which included the filing of multiple grievances, culminated in the July 14, 1981, dismissal of several social workers, including plaintiffs Scott and Wall. 1

Two months after Scott resigned the director’s duties in October, 1980, a Clinical Social Worker C position was approved for the SGTC. Scott applied for the position, and was one of five finalists interviewed for the job. The position was given to Ruth Cook, a white woman. Scott alleges that the failure to promote her to the position was based on race.

The burden of proof in a disparate treatment case is allocated according to the rules of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden of production then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting the plaintiff. The burden of production then returns to the plaintiff to prove that the employer’s stated reasons were actually a pretext for discrimination. The McDonnell Douglas rules are an analytical framework for examining evidence. The burden of persuasion always remains on the plaintiff, who must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her employer intentionally discriminated against her because of her race.

Usually, to make out a prima facie case, the plaintiff must show that (1) she belonged to a racial minority; (2) she applied and was qualified for the promotion she sought; (3) she was denied the promotion; and (4) the position remained opened and was later filled by the employer from another applicant possessing the same general qualifications. Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 229 (4th Cir.1981) (en banc). There is no question that Scott has established the first three elements. She is black, she applied for promotion to a position which she had in effect held for four years, and she was denied the promotion. Here, of course, Scott cannot prove that the vacancy remained open since Cook was appointed to the position at the time it became available. She must therefore present some other evidence that her race was a factor considered by the Hospital in not granting her the promotion. Holmes v. Bevilacqua, 774 F.2d 636 (4th Cir.1985) (en banc). The court finds that Scott has met this burden by showing that (1) she performed duties outside her job description for over four years; (2) two months after she resigned the extra duties, a new upgraded position was established, involving the same duties; and (3) she was not promoted to the upgraded position. Although Title VII does not require the employer to prefer an employee who has actually performed the duties of the job he seeks, Chaves v. Thomas, 35 F.E.P. 397 (D.D.C. 1984) [Available on WESTLAW, DCT database], the facts as stated here are sufficient to support an inference of discrimination. Scott has therefore met the burden of establishing a prima facie case.

The burden then shifts to the Hospital to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its failure to promote Scott. The Hospital offered abundant evidence that it was Scott’s deficiencies as a manager, rather than her race, which cost her the promotion. Throughout the time that Scott served as Director of Social Work for the SGTC, she received written evaluations which criticized her managerial skills. In her response to these evaluations and other criticisms, Scott never suggested that they were racially motivated. To the contrary, in several instances Scott agreed with the criticisms.

Under McDonnell Douglas, Scott must show that the nondiscriminatory rea *596 son offered by the Hospital for its decision not to promote her was a pretext for racial discrimination. Scott has failed to meet this burden. As noted earlier, Title VII does not require an employer to promote an employee simply because the employee has performed the duties of the position which she seeks. Moreover, here the evidence shows that Scott had performed the supervisory duties poorly. The record is replete with examples of poor management by Scott, including her failure to attend an important meeting about prescreening patients for transfer to Catawba Hospital, despite express instructions to do so; her failure personally to follow through on the Waynesboro project for placing discharged patients into the community; her late submission of a plan to restructure the Treatment Center’s social worker department, a plan which by her own admission was based on the desires of individual social workers rather than the needs of the patients; her poor performance in contacting family members of patients involved in major accidents; her failure to attend community meetings; and her failure to enter into agreements with local boards to accept patients discharged from Western State Hospital.

Scott’s deficiencies were noted by four different supervisors, Linwood Harding, Gloria deCuir, Paul Hundley, and Philip Denton.

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Related

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
411 U.S. 792 (Supreme Court, 1973)
Friend v. Leidinger
588 F.2d 61 (Fourth Circuit, 1978)
Holmes v. Bevilacqua
774 F.2d 636 (Fourth Circuit, 1985)
Buschi v. Kirven
775 F.2d 1240 (Fourth Circuit, 1985)

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Bluebook (online)
658 F. Supp. 593, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1290, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3243, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/scott-v-western-state-hospital-vawd-1987.