Scott v. Washington

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedJune 15, 2022
Docket2:22-cv-00873
StatusUnknown

This text of Scott v. Washington (Scott v. Washington) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Scott v. Washington, (D. Ariz. 2022).

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Gene Edward Scott, II, No. CV-22-00873-PHX-DJH

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Doris Washington, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District Court 16 Without Prepaying Fees or Cost (Doc. 2). Upon review, Plaintiff’s Application, signed 17 under penalty of perjury, indicates that he is financially unable to pay the filing fee. The 18 Court will grant Plaintiff’s Application and allow him to proceed in forma pauperis 19 (“IFP”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court will proceed to screen Plaintiff’s 20 Complaint (Doc. 1). 21 I. Legal Standard 22 When a party has been granted IFP status, the Court must review the complaint to 23 determine whether the action: 24 (i) is frivolous or malicious; 25 (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or 26 (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 27 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).1 In conducting this review, “section 1915(e) not only

28 1 “While much of § 1915 outlines how prisoners can file proceedings in forma pauperis, §1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis proceedings, not just those filed by prisoners.” 1 permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that fails to state a claim.” 2 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). 3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires complaints to make “a short and plain 4 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” While Rule 8 does 5 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the 6 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 7 (2009).2 “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 8 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. A complaint “must contain sufficient factual 9 matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting 10 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when 11 the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 12 that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 13 556). A complaint that provides “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 14 elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor will a complaint 15 suffice if it presents nothing more than “naked assertions” without “further factual 16 enhancement.” Id. at 557. 17 The Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and interpret the 18 facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 19 435 (9th Cir. 2000). That rule does not apply, however, to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 20 U.S. at 678. The Court is mindful that it must “construe pro se filings liberally when 21 evaluating them under Iqbal.” Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 763–64 (9th Cir. 2014) 22

23 Long v. Maricopa Cmty. College Dist., 2012 WL 588965, at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 22, 2012) (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[S]ection 1915(e) applies 24 to all in forma pauperis complaints[.]”); see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”) 25 (citation omitted). Therefore, section 1915 applies to this non-prisoner IFP complaint.

26 2 “Although the Iqbal Court was addressing pleading standards in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court finds that those standards also apply in the initial screening of 27 a complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A since Iqbal discusses the 28 general pleading standards of Rule 8, which apply in all civil actions.” McLemore v. Dennis Dillon Automotive Group, Inc., 2013 WL 97767, at *2 n. 1 (D. Idaho Jan. 8, 2013). 1 (quoting Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010)). 2 II. Discussion 3 The Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be 4 granted. Plaintiff wishes to bring a Bivens claim and a § 1983 claim. (Doc. 1 at 3). Plaintiff 5 alleges “Defendants neglectfully condones too little Negroes’ land ownership (specifically 6 farming) (including farming equipments [sic]) (activities in Cotton Gins and soybeans 7 farming processes in zip code 72069 and Monroe County Arkansas . . .” (Doc. 1 at 4). The 8 Complaint, however, does not allege with specificity what constitutional deprivations 9 Plaintiff has suffered. Simply asserting Defendants violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964 10 does not draw an inference that a particular defendant violated the law. Plaintiff further 11 alleges “the space sattelites [sic] allow neglect and crimes” and “they are anti-Christian [] 12 and anti-God.” (Id.). He continues in an indiscernible manner, “[i]llegal roads closures at 13 Redmon cemetery area and Green Lake area in Arkansas State. Caucasian farmers.” (Id.) 14 Under “sustained injuries,” he writes, “[e]xtremely severe unemployment in zip code 15 72069’s area.” (Id. at 5). Plainly, these allegations do not meet Rule 8’s pleading 16 standards. A complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a 17 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In other words, Plaintiff 18 must allege facts showing he has a plausible legal claim. Id. Without more factual 19 detail, such as how Defendants deprived Plaintiff of certain constitutional rights, the Court 20 cannot infer a plausible claim. Id. The Complaint, therefore, fails to state a claim and must 21 be dismissed. III. Leave to Amend 22 In accordance with the well-settled law in this Circuit, because “it is not ‘absolutely 23 clear’ that [Plaintiff] could not cure [the Complaint’s] deficiencies by amendment,” the 24 Court will grant him the opportunity to do so. See Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 767 25 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 (en banc) (internal 26 quotation marks and citations omitted) (holding that a pro se litigant must be given leave 27 to amend his complaint “if it appears at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the defect” 28 in the complaint); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (leave to amend should be “freely” given “when 1 justice so requires[]”).

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Related

Hawkins v. McHugh
46 F.3d 10 (Fifth Circuit, 1995)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hebbe v. Pliler
627 F.3d 338 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Michael Henry Ferdik v. Joe Bonzelet, Sheriff
963 F.2d 1258 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)
Jesse J. Calhoun v. Donald N. Stahl James Brazelton
254 F.3d 845 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)
Michael Lacey v. Joseph Arpaio
693 F.3d 896 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Frederick Jackson v. Michael Barnes
749 F.3d 755 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
McHenry v. Renne
84 F.3d 1172 (Ninth Circuit, 1996)
Lopez v. Smith
203 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)
Shwarz v. United States
234 F.3d 428 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)

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Scott v. Washington, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/scott-v-washington-azd-2022.