Scott v. Scott

95 Mo. 300
CourtSupreme Court of Missouri
DecidedApril 15, 1888
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 95 Mo. 300 (Scott v. Scott) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Scott v. Scott, 95 Mo. 300 (Mo. 1888).

Opinion

Norton, C. J.

This is a proceeding in equity instituted in the circuit court of Nodaway county, to vacate and annul a certain deed purporting to have been executed on the twenty-third of April, 1883, by Maggie R. Scott, conveying to defendant certain lands in the counties of Nodaway and Yernon in this state, and other lands in the states of Ohio and Nebraska, and also all the j)ersonal .property of said Maggie; which said deed was filed for record in the recorder’s office in Nodaway county on the seventeenth day of September, 1883. On the trial of the cause the court rendered judgment for defendant, from which plaintiffs have -appealed.

The grounds set up in the petition for vacating this deed are substantially as follows : First, that the deed was never delivered to defendant; second, that said Maggie R. Scott did not make the deed in the form in which it now appears and in which it was recorded ; third, that in whatever form said deed was executed by said Maggie, if executed by her at all, it was procured to be executed, by fraud and undue influence on tlie part of defendant exerted- by him over her in consequence of confidential relations existing between them.

The deed sought to be vacated conveyed to defendant, “for and in consideration of the sum of being provided for during her natural life as she desires, affection, and other very valuable considerations to her in hand paid by the party of the second part, the receipt of which is acknowledged,” all the real and personal estate of said Maggie. It is dated the twenty-third of April, [307]*3071883, and has appended to it a certificate of ácknowledgment of the same date taken by Robert Baird, notary public, and is attested by said notary and W. E. Baird. It is admitted by the answer that all of the written part of said deed except the signatures of said Maggie, the notary, and W. E. Baird, is in the handwriting of defendant.

The evidence of the notary and attesting witness .sufficiently prove the execution of the deed, .and its acknowledgment before the notary. W. E. Baird testified that he was requested by said Maggie to. witness the deed; that he never read it or heard it read, nor were the contents of the deed stated to him further than that it was a deed from Maggie R. Scott to David A. Scott; that he could not say whether the deed was filled out or not; that he did not look at it only when his signature was to be written; that said Maggie took the deed away with her.

Robert E. Baird, tbe notary, testified that he took the acknowledgment of this deed and also of another one a month or two previous; that one of these deeds was handed by said Maggie to Scott in the hall, and his impression was that it was the last one acknowledged. This deed, so far as the fact is disclosed by the evidence, from the time it was executed and acknowledged and handed by the notary to said Maggie, does not again appear till the seventeenth day of September, 1883, two days after the death of said Maggie, when it was given by defendant to one McMillan to be filed for record, and was by him on said day filed for record in the recorder’s office of Nodaway county.

Mr. Noel, the recorder, testified that at the time the deed was filed his attention was called to it and he thought it was not all written at the same time; that there were at that time about three shades of ink, the ink in the descriptive part was lighter, the lower part of the description was lighter than the balance of it, newer [308]*308written; that the ink was more nearly alike .when he testified than when it was filed for record.

' Where a deed has been executed and acknowledged, the possession of it by the grantee is presumptive evidence of its delivery. Yarnall v. Yarnall, 6 Mo. 326. It is affirmed in the case of Huey v. Huey, 65 Mo. 689, that the lodgment of a deed properly executed and acknowledged by the grantor in a place to which the grantee has access, and from which he can without hindrance transfer it to his own possession, with the intent on the part of the grantor that the grantee may, after his death, take it and have it recorded, does not constitute delivery of the deed.

The first question to be considered is, do the facts in evidence overcome the presumption arising from defendant’s possession of the deed, that it was delivered. As preliminary to the discussion of this question it is proper to state the relations the various parties sustained to each other.

It appears that Alexander F. Scott died in 1865 in Harrison county, Ohio, the owner of a large amount of real and other estate, leaving said Maggie R. Scott, his widow Eleanor, one of the plaintiffs, and the other plaintiffs in this suit, as his heirs ; that defendant is the cousin of said Maggie, and commenced boarding, in Í868 with the family of said Eleanor while going to school; that he assumed to act for said Eleanor as her agent in some matters pertaining to the estate of said Alexander, induced her to sell some of the lands and convey other lands to said Maggie ; that he was authorized to sell certain lands in Yernon county, this state, at nine dollars per acre and was to receive one dollar p.er acre for making the sale, that he sold the land for $12.50 per acre, and accounted for it at nine dollars per acre and kept the balance. The evidence tended to show that Maggie was engaged to be married, in 1871 or 1872, to Rev. Workman, that this engagement was [309]*309broken off by the influence' of defendant; that defendant’s attentions to Maggie were displeasing to her mother, who some time thereafter, about 1876, refused longer to board him and ordered him away; that Maggie, in January, 1878, left her mother’s and went to live with Samuel Scott, who lived twenty-five miles distant, and was her uncle and the father of defendant; that she returned to her mother’s in the summer of 1881 and remained a week or two, returned again in the fall of 1881 and remained till May, 1882, and her last visit was in June, 1883. The evidence also tended to show that defendant acted as the agent of said Maggie in transacting her business, and in some instances as her attorney, and that he had full possession of her confidence.

The facts disclosed by the folloAving evidence are relied upon to overcome the presumption raised by defendant’s possession of the deed that it was delivered.

Lamon Scott testified as follows: “In May, 1883, after David A. returned from Ohio, I had a talk with him. Before this I had written a letter to Maggie about the partition of the land'in Vernon county. I met David on the street in Maryville, and asked him what Maggie wanted to do about the division of the land in Vernon county, and he said he intended to let her do as she pleased, as my mother had blamed him for meddling, and he would have nothing to do with it, and he did not know what Maggie intended to do about it.”

The letter of this witness was replied to on the fourteenth of May, 1883, by said Maggie, as follows: “ Your letter of recent date at hand and contents noted. I think the remaining lands o,ught to be divided, but in which of the two ways I scarcely knoAv. It may not cost so much for to settle up by each of us making quitclaim deeds to each' other, but would it be quite as satisfactory a Avay of doing business as to partition it through court ?”

[310]*310The following letter of said Maggie written to defendant was also in evidence :

“ E. Springfield, Jefferson Co., Ohio,
“July 15th, 1883.

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Bluebook (online)
95 Mo. 300, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/scott-v-scott-mo-1888.