Scott v. Indus. Comm., 07ap-1041 (8-14-2008)

2008 Ohio 4104
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedAugust 14, 2008
DocketNo. 07AP-1041.
StatusUnpublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2008 Ohio 4104 (Scott v. Indus. Comm., 07ap-1041 (8-14-2008)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Scott v. Indus. Comm., 07ap-1041 (8-14-2008), 2008 Ohio 4104 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).

Opinion

DECISION
{¶ 1} Clarence Scott filed this action in mandamus seeking a writ to compel the Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission") to vacate its order which denied him temporary total disability ("TTD") compensation. *Page 2

{¶ 2} In accord with Loc. R. 12, the case was referred to a magistrate to conduct appropriate proceedings. The parties stipulated to the pertinent evidence and filed briefs. The magistrate then issued a magistrate's decision (attached as Appendix A) which contains detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The magistrate's decision includes a recommendation that we grant the requested relief.

{¶ 3} Counsel for Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. ("Ryder"), Clarence Scott's employer, has filed objections to the magistrate's decision. The case is now before the court for review.

{¶ 4} In March 2007, Clarence Scott was working for Ryder as a truck driver when he fractured the small toe on his right foot. He was not able to drive for awhile, but was cleared by his treating physician for sedentary work with restrictions.

{¶ 5} On April 11, 2007, Ryder sent a letter to Scott stating that he had been released to the Return to Work Program. The letter indicated that Scott would receive a "transitional work position" which was subject to modification as Scott's medical condition changed. Scott was directed to report to work the next day. Scott did not report to work the next day.

{¶ 6} On May 23, 2007, Scott filed a motion requesting TTD compensation. The motion was denied by both a district hearing officer ("DHO") and a staff hearing officer ("SHO") based upon Ryder's offer of a light duty position and Scott's failure to accept it. Scott's administrative appeal was refused, resulting in the filing of this action in mandamus.

{¶ 7} The issue in this case is whether or not Ryder complied with the requirements of State ex rel. Coxson v. Dairy Mart Stores of Ohio,Inc. (2000), *Page 3 90 Ohio St.3d 428. Coxson requires that a specific position be offered and the duties of the position be identified.

{¶ 8} Ryder clearly provided no written job offer which complies withCoxson. In its objections, Ryder argues otherwise, but an offer of an unspecified "transitional work position" which "meets the restrictions outlined by your medical provider" does not meet either requirement ofCoxson.

{¶ 9} The first and fourth objections filed on behalf of Ryder are overruled.

{¶ 10} Next, Ryder argues that it made a sufficient oral job offer, but had no obligation to turn the oral offer into a written document.

{¶ 11} Ohio Adm. Code 4121-3-32(A)(6) defines "job offer" as follows:

"Job offer" means a proposal, made in good faith, of suitable employment within a reasonable proximity of the injured worker's residence. If the injured worker refuses an oral job offer and the employer intends to initiate proceedings to terminate temporary total disability compensation, the employer must give the injured worker a written job offer at least forty-eight hours prior to initiating proceedings. If the employer files a motion with the industrial commission to terminate payment of compensation, a copy of the written offer must accompany the employer's initial filing.

{¶ 12} Under this definition, Ryder did not make a job offer. The treating physician does not decide whether the injured worker will accept an offer of employment. The injured worker makes that decision and the employer needs to communicate the job offer to the injured worker, not rely on the treating physician or the physician's staff to interpret the job offer for the worker.

{¶ 13} The second objection is overruled. *Page 4

{¶ 14} In the third objection, Ryder argues that the magistrate failed to apply Ohio Adm. Code 4121-3-32(B)(1)(b). Ohio Adm. Code 121-3-32(B)(1)(b) allows a self-insured employer to terminate TTD compensation when the injured workers' treating physician certifies that the workers can return to his or her former position of employment. That never occurred here.

{¶ 15} Ohio Adm. Code 4121-3-32(B) also allows TTD compensation to be determined if the treating physician finds the employer is capable of returning to other available suitable employment. Ohio Adm. Code 121-3-32(B) must be read in conjunction with Ohio Adm. Code 121-3-32(A), which requires a written job offer or an oral job offer of suitable employment which is subsequently reduced to writing before terminating TTD compensation. Further, no job offer which corresponds to the requirement of the Coxson case was made.

{¶ 16} The word "suitable" in Ohio Adm. Code 4121-3-32(B) does not mean "suitable to the employer." To be suitable, the offer must be suitable from an objective point of view. The whole point of the Coxson case is to assure that the actual job offer is known, with its specifications and medical demands. The courts are then in a position to determine if the employer's job offer is an offer of truly suitable employment. By failing to comply with Coxson and Ohio Adm. Code 4121-3-32(A), Ryder failed to offer suitable employment for purposes of Ohio Adm. Code 121-3-32(B).

{¶ 17} The third objection is overruled.

{¶ 18} All four objections having been overruled, we adopt the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the magistrate's decision. As a result, we grant a writ of mandamus compelling the commission to vacate its orders denying TTD compensation *Page 5 and compelling the commission to adjudicate Clarence Scott's entitlement to TTD compensation irrespective of Ryder's alleged offer or offers of alternative employment.

Objections overruled; writ of mandamus granted.

PETREE and T. BRYANT, JJ., concur.

BRYANT, J., retired of the Third Appellate District, assigned to active duty under the authority of Section 6(C), Article IV, Ohio Constitution. *Page 6

APPENDIX A
MAGISTRATE'S DECISION
{¶ 19} In this original action, relator, Clarence Scott, requests a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission") to *Page 7 vacate its order denying him temporary total disability ("TTD") compensation beginning April 12, 2007, on grounds that he refused a written job offer of suitable employment, and to enter an order finding that the job offer failed to meet the specificity requirements ofState ex rel. Coxson v. Dairy Mart Stores of Ohio, Inc. (2000),90 Ohio St.3d 428, and adjudicating the merits of his request for TTD compensation.

Findings of Fact:

{¶ 20} 1.

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Bluebook (online)
2008 Ohio 4104, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/scott-v-indus-comm-07ap-1041-8-14-2008-ohioctapp-2008.