Scott v. Carr

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedJuly 6, 2020
Docket2:20-cv-00236
StatusUnknown

This text of Scott v. Carr (Scott v. Carr) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Scott v. Carr, (W.D. Wash. 2020).

Opinion

11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 12 AT SEATTLE 13

14 PAUL SCOTT, CASE NO. C20-236RSM

15 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 16 TRANSFER VENUE v. 17 CALEB CARR, et al., 18

19 Defendants.

20 21 I. INTRODUCTION 22 This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Caleb Carr and Vita Inclinata 23 Technologies, Inc. (“Vita”)’s Motion to Transfer Venue, Dkt. #25. Plaintiff Paul Scott opposes 24 25 Defendants’ Motion. Dkt. #28. The Court finds oral argument unnecessary to resolve the underlying 26 issues. Having reviewed Defendants’ Motion, Plaintiff’s Response, and the remainder of the record, 27 the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Transfer Venue for the reasons set forth below. 28 // II. BACKGROUND 1 2 In 2018, Defendant Carr was in the early stages of developing technology company Vita 3 Inclinata Technologies, LLC (“Vita LLC”) and sought assistance in early stage business 4 development. Dkt. #19 at ¶¶ 3.1-3.4. Parties’ mutual connections at Seattle University introduced 5 Mr. Carr to Plaintiff, who is experienced in business development and advising new venture 6 companies. In exchange for Plaintiff’s consulting and assistance with early business development 7 8 of Vita LLC, Defendant Carr offered Plaintiff a 1% ownership interest in the company. Parties 9 executed an agreement on November 9, 2018 (“the Agreement”) in which Mr. Carr pledged 1% 10 equity in Vita LLC to Plaintiff in consideration for past and ongoing consulting services. Id. at 11 ¶¶ 3.8-3.10. After execution of the agreement, Vita LLC was converted into Vita Inclinata 12 13 Technologies, Inc. (“Vita”), a Delaware corporation. Id. at ¶ 3.11. 14 Plaintiff alleges that starting in October 2019, Defendant Carr began making efforts to 15 modify the parties’ Agreement, including proposing changes that would replace the commitment 16 to transfer ownership with a vesting structure contingent on Plaintiff’s continued involvement 17 with Vita. Id. at ¶¶ 3.12-3.13. Plaintiff claims he rejected these proposed changes and requested 18 19 transfer of the agreed-upon shares in Vita. Defendant Carr allegedly responded by inviting 20 Plaintiff to participate as Managing Director of AeroInnovate, an affiliated non-profit of Vita, 21 and proposed a Master Service Agreement that purported to supersede prior agreements between 22 the parties. Id. at ¶¶ 3.13-3.14. Plaintiff rejected this offer. 23 On January 16, 2020, Plaintiff initiated this action against Defendants in Washington 24 25 State Superior Court, claiming breach of contract and seeking equitable relief for Defendants’ 26 alleged failure to transfer the 1% interest as provided by the terms of the Agreement. Dkt. #1. 27 Defendants timely removed the case to this Court on February 14, 2020 based on diversity 28 jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Id. On April 6, 2020, Defendants moved to transfer this case to 1 2 the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404. Dkt. #25. 3 III. DISCUSSION 4 A. Legal Standard 5 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404, this Court has discretion to transfer this case in the interests of 6 convenience and justice to another district in which venue would be proper. See Jones v. GNC 7 8 Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 2000). Specifically, Section 1404(a) states: 9 For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division 10 where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all 11 parties have consented.

12 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The purpose of this statute is to “prevent the waste of time, energy, and 13 money and to protect litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and 14 expense.” Pedigo Prods., Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, Inc., No. 12-CV-05502-BHS, 2013 15 16 WL 364814, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 30, 2013) (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 17 616 (1964)). 18 In the Ninth Circuit, district courts typically apply a nine-factor balancing test to 19 determine whether to transfer a case under § 1404(a), examining: “(1) the location where the 20 relevant agreements were negotiated and executed, (2) the state that is most familiar with the 21 22 governing law, (3) the plaintiff’s choice of forum, (4) the respective parties’ contacts with the 23 forum, (5) the contacts relating to the plaintiff’s cause of action in the chosen forum, (6) the 24 differences in the costs of litigation in the two forums, (7) the availability of compulsory process 25 26 27 28 to compel attendance of unwilling non-party witnesses, [] (8) the ease of access to sources of 1 2 proof, and (9) the public policy considerations of the forum state.” Jones, 211 F.3d at 498–99.1 3 As an initial matter, Plaintiff does not dispute that the action could have been brought in 4 the District of Colorado. See Dkt. #25 at 6-7. The Court agrees. The District of Colorado has 5 subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), because the matter in controversy 6 exceeds $75,000 and Plaintiffs and Defendants are citizens of different states. Dkt. #19 at ¶ 2.1. 7 8 The District of Colorado also has personal jurisdiction over Defendants, who both reside in the 9 state. Id. at ¶¶ 1.2-1.3 (Mr. Carr is a resident of Colorado and Vita maintains its principal place 10 of business in Broomfield, Colorado). Venue is likewise proper in the District of Colorado given 11 that all defendants reside in the state. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). 12 13 However, parties disagree as to whether transfer to the District of Colorado would be 14 convenient to the parties and witnesses and would further the interests of justice. For the reasons 15 set forth below, the Court finds that the nine Jones factors weigh against transfer. 16 1. Location where the relevant agreements were negotiated and executed 17 There is no dispute that the November 11, 2018 Agreement setting forth Plaintiff’s 18 19 alleged 1% equity interest in Vita was negotiated and executed in Washington. See Dkt. #30 at 20 5-6. Defendants claim that two subsequent “agreements” were negotiated after June 2019, at 21 which point Defendant Carr’s business and communication was conducted from Colorado. This 22 includes the Master Service Agreement, which offered Plaintiff the opportunity to participate as 23 Managing Director of AeroInnovate. However, these subsequent negotiations by parties never 24 25 26 1 Defendants have applied the eight-factor test from Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 27 F.2d 834 (9th Cir.1986), instead of the more recent Jones test. See Dkt. #25. Because courts in the Ninth Circuit typically the Jones test, which addresses nearly the same factors as Decker Coal, the Court will 28 apply the nine-factor Jones test here. resulted in a new executed agreement. As a result, the only relevant agreement negotiated and 1 2 executed, which forms the basis of this lawsuit, is the November 11, 2018 Agreement. 3 Accordingly, this factor weighs against transfer. 4 2.

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Van Dusen v. Barrack
376 U.S. 612 (Supreme Court, 1964)
Decker Coal Company v. Commonwealth Edison Company
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Idaho Copper Corp. v. Campbell
27 F.2d 833 (Ninth Circuit, 1928)
Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc.
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Scott v. Carr, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/scott-v-carr-wawd-2020.