NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0718-23
SCOTT MAYERS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DAVID MAYERS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Submitted March 5, 2025 – Decided June 17, 2025
Before Judges Marczyk and Paganelli.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. DC-005500- 23.
Almasy LaMountain, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Kimberley Almasy LaMountain, on the briefs).
Scott Mayers, respondent pro se.
PER CURIAM
Defendant David Mayers appeals from the trial court's September 25,
2023 order for judgment following a bench trial, finding in favor of plaintiff Scott Mayers and awarding him $17,195.47 plus costs due to defendant
erroneously transferring funds from plaintiff's account created pursuant to the
Uniform Transfers to Minors Act (UTMA), N.J.S.A. 46:38A-1 to -57. The
primary issue before us is whether defendant is entitled to reimbursement as
custodian of plaintiff's UTMA account for purchases or payments made for
plaintiff's benefit, or whether such purchases or payments were gifts and thus
not subject to reimbursement.
We conclude the trial court did not err in finding the purchases or
payments made by defendant were gifts rather than loans, and that defendant
failed to present any evidence at trial to the contrary. We thus affirm the trial
court's decision.
I.
Plaintiff is defendant's son. In 2012, defendant and plaintiff's mother set
up two UTMA accounts, one for plaintiff, and another for plaintiff's younger
brother Eric and designated defendant as custodian of the accounts. Between
the years 2019 and 2021, defendant made certain purchases and payments for
plaintiff including college payments, a down payment on a car, car repairs, and
a computer. These expenditures purportedly totaled $24,686.35.
A-0718-23 2 Defendant and plaintiff's mother were divorced in May 2023. During the
course of the divorce, plaintiff and defendant became estranged. On March 1,
2022—one day prior to plaintiff's twenty-first birthday—defendant withdrew all
the funds in plaintiff's UTMA account, a total of $17,195.47, and transferred it
into Eric's UTMA account. Plaintiff asserted defendant was not permitted to
make such a transfer, and defendant maintained the transfer was reimbursement
for the purchases and payments he previously made for plaintiff's benefit.
Plaintiff filed a complaint in June 2023, seeking return of the funds
defendant withdrew from his UTMA account. Plaintiff claimed defendant, as
custodian of plaintiff's UTMA account, "did not have unfettered discretion to
use or deplete the funds," and the transfer of funds into Eric's account was not
for plaintiff's benefit. Plaintiff contended defendant violated his fiduciary duty
as custodian of plaintiff's UTMA account.
The parties proceeded to trial in September 2023. Plaintiff testified
defendant, as custodian of plaintiff's UTMA account, did not have unrestricted
authority to exhaust the funds in the account. Plaintiff also asserted the transfer
of funds into Eric's UTMA account was not for the purpose of collecting,
holding, or managing the investments of property on plaintiff's behalf, and thus
defendant violated his fiduciary duty to plaintiff. Conversely, defendant
A-0718-23 3 asserted he made all payments for plaintiff's benefit expecting to be reimbursed.
Defendant produced receipts for certain payments, but only supported his
assertion that the payments were a loan through his in-court testimony.
The trial court found it was "obvious . . . something [wa]s going on here
other than the UTMA account," and a review of the evidence established
defendant and plaintiff's mother went through a contentious divorce. The court
determined that under the UTMA, the money placed into plaintiff's UTMA
account was "irrevocable, which means no take backs. But [the UTMA] does
give the custodian of funds the right to use the money in that account to pay the
expenses for the minor."
The court recognized the payments for the car, college tuition, and
computer were all documented, and that defendant was seeking reimbursement
for these payments, yet in all the documentation, "[t]he one thing . . . missing
. . . [wa]s any indication" that the payments were in "some way a loan. At any
time . . . defendant could have withdrawn the money from [the UTMA] account
and reimbursed himself . . . but there's no record of reimbursements . . . ." The
court thus concluded defendant's payments "were gifts," and defendant was
precluded from "turn[ing] around and . . . suddenly . . . recharacteriz[ing the
payments] as loans just before" plaintiff turned twenty-one in an attempt to "take
A-0718-23 4 it all back." Thus, the court found in favor of plaintiff and awarded him
$17,195.47 plus costs.
II.
On appeal, defendant contends there is no time limit on when a parent
must seek reimbursement from a UTMA account for funds expended for the
benefit of a child, and that the passage of time cannot convert a loan into a gift.
He asserts because parties in divorce proceedings are normally instructed not to
dissipate their assets under equitable distribution principles, "a lay person" like
defendant cannot be expected to know that funds in a UTMA account are not
subject to equitable distribution. He thus argues his "decision to wait" is not
evidence that such payments were intended as gifts rather than loans.
Defendant posits "it is unlikely that a custodian would advise a minor in
written form" that purchases on the minor's behalf are actually loans rather than
gifts. He maintains the payments and purchases were for plaintiff's benefit and
not for any of plaintiff's basic needs. Defendant also takes issue with the trial
court's credibility determinations, asserting plaintiff's testimony at trial was
"inconsistent" and "less than credible."
Plaintiff counters defendant misrepresented the evidence in an attempt to
recategorize the gifts as loans. He argues defendant was not waiting to seek
A-0718-23 5 reimbursement pending the divorce, as the funds were transferred fourteen
months prior to the judgment of divorce. He asserts the transfer was purposely
timed due to him turning twenty-one and "had absolutely nothing to do with the
divorce." He points out that N.J.S.A. 46:38A-30 requires a custodian to keep
records of all transactions with respect to custodial property, and defendant
never provided any documentation showing the transactions were loans, or even
that such payments were made using defendant's money. He argues it is
defendant's responsibility as custodian to track and account each transaction.
He also argues defendant could have withdrawn the money each time an expense
was incurred and the failure to do so rendered all the payments gifts, not loans.
Finally, he contends the transfer out of his UTMA account cannot be considered
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0718-23
SCOTT MAYERS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DAVID MAYERS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Submitted March 5, 2025 – Decided June 17, 2025
Before Judges Marczyk and Paganelli.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. DC-005500- 23.
Almasy LaMountain, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Kimberley Almasy LaMountain, on the briefs).
Scott Mayers, respondent pro se.
PER CURIAM
Defendant David Mayers appeals from the trial court's September 25,
2023 order for judgment following a bench trial, finding in favor of plaintiff Scott Mayers and awarding him $17,195.47 plus costs due to defendant
erroneously transferring funds from plaintiff's account created pursuant to the
Uniform Transfers to Minors Act (UTMA), N.J.S.A. 46:38A-1 to -57. The
primary issue before us is whether defendant is entitled to reimbursement as
custodian of plaintiff's UTMA account for purchases or payments made for
plaintiff's benefit, or whether such purchases or payments were gifts and thus
not subject to reimbursement.
We conclude the trial court did not err in finding the purchases or
payments made by defendant were gifts rather than loans, and that defendant
failed to present any evidence at trial to the contrary. We thus affirm the trial
court's decision.
I.
Plaintiff is defendant's son. In 2012, defendant and plaintiff's mother set
up two UTMA accounts, one for plaintiff, and another for plaintiff's younger
brother Eric and designated defendant as custodian of the accounts. Between
the years 2019 and 2021, defendant made certain purchases and payments for
plaintiff including college payments, a down payment on a car, car repairs, and
a computer. These expenditures purportedly totaled $24,686.35.
A-0718-23 2 Defendant and plaintiff's mother were divorced in May 2023. During the
course of the divorce, plaintiff and defendant became estranged. On March 1,
2022—one day prior to plaintiff's twenty-first birthday—defendant withdrew all
the funds in plaintiff's UTMA account, a total of $17,195.47, and transferred it
into Eric's UTMA account. Plaintiff asserted defendant was not permitted to
make such a transfer, and defendant maintained the transfer was reimbursement
for the purchases and payments he previously made for plaintiff's benefit.
Plaintiff filed a complaint in June 2023, seeking return of the funds
defendant withdrew from his UTMA account. Plaintiff claimed defendant, as
custodian of plaintiff's UTMA account, "did not have unfettered discretion to
use or deplete the funds," and the transfer of funds into Eric's account was not
for plaintiff's benefit. Plaintiff contended defendant violated his fiduciary duty
as custodian of plaintiff's UTMA account.
The parties proceeded to trial in September 2023. Plaintiff testified
defendant, as custodian of plaintiff's UTMA account, did not have unrestricted
authority to exhaust the funds in the account. Plaintiff also asserted the transfer
of funds into Eric's UTMA account was not for the purpose of collecting,
holding, or managing the investments of property on plaintiff's behalf, and thus
defendant violated his fiduciary duty to plaintiff. Conversely, defendant
A-0718-23 3 asserted he made all payments for plaintiff's benefit expecting to be reimbursed.
Defendant produced receipts for certain payments, but only supported his
assertion that the payments were a loan through his in-court testimony.
The trial court found it was "obvious . . . something [wa]s going on here
other than the UTMA account," and a review of the evidence established
defendant and plaintiff's mother went through a contentious divorce. The court
determined that under the UTMA, the money placed into plaintiff's UTMA
account was "irrevocable, which means no take backs. But [the UTMA] does
give the custodian of funds the right to use the money in that account to pay the
expenses for the minor."
The court recognized the payments for the car, college tuition, and
computer were all documented, and that defendant was seeking reimbursement
for these payments, yet in all the documentation, "[t]he one thing . . . missing
. . . [wa]s any indication" that the payments were in "some way a loan. At any
time . . . defendant could have withdrawn the money from [the UTMA] account
and reimbursed himself . . . but there's no record of reimbursements . . . ." The
court thus concluded defendant's payments "were gifts," and defendant was
precluded from "turn[ing] around and . . . suddenly . . . recharacteriz[ing the
payments] as loans just before" plaintiff turned twenty-one in an attempt to "take
A-0718-23 4 it all back." Thus, the court found in favor of plaintiff and awarded him
$17,195.47 plus costs.
II.
On appeal, defendant contends there is no time limit on when a parent
must seek reimbursement from a UTMA account for funds expended for the
benefit of a child, and that the passage of time cannot convert a loan into a gift.
He asserts because parties in divorce proceedings are normally instructed not to
dissipate their assets under equitable distribution principles, "a lay person" like
defendant cannot be expected to know that funds in a UTMA account are not
subject to equitable distribution. He thus argues his "decision to wait" is not
evidence that such payments were intended as gifts rather than loans.
Defendant posits "it is unlikely that a custodian would advise a minor in
written form" that purchases on the minor's behalf are actually loans rather than
gifts. He maintains the payments and purchases were for plaintiff's benefit and
not for any of plaintiff's basic needs. Defendant also takes issue with the trial
court's credibility determinations, asserting plaintiff's testimony at trial was
"inconsistent" and "less than credible."
Plaintiff counters defendant misrepresented the evidence in an attempt to
recategorize the gifts as loans. He argues defendant was not waiting to seek
A-0718-23 5 reimbursement pending the divorce, as the funds were transferred fourteen
months prior to the judgment of divorce. He asserts the transfer was purposely
timed due to him turning twenty-one and "had absolutely nothing to do with the
divorce." He points out that N.J.S.A. 46:38A-30 requires a custodian to keep
records of all transactions with respect to custodial property, and defendant
never provided any documentation showing the transactions were loans, or even
that such payments were made using defendant's money. He argues it is
defendant's responsibility as custodian to track and account each transaction.
He also argues defendant could have withdrawn the money each time an expense
was incurred and the failure to do so rendered all the payments gifts, not loans.
Finally, he contends the transfer out of his UTMA account cannot be considered
a reimbursement as the money was transferred into Eric's UTMA account.
Our scope of review of the trial court's findings of fact is limited. Cesare
v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). Deference is particularly appropriate when
the evidence at trial is largely testimonial because the trial judge had the
opportunity to hear, see, and observe the witnesses. Id. at 412. Therefore, an
appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of a trial court "unless [it is]
convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the
competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests
A-0718-23 6 of justice." Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484
(1974) (quoting Fagliarone v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 78 N.J. Super. 154, 155 (App.
Div. 1963)). A trial court's interpretation of the law, however, is entitled to no
special deference. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140
N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
The UTMA allows for the "transfer by irrevocable gift to . . . a custodian
for the benefit of a minor." N.J.S.A. 46:38A-8. Any transfer so made "is
irrevocable, and the custodial property is indefeasibly vested in the minor."
N.J.S.A. 46:38A-24.
Once the gifted property is delivered, "acting in a custodial capacity, [the
custodian] has all the rights, powers, and authority over custodial property that
unmarried adult owners have over their own property." N.J.S.A. 46:38A-31.
The custodian has the responsibility to "[c]ollect, hold, manage, invest, and
reinvest custodial property." N.J.S.A. 46:38A-26. However, custodial property
must be kept at all times "separate and distinct from all other property in a
manner sufficient to identify it clearly as custodial property of the minor."
N.J.S.A. 46:38A-29. Furthermore, N.J.S.A. 46:38A-30 requires a custodian to
"keep records of all transactions with respect to custodial property" and make
A-0718-23 7 such records "available for inspection . . . by the minor if the minor" has reached
the age of fourteen.
Although the UTMA invests the custodian with discretion to "pay to the
minor or expend for the minor's benefit so much of the custodial property as the
custodian considers advisable for the use and benefit of the minor," N.J.S.A.
46:38A-32, such a payment or expenditure "is in addition to, not in substitution
for, and does not affect any obligation of a person to support the minor,"
N.J.S.A. 46:38A-34; see also Colca v. Anson, 413 N.J. Super. 405, 416 (App.
Div. 2010) ("A child's assets may not be used to fulfill a financially able parent's
support obligation."); Cohen v. Cohen, 258 N.J. Super. 24, 30-31 (App. Div.
1992) ("[A] custodian who is also a parent cannot properly use assets of a
U[T]MA account to defray the parent's legal obligations to a child if the parent
is financially able to support the child."). Unless the terms of the gift expressly
state otherwise, the custodian must "transfer the custodial property to the minor
or to the minor's estate upon the earlier of" (1) "[t]he minor's attainment of
[twenty-one] years of age"; or (2) "[t]he minor's death." N.J.S.A. 46:38A-52(a),
(c).
"A custodian is entitled to reimbursement from custodial property," but
only "for reasonable expenses incurred in the performance of the custodian's
A-0718-23 8 duties." N.J.S.A. 46:38A-35. A custodian also "has a noncumulative election
during each calendar year to charge reasonable compensation for services
performed during that year." N.J.S.A. 46:38A-36.
In the context of a transfer of property from a parent to a child, our
Supreme Court has delineated "the elements of a valid inter vivos gift and the
nature and measure of the proof required to rebut the presumption of such a
gift." Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 40 (2014). Those three elements are:
(1)"actual or constructive delivery;" (2) "donative intent;" and (3) "acceptance."
Ibid. Typically "[t]he burden of proving an inter vivos gift is on the party who
asserts the claim." Id. at 41. However, when "the transfer is from a parent to a
child, the initial burden of proof on the party claiming a gift is slight. . . . In
such cases a presumption arises that the transfer is a gift." Ibid. This is because
"a child is considered a natural object of the bounty of the donor." Id. at 42.
Yet, this presumption can be overcome by clear and convincing evidence of a
contrary intent. Id. at 46-47.
Thus, "the proofs advanced to rebut the presumption of a gift 'must be of
facts antecedent to or contemporaneous with the purchase, or so immediately
afterwards as to form a part of the res gestae.'" Id. at 43 (quoting Herbet v.
A-0718-23 9 Alvord, 75 N.J. Eq. 428, 429-30 (Ch. 1909)). The Court in Bhagat summarized
the above principles, stating:
[A] person who has transferred property to another, which raises a presumption that the transferred property was a gift, must meet the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof to rebut the presumption. . . . [T]he person seeking to rebut the presumption is limited to evidence antecedent to, contemporaneous with, or immediately following the transfer. In addition, a party seeking to rebut the presumption may also adduce proof of statements by the parties concerning the purpose and effect of the transfer.
[Id. at 47.]
The Court in Bhagat found this court "properly refused to consider . . . the
evidence offered" by the parent "of statements" he made "years after the . . .
transfers" to the child, as "[t]hose statements [we]re neither antecedent to,
contemporaneous with, or immediately following the transaction and thus
fail[ed] to provide reliable evidence of the intent of the . . . transfers." Id. at 48.
Here, defendant never supplied any "records of [any] transactions with
respect to custodial property" which established the purchases or payments were
meant as loans as opposed to gifts. N.J.S.A. 46:38A-30. Rather, defendant only
points to his testimony at trial to indicate such purchases were intended as loans,
and questions the court's credibility determinations.
A-0718-23 10 Although N.J.S.A. 46:38A-32 permits the custodian to "expend for the
minor's benefit so much of the custodial property as the custodian considers
advisable for the use and benefit of the minor," the trial court determined
defendant's expenditures on behalf of plaintiff were gifts. Like the parent in
Bhagat, defendant offers proof "neither antecedent to, contemporaneous with,
or immediately following the [purchases] and thus fail[s] to provide reliable
evidence of [his] intent" to categorize the payments as loans, rather than gifts.
217 N.J. at 48. Instead, defendant relies on his trial testimony to assert that
years after the purchases were made, he was unaware the UTMA account was
not subject to equitable distribution in the divorce proceedings, and questions
the court's credibility findings.
We are unconvinced the trial court's factual findings were "so manifestly
unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably
credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at
484 (quoting Fagliarone, 78 N.J. Super. at 155). Rather, we conclude there was
ample evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings, and we discern
no basis to disturb the court's order for judgment.
Affirmed.
A-0718-23 11