TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-21-00520-CV
Scott Many, Appellant
v.
Victoria Ridgely, as Independent Executor of the Estate of Marjorie Dell Many, Deceased, Appellee
FROM THE COUNTY COURT OF LLANO COUNTY NO. 06904, THE HONORABLE RON CUNNINGHAM, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This appeal concerns the disposition of the estate (Estate) of Marjorie Dell Many
(Deceased) who died testate in January 2013. Appellant Scott Many (Many) and appellee
Victoria Ridgely (Ridgely) are siblings and named beneficiaries of the Estate, with Ridgely
designated as the independent executor. Many challenges the probate court’s final order approving
accounting of the Estate, arguing the court erred in (1) approving the accounting despite Many’s
contention it did not comply with Sections 404.001 and 405.001 of the Texas Estates Code,
(2) denying Many’s motion for forensic accounting, and (3) ordering Many to reimburse Ridgely
for his debt owed to the Estate. We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Marjorie Dell Many died on January 14, 2013, leaving her children Scott Many and
Victoria Ridgely as beneficiaries of her Estate. Shortly after Decedent’s death, Ridgely filed an
application for probate. On February 21, 2013, the court admitted the will to probate and granted
letters testamentary. The order also required Ridgely, as independent executor, to file with the
court an inventory, appraisement, and list of claims of the Estate within ninety days. Ridgely
provided these filings two years late, ultimately submitting them to the court on March 5, 2015.
The same day it was filed, the probate court approved the inventory, appraisement, and list of
claims. One of the listed debts was $200,000 owed to the Estate by Many. Before Decedent’s
death, she loaned $200,000 to Many to be deducted from his inheritance. Many did not object to
any of the accountings or inventory.
During the administration of the Estate, Many placed a lien upon Decedent’s
residence so as to allegedly insure distribution of one half of the net sale proceeds to him. Many
anticipated the net sale proceeds would satisfy his debt to the Estate as well as Ridgely’s payments
of bills, expenses, and debts of the Estate made from her personal funds. Prior to the sale of the
residence, Ridgely hired a contractor to install a new roof to enhance the resale value of the home.
Ridgely filed a claim through the homeowner’s insurance policy, which in turn issued checks
payable to the contractor. Many refused to endorse the check, leaving the contractor unpaid for
his services. The residence was eventually sold in July 2020 with the net sale proceeds being held
in escrow.
On January 27, 2021, six years after Ridgely’s initial accounting, Many sought an
accounting pursuant to Section 404.001(a) of the Estates Code. See Tex. Est. Code § 404.001(a).
The probate court held a hearing on April 8, 2021, at which Ridgely provided the court with an
2 updated accounting of all Estate transactions. After the hearing, Ridgely provided further
information to Many via email correspondence to resolve Many’s issues about the accounting,
including the rental history of the Decedent’s residential property, the condition and upkeep of the
residence, and the disposition of Decedent’s personal property. On July 12, 2021, despite the
previous hearing and subsequent attempts at informal resolution, Many filed a motion for forensic
accounting under Section 405.001 of the Estates Code, claiming that Ridgely’s accounting of the
Estate provided at the April 8, 2021 hearing was insufficient, specifically the itemized debts. The
probate court held a hearing three days later to address the motion. After the hearing, the parties
submitted their respective arguments to the court: Ridgely provided the probate court with a
response to each accounting item challenged in Many’s motion for forensic accounting, and Many
submitted briefing to the court re-urging his arguments made at the hearing.
On August 27, 2021, the probate court issued a final order (Order) that, among other
things: (1) approved Ridgely’s accounting, (2) denied Many’s motion for forensic accounting, and
(3) ordered Many to reimburse Ridgely for his debt owed to the Estate. Many did not submit a
motion to modify the order, a motion for reconsideration, or a motion for findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Many timely filed this appeal, asking this Court to “vacate the Order, remand
to the trial court and order Ridgely to file accounting that complies with the Estates Code; and, in
the alternative or additionally, vacate the portion of the order requiring Many to reimburse Ridgely
from either his personal funds or from the net proceeds from his share of the house.”
STANDARD OF REVIEW
An order partitioning and distributing estate property is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. See In re Estate of Gaines, 262 S.W.3d 50, 55 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008,
3 no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion when it rules arbitrarily, unreasonably, without regard
to guiding legal principles, or without supporting evidence. Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19,
21 (Tex. 1998). An appellate court must uphold the trial court’s ruling if there is any legitimate
basis for it. See Owens–Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 43 (Tex. 1998). A
trial court does not abuse its discretion when some evidence of substantive and probative character
exists to support its decision. See Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 211 (Tex. 2002).
An appellate court will not conclude that a trial court abused its discretion merely because, in
similar circumstances, the appellate court would have decided the matter differently. See Downer
v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985).
DISCUSSION
Many’s first issue is whether the probate court abused its discretion in approving
Ridgely’s accounting despite his contention that the accounting lacked details necessary for a full
understanding of the Estate’s condition under Section 404.001(a) (providing that interested person
may demand accounting from independent executor). See Tex. Est. Code § 404.001(a)(6). His
second issue is whether the probate court abused its discretion in accepting this accounting and
consequently denying his request for a forensic accounting under Section 405.001 (providing
interested person, at least two years after existence of independent administration, may petition
court for accounting and distribution which includes information necessary for court to distribute
estate). See id. § 405.001. Because the two issues are sufficiently intertwined, we address them
in tandem.
Section 404.001(a) of the Estates Code provides that an interested party may
demand an accounting from the independent executor. See id.
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TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-21-00520-CV
Scott Many, Appellant
v.
Victoria Ridgely, as Independent Executor of the Estate of Marjorie Dell Many, Deceased, Appellee
FROM THE COUNTY COURT OF LLANO COUNTY NO. 06904, THE HONORABLE RON CUNNINGHAM, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This appeal concerns the disposition of the estate (Estate) of Marjorie Dell Many
(Deceased) who died testate in January 2013. Appellant Scott Many (Many) and appellee
Victoria Ridgely (Ridgely) are siblings and named beneficiaries of the Estate, with Ridgely
designated as the independent executor. Many challenges the probate court’s final order approving
accounting of the Estate, arguing the court erred in (1) approving the accounting despite Many’s
contention it did not comply with Sections 404.001 and 405.001 of the Texas Estates Code,
(2) denying Many’s motion for forensic accounting, and (3) ordering Many to reimburse Ridgely
for his debt owed to the Estate. We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Marjorie Dell Many died on January 14, 2013, leaving her children Scott Many and
Victoria Ridgely as beneficiaries of her Estate. Shortly after Decedent’s death, Ridgely filed an
application for probate. On February 21, 2013, the court admitted the will to probate and granted
letters testamentary. The order also required Ridgely, as independent executor, to file with the
court an inventory, appraisement, and list of claims of the Estate within ninety days. Ridgely
provided these filings two years late, ultimately submitting them to the court on March 5, 2015.
The same day it was filed, the probate court approved the inventory, appraisement, and list of
claims. One of the listed debts was $200,000 owed to the Estate by Many. Before Decedent’s
death, she loaned $200,000 to Many to be deducted from his inheritance. Many did not object to
any of the accountings or inventory.
During the administration of the Estate, Many placed a lien upon Decedent’s
residence so as to allegedly insure distribution of one half of the net sale proceeds to him. Many
anticipated the net sale proceeds would satisfy his debt to the Estate as well as Ridgely’s payments
of bills, expenses, and debts of the Estate made from her personal funds. Prior to the sale of the
residence, Ridgely hired a contractor to install a new roof to enhance the resale value of the home.
Ridgely filed a claim through the homeowner’s insurance policy, which in turn issued checks
payable to the contractor. Many refused to endorse the check, leaving the contractor unpaid for
his services. The residence was eventually sold in July 2020 with the net sale proceeds being held
in escrow.
On January 27, 2021, six years after Ridgely’s initial accounting, Many sought an
accounting pursuant to Section 404.001(a) of the Estates Code. See Tex. Est. Code § 404.001(a).
The probate court held a hearing on April 8, 2021, at which Ridgely provided the court with an
2 updated accounting of all Estate transactions. After the hearing, Ridgely provided further
information to Many via email correspondence to resolve Many’s issues about the accounting,
including the rental history of the Decedent’s residential property, the condition and upkeep of the
residence, and the disposition of Decedent’s personal property. On July 12, 2021, despite the
previous hearing and subsequent attempts at informal resolution, Many filed a motion for forensic
accounting under Section 405.001 of the Estates Code, claiming that Ridgely’s accounting of the
Estate provided at the April 8, 2021 hearing was insufficient, specifically the itemized debts. The
probate court held a hearing three days later to address the motion. After the hearing, the parties
submitted their respective arguments to the court: Ridgely provided the probate court with a
response to each accounting item challenged in Many’s motion for forensic accounting, and Many
submitted briefing to the court re-urging his arguments made at the hearing.
On August 27, 2021, the probate court issued a final order (Order) that, among other
things: (1) approved Ridgely’s accounting, (2) denied Many’s motion for forensic accounting, and
(3) ordered Many to reimburse Ridgely for his debt owed to the Estate. Many did not submit a
motion to modify the order, a motion for reconsideration, or a motion for findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Many timely filed this appeal, asking this Court to “vacate the Order, remand
to the trial court and order Ridgely to file accounting that complies with the Estates Code; and, in
the alternative or additionally, vacate the portion of the order requiring Many to reimburse Ridgely
from either his personal funds or from the net proceeds from his share of the house.”
STANDARD OF REVIEW
An order partitioning and distributing estate property is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. See In re Estate of Gaines, 262 S.W.3d 50, 55 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008,
3 no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion when it rules arbitrarily, unreasonably, without regard
to guiding legal principles, or without supporting evidence. Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19,
21 (Tex. 1998). An appellate court must uphold the trial court’s ruling if there is any legitimate
basis for it. See Owens–Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 43 (Tex. 1998). A
trial court does not abuse its discretion when some evidence of substantive and probative character
exists to support its decision. See Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 211 (Tex. 2002).
An appellate court will not conclude that a trial court abused its discretion merely because, in
similar circumstances, the appellate court would have decided the matter differently. See Downer
v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985).
DISCUSSION
Many’s first issue is whether the probate court abused its discretion in approving
Ridgely’s accounting despite his contention that the accounting lacked details necessary for a full
understanding of the Estate’s condition under Section 404.001(a) (providing that interested person
may demand accounting from independent executor). See Tex. Est. Code § 404.001(a)(6). His
second issue is whether the probate court abused its discretion in accepting this accounting and
consequently denying his request for a forensic accounting under Section 405.001 (providing
interested person, at least two years after existence of independent administration, may petition
court for accounting and distribution which includes information necessary for court to distribute
estate). See id. § 405.001. Because the two issues are sufficiently intertwined, we address them
in tandem.
Section 404.001(a) of the Estates Code provides that an interested party may
demand an accounting from the independent executor. See id. § 404.001(a). The statute then
4 provides a list of what the independent executor must provide to the interested party within sixty
days, including, among other things: estate property that has “come into” the executor’s
possession and the disposition of that property; debts paid by the estate; and debts and expenses
still owing to the estate. Id. Subsection (6) contains a catch-all provision, requiring the executor
to show “other facts as may be necessary to a full and definite understanding of the exact condition
of the estate.” Id. Section 405.001, on the other hand, allows an interested person to petition the
probate court for accounting and distribution. See id. § 405.001(a). The probate court “may order
an accounting to be made with the court by the independent executor at such time as the court
considers proper.” Id. The statute requires the accounting to include “the information that the
court considers necessary to determine whether any part of the estate should be distributed.” Id.
After the initial accounting in 2015, the record demonstrates that Ridgely provided
the probate court with two more detailed accountings: one on April 8, 2021, and an additional
accounting after the July 15, 2021 hearing, which included over one hundred pages of invoices,
receipts, canceled checks, and other documents, as specific evidence addressing Many’s
complaints about the accuracy of the Estate’s debts. Many objected to both.
First, in regard to the April 8, 2021 accounting, Many complained about
“unexplained contradictions” and “inconsistences” within Ridgely’s accounting of expenses, one
of them being why Ridgely left the Decedent’s residence vacant for several years after Decedent’s
death. In response, Ridgely provided documentation explaining that she attempted to lease the
residence but had issues doing so because of the residence’s physical condition and her inability
to find prospective tenants who could afford the requested rent. Relatedly, Many also questioned
the utility expenses on the residence, claiming they were unusually high for a mostly vacant
property. In response, Ridgely provided documentation of homeowner’s insurance, water usage
5 reports, exterminator services, housekeeping services, and other items related to the upkeep of the
residence. As independent executor, Ridgely had a duty to “take care of estate property as a
prudent person would take care of that person’s own property, and keep [any buildings belonging
to the estate] in good repair.” Id. § 351.101.
Despite these explanations, Many again objected to the accounting, specifically to
Ridgely’s itemized debts. Once more, Ridgely, in a sworn affidavit and inventory, provided the
probate court with a response to the accounting items challenged by Many. These explanatory
documents included, among other items: receipts from payments of housekeeping services,
property taxes, lawn services, neighborhood association dues, and funeral services. In all, the
sworn inventory provided approximately thirty-six items of specific Estate expenses that Ridgely
paid out of her own personal funds. Based on the documentary evidence and Ridgely’s sworn
affidavit, we conclude the probate court did not abuse its discretion in approving Ridgely’s final
accounting. See Burke v. Satterfield, 525 S.W.2d 950, 955 (Tex. 1975) (explaining deference is
allowed in order to free independent executor from judicial supervision and to effect distribution
of estate with minimal cost and delay). We overrule Many’s first issue.
Many’s second issue is whether the probate court erred in denying his motion for
forensic accounting. Because we have determined the probate court did not abuse its discretion in
approving Ridgely’s final accounting, we necessarily conclude that Many’s request for accounting
and distribution under Section 405.001 was unnecessary and that the probate court did not err in
denying it. The record demonstrates the court provided a detailed final order, including
approximately fourteen separate findings, supporting the fact that the court had all the relevant
information needed to dispose of the Estate without needing to order forensic accounting. See
Tex. Est. Code §§ 404.001(a), 405.001; see In re Estate of Bean, 120 S.W.3d 914, 918 (Tex.
6 App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. denied) (“As long as the estate is represented by an independent
executor, further action should not be had in the court except where the Probate Code, or other
law, specifically and explicitly provides for some action in the court.”); see also Burke, 525 S.W.2d
at 954 (concluding court can neither approve nor disapprove final accounting; it can only review
whether documentation meets statutory requirements). Finally, we note that Many never objected
to Ridgely’s original accounting submitted in 2015, discrediting any argument that the accounting
was so deficient as to warrant immediate intervention. We overrule Many’s second issue.
Many’s third issue is whether the probate court abused its discretion in ordering
him to reimburse Ridgely for his share of debt owed to the Estate. The net sale of the proceeds
from the residence was $316,814.22. Many’s one-half share of the net proceeds of the residence
was therefore $158,407.11. 1 The record shows Ridgely paid Estate debts in the amount of
$122,502.32 using separate personal funds because the Estate had inadequate available cash funds
at the time. The probate court ordered one-half of Many’s $200,000.00 debt ($100,000.00) and
one-half of the reimbursement he owed to Ridgely ($61,251.16) to be deducted from his share of
the net sale proceeds ($158,407.11). After those calculations, the record shows Many owed
Ridgely $2,844.05. 2 Many argues he is not required to pay that debt because (1) the debt was
calculated based on insufficient accountings, (2) Many was not personally liable for the debt, and
1 Ridgely claims the trial court erroneously calculated this number as $158,000.00 and asserts that $158,407.00 is the corrected number. However, based on our calculation, one-half of the net proceeds of the residence ($316,814.22) amounts to $158,404.11. 2 If the estate debts and expenses totaling $122,502.32 are deducted from the net sale proceeds ($316,814.22), then Many’s one-half share of those proceeds is $97,155.95, which is less than the $100,000.00 he owes Ridgely. 7 (3) Ridgely owes the debt instead because she “breached her fiduciary duty” by mismanaging
the Estate.
Many preserved the second argument by arguing to the probate court via letter that
“a beneficiary of an Estate is not personally responsible for the debts or liabilities of the deceased
person or the Estate.” In support, Many cites to Section 403.0585 of the Estates Code, which
governs the liability of an independent executor to pay a claim. This statute, however, does not
apply to the situation in this case; while the Estate had insufficient funds at the time Ridgely fronted
the costs, it later had sufficient funds to pay the debts. See Gallagher v. Redmond, 64 Tex. 622,
625 (1885) (holding that where will charges estate assets with payment of debts, an heir who pays
more than his or her proportionate share of estate debt has action for reimbursement against other
heirs). Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Many to reimburse Ridgely
for repayment of the debt he owed the Estate combined with his share of the Estate’s expenses for
which the Estate owed Ridgely reimbursement.
Finally, and for the first time on appeal, Many argues he owes no debt to Ridgely
because she “breached her fiduciary duty” by “mismanaging the estate.” He therefore opines she
is personally liable for all remaining estate debts. However, nowhere in the record does it show
that Many raised this claim with the trial court; thus, this issue is waived. See Tex. R. App. P.
33.1(a) (“To preserve an issue or complaint for appellate review, the record must show that the
complaint was made to the trial court in a timely and sufficiently specific manner.”). Accordingly,
we overrule Many’s third issue.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled Many’s issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
8 __________________________________________ Edward Smith, Justice
Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Kelly and Smith
Affirmed
Filed: October 27, 2023