Scott K. Jordan v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 16, 2017
• Docket: 02A05-1612-CR-2780
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any May 16 2017, 11:15 am

court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Stanley L. Campbell Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Fort Wayne, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Ellen H. Meilaender Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Scott K. Jordan, May 16, 2017 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 02A05-1612-CR-2780 v. Appeal from the Allen Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Frances C. Gull, Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge Trial Court Cause No. 02D06-1607-MR-2

Riley, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1612-CR-2780 | May 16, 2017 Page 1 of 8 STATEMENT OF THE CASE [1] Appellant-Defendant, Scott K. Jordan (Jordan), appeals his sentence following

his conviction for murder, a felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1).

[2] We affirm.

ISSUE [3] Jordan raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as follows: Whether

Jordan’s sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his

character.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 1 [4] In March of 2016, the family of Jacqueline Vanduyn (Vanduyn) contacted the

Fort Wayne Police Department (FWPD) to report that Vanduyn, a resident of

Fort Wayne, Allen County, Indiana, was missing. On April 19, 2016, the

FWPD interviewed the property manager at Vanduyn’s apartment complex,

who stated that she had previously been informed of the missing person’s report

by Vanduyn’s family. As a result of the family’s inquiry, the property manager

had gone to Vanduyn’s apartment to locate her. However, it was Vanduyn’s

boyfriend, Jordan, who answered the door and indicated that Vanduyn was at

1 Both Jordan and the State have relied upon the Probable Cause Affidavit to set forth a recitation of the facts; we now do the same. The Probable Cause Affidavit, which was not introduced as evidence but was attached to the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report and included as part of the record, has been included in the confidential version of Jordan’s appendix. To the extent that it contains information that is excluded from public access, we note that discussion of the contents therein is essential to the resolution of this matter. Ind. Administrative Rule 9(G)(7)(a)(ii)(c).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1612-CR-2780 | May 16, 2017 Page 2 of 8 work. Because Jordan was not listed on the lease and was in possession of the

sole key issued for Vanduyn’s apartment, the property manager ordered him to

leave the apartment and immediately had the lock changed. The property

manager further explained to the FWPD that she received a money order for

Vanduyn’s rent on April 1, 2016, but the signature on the money order differed

from Vanduyn’s signature on the lease and prior rent checks.

[5] The FWPD subsequently interviewed Jordan, who was incarcerated at the

Allen County Jail following his recent arrest for a robbery at a pharmacy.

Jordan stated that Vanduyn had kicked him out of her apartment in March of

2016, at which time she had also moved out. However, Jordan claimed that

Vanduyn instructed him to pay her rent on April 1, so he obtained a money

order, signed her name, and deposited it at the apartment complex’s office. The

FWPD also reviewed surveillance footage from outside Vanduyn’s apartment

complex. Although Vanduyn had a consistent routine in “coming and going

from the apartment daily,” after she entered her apartment on March 6, 2016,

she was not seen again. (Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. II, p. 11).

[6] On April 25, 2016, the FWPD obtained a search warrant for Vanduyn’s

apartment. Upon opening the door, officers detected the odor of a decaying

corpse. In a closet, the officers discovered a black plastic bag, which “appeared

to have blood coming out of it.” (Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. II, p. 11). Once

the coroner arrived, the bag was opened, and Vanduyn’s body was observed to

be “face down inside.” (Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. II, p. 11). It appeared that

Vanduyn had been “deceased for some time and her legs were tied together and

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1612-CR-2780 | May 16, 2017 Page 3 of 8 her mouth was taped shut.” (Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. II, p. 11). In

addition, Vanduyn’s body was covered with numerous water bottles, and

officers found more than twenty frozen water bottles in the freezer. The officers

deduced that “someone had been exchanging frozen bottles of water on

[Vanduyn’s body] in an attempt to keep her cold, thus decreasing the

decomposition of the body.” (Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. II, p. 11).

[7] On May 3, 2016, Vivian Jordan, a resident of Lakeland, Florida, contacted the

Allen County Sheriff’s Department to report that she had received a letter from

her son, Jordan, in which he had confessed to killing Vanduyn. The letter was

forwarded to the FWPD. Upon review of the letter, the FWPD discovered that

Jordan had admitted that he caused Vanduyn’s death by “getting on top of her

and choking the life outta her” and added that he “got so mad that I killed her.”

(Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. II, p. 12). On June 23, 2016, Vanduyn’s autopsy

results established that the cause of her death “was asphyxia due to

strangulation and suffocation.” (Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. II, p. 12).

[8] On July 8, 2016, the State filed an Information, charging Jordan with Count I,

murder, a felony, I.C. § 35-42-1-1(1); and Count II, altering the scene of death

of a person, a Level 6 felony, I.C. § 36-2-14-17(b). At a hearing on October 14,

2016, Jordan pled guilty to the murder charge without the benefit of a plea

agreement. At the State’s request, the trial court dismissed Count II of the

Information concerning Jordan’s alteration of the crime scene. With respect to

a factual basis for the plea, Jordan simply admitted that sometime between

March 6, 2016, and April 19, 2016, during which period he lived in Vanduyn’s

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1612-CR-2780 | May 16, 2017 Page 4 of 8 apartment, he “knowingly or intentionally killed” her. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 10). The

trial court accepted Jordan’s guilty plea and entered a judgment of conviction.

On November 8, 2016, the trial court held a sentencing hearing and ordered

Jordan to execute sixty-five years in the Indiana Department of Correction,

with said sentence to run consecutive to Jordan’s sentences in other cases.

[9] Jordan now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION [10] Jordan claims that his sixty-five-year sentence is inappropriate. It is well

established that “‘sentencing is principally a discretionary function in which the

trial court’s judgment should receive considerable deference.’” Parks v. State, 22

N.E.3d 552, 555 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222

(Ind. 2008)). Yet, even if a trial court imposes a sentence that is authorized by

statute, our court may revise the sentence if, “after due consideration of the trial

court’s decision, [we] find[] that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the

nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule

7(B).

[11] Appellate Rule 7(B) provides for sentence review in an “attempt to leaven the

outliers, and identify some guiding principles for trial courts and those charged

with improvement of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived

‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225. Ultimately,

“whether we regard a sentence as appropriate at the end of the day turns on our

sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1612-CR-2780 | May 16, 2017 Page 5 of 8 done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Id.

at 1224. On review, we focus on “the length of the aggregate sentence and how

it is to be served.” Id. Jordan bears the burden of persuading this court that his

sentence is inappropriate. Corbally v. State, 5 N.E.3d 463, 471 (Ind. Ct. App.

2014).

[12] With respect to the nature of the offense, “the advisory sentence is the starting

point [that] our legislature has selected as [an] appropriate sentence for the

crime committed.” Richardson v. State, 906 N.E.2d 241, 247 (Ind. Ct. App.

2009) (citing Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494, clarified on reh’g, 875

N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)). The advisory sentence for murder is fifty-five years,

with a maximum sentence of sixty-five years and a minimum term of forty-five

years. I.C. § 35-50-2-3(a). Here, the trial court, in imposing the maximum

sentence permitted by statute, described the circumstances of the murder as

“[e]xtraordinarily egregious” and “reprehensible.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 10). On

appeal, Jordan asserts that his strangulation of Vanduyn is no more egregious

than any other murder, such that the trial court should have ordered the

advisory term of fifty-five years.

[13] The record reveals that, in an apparent fit of anger, Jordan strangled and

suffocated Vanduyn. Whether done before or after the murder, Jordan also

bound Vanduyn’s legs and taped her mouth shut. He then stuffed her into a

plastic bag, which he stowed in a closet in Vanduyn’s apartment. For several

weeks thereafter, Jordan used frozen water bottles in an effort to keep

Vanduyn’s body from decomposing while he continued to live in her apartment

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1612-CR-2780 | May 16, 2017 Page 6 of 8 and present a façade to Vanduyn’s family and others that she was simply

temporarily unavailable. To the extent that Jordan now argues that his conduct

following Vanduyn’s murder (i.e., his efforts to conceal her death) is irrelevant

as a consideration for his murder sentence in light of the fact that his charge for

altering the crime scene was dismissed at the time of his guilty plea, we note

that “we may look to any factors appearing in the record” in considering the

appropriateness of a sentence. Croy v. State, 953 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ind. Ct. App.

2011). 2 “The nature of the offenses is found in the details and circumstances of

the commission of the offenses and the defendant’s participation.” Id.

Notwithstanding that Jordan was not specifically convicted of altering the crime

scene as initially charged, the circumstances surrounding the commission of the

murder are highly relevant to the nature of the offense as a whole.

[14] As to Jordan’s character, the record reveals nothing particularly redeemable

that would warrant anything less than the maximum sentence imposed by the

trial court. Although Jordan pled guilty without the benefit of a plea

agreement, the trial court found that Jordan had never expressed any genuine

remorse for his conduct. Moreover, Jordan’s extensive criminal history is

2 Jordan also appears to assert that the trial court improperly considered his post-murder conduct as an aggravating factor in his sentence for murder. The consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is a matter left to the trial court’s discretion. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 489-91. As our court has previously stated, “inappropriate sentence and abuse of discretion claims are to be analyzed separately.” King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491). Accordingly, because Jordan has failed to present a separate, cogent argument with the appropriate standard of review regarding the trial court’s sentencing discretion, we find that he has waived the issue for appellate review. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a)-(b).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1612-CR-2780 | May 16, 2017 Page 7 of 8 illustrative of his poor character. Dating back to 1990, when he was just

nineteen years old, Jordan’s criminal record includes nine misdemeanor

convictions and sixteen felony convictions, which he accumulated in three

different states. Among others, Jordan’s convictions include misdemeanors for

battery, resisting arrest, conversion, and criminal trespass; and felonies for

burglary, robbery, theft, forgery, and selling methamphetamine. Jordan has

had his probation revoked on four occasions and has had a suspended sentence

modified. Despite claiming substance abuse issues, Jordan has never

participated in substance abuse treatment even though he has had ample

opportunity to do so while incarcerated. Furthermore, according to the Pre-

Sentence Investigation Report, Jordan had been unemployed for several years

and sold illegal drugs to earn money. Thus, it is clear that all prior efforts to

rehabilitate Jordan and persuade him to lead a law-abiding life have failed. As

the trial court aptly noted, Jordan will likely spend the rest of his life in prison

as a result of his own poor choices. Accordingly, we cannot say that Jordan’s

sentence is inappropriate.

CONCLUSION [15] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Jordan’s sixty-five-year sentence is

not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character.

[16] Affirmed.

[17] Najam, J. and Bradford, J. concur

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