In the Iowa Supreme Court
No. 22–1599
Submitted November 14, 2024—Filed April 11, 2025
Scott Hampe,
Appellant,
vs.
Charles Gabus Motors, Inc. d/b/a Toyota of Des Moines and Gadimina Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a Mid-Iowa Occupational Testing,
Appellees.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Joseph Seidlin, judge.
A fired employee seeks further review of a court of appeals decision that
affirmed in part and reversed in part the dismissal of the employee’s claims
under Iowa Code section 730.5, which governs employer drug testing. Decision
of Court of Appeals Affirmed as Modified; District Court Judgment Affirmed
in Part, Reversed in Part, and Case Remanded with Instructions.
May, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which McDonald, Oxley, and
McDermott, JJ., joined. Mansfield, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Christensen, C.J., and Waterman, J., joined.
Gary Dickey (argued) and Matthew M. Sahag of Dickey, Campbell & Sahag
Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines, for appellant.
Andrew Tice (argued) of Ahlers & Cooney, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee
Charles Gabus Motors, Inc. d/b/a Toyota of Des Moines. 2
Margaret A. Hanson and Katelynn T. McCullough of Dentons Davis Brown
P.C., Des Moines, for appellee Gadimina Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a Mid-Iowa
Occupational Testing. 3
May, Justice.
Before 1998, Iowa law prohibited “random or blanket drug testing of
employees” by private employers. Iowa Code § 730.5(2) (1997). It was not legal at
all.
But that spring, the legislature revised Iowa Code section 730.5. 1998
Iowa Acts ch. 1011 (codified at Iowa Code § 730.5 (1999)); see also Dix v. Casey’s
Gen. Stores, Inc., 961 N.W.2d 671, 681 (Iowa 2021) (discussing the statutory
history). The revised law permits some random testing. See Iowa Code § 730.5
(2019). But narrow is the gate: Employers who choose to conduct random tests
must comply with a “comprehensive” set of requirements. Dix, 961 N.W.2d at
681. Employers who fail to substantially comply with those requirements can be
liable to “an aggrieved employee.” Iowa Code § 730.5(15)(a)(1).
Here we consider an employee’s claim that his employer violated
section 730.5’s requirements for composition of testing pools. We conclude that
the employer failed to substantially comply with those requirements. And we
conclude that the employee was aggrieved by the employer’s failure. So we
conclude that the district court erred in dismissing the employee’s claim. We
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Background.
From 2008 until December 2019, Scott Hampe was employed by Charles
Gabus Motors, Inc. (Gabus), a car dealership. Hampe received and acknowledged
Gabus’s drug testing policies. He understood that violations of those policies
could lead to discipline including termination.
Since 2016, Kelsey Gabus-McBride (McBride) has served as Gabus’s
director of human resources. She oversaw Gabus’s drug testing policies. 4
On December 5, 2019, Gabus conducted an unannounced drug test of
some employees. Gabus was assisted by an independent drug testing service
provider, Mid-Iowa Occupational Testing (Mid-Iowa).
The process went this way: At some point prior to December 5, Gabus
provided Mid-Iowa with a master list of its employees. At that time, Gabus had
approximately 165 employees. With some exceptions that are not relevant here,
all of Gabus’s employees were on the master list. For reasons that will be
explained, we sometimes refer to this master list as the “testing pool” or “pool.”
As the December 5 test date approached, McBride asked Mid-Iowa to
provide a list of employees to be tested. McBride wanted to test a total of fifteen
employees. So Mid-Iowa ran Gabus’s master list—its pool—through a computer-
based random number generator. The generator produced a list of twenty-three
names: fifteen employees for testing plus eight alternates.
On November 27, Mid-Iowa sent that list to Gabus. Hampe’s name
appeared as the eighth alternate, that is, the last name on the list.
On the morning of December 5, McBride asked department managers to
gather the employees named on the list. They started at the top of the list and
worked their way down. If an employee was on the list but was not physically
present, they skipped over that employee and moved to the next name.
Ultimately, six of the initial fifteen employees were subjected to testing. So were
seven of the alternates, including Hampe.
Hampe was scheduled to work that day. He had arrived as scheduled at
9:00 a.m. Soon after, Hampe’s manager called him about the drug test. Hampe
reported to the designated testing area, which was near the dealership’s
lunchroom. Hampe saw other employees waiting. Hampe took a seat and waited
his turn. 5
Mid-Iowa employee Sarah Ghee was present to assist with sample
collection. When Ghee was ready for Hampe to test, she handed him a cup and
accompanied him into the bathroom that was being used as the collection site.
Hampe went into the toilet stall. Ghee stood on the other side of the toilet stall
wall.
Hampe provided a filled sample cup to Ghee. Ghee measured it with a laser
thermometer. Hampe recalls the thermometer reporting 101 degrees. Ghee
reminded Hampe that the sample had to be between 90–100 degrees. Ghee
dumped out the urine.
Hampe was asked to drink water and then provide an additional sample.
He did so. This time, Ghee observed that there wasn’t enough urine for testing.
Ghee discarded the urine.
Hampe returned to the waiting area. After about twenty minutes, Hampe
decided to leave. Before he left, Hampe talked to McBride, who was in the testing
area. Hampe told McBride that he was leaving to take care of his sick child. In
response, McBride said, “You know, if you leave, you’re going to get fired.” Hampe
responded, “You would really do that to me?” McBride replied, “Yeah.”
Hampe waited another fifteen minutes. Hampe then walked over to
McBride and said: “Yeah, I’m going to leave.” McBride responded, “No. If you
leave, you’re fired.” Hampe replied, “This is the hardest decision I’ve had to make.
I shouldn’t even be up here anyhow because my name’s not on the list.” Then
Hampe left. He was later fired.
In May 2020, Hampe filed this lawsuit against Gabus and Mid-Iowa.
Hampe alleged violations of Iowa Code section 730.5. He also asserted common
law claims. 6
Gabus and Mid-Iowa filed motions for summary judgment. Hampe resisted
and filed his own motion for partial summary judgment as to liability on his
statutory claims.
The district court denied Hampe’s motion, granted Gabus’s and Mid-Iowa’s
motions, and dismissed all of Hampe’s claims. Hampe then filed this appeal. In
his appellate brief, Hampe argued that the district court should not have
dismissed his claims. Hampe also argued that the district court should have
granted summary judgment in his favor concerning his statutory claims. Gabus
and Mid-Iowa filed responsive briefs.
We transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals
affirmed the dismissal of all of Hampe’s claims against Mid-Iowa and most of
Hampe’s claims against Gabus. But the court of appeals reversed as to Hampe’s
claims that Gabus violated section 730.5’s testing pool requirements
(section 730.5(8)(a)), supervisor training requirements (section 730.5(9)(h)), and
uniform disciplinary policy requirements (section 730.5(9)(b)). As to those
claims, the court of appeals found that genuine issues of material fact preclude
summary judgment. Gabus then sought further review, which we granted.
II. Scope of Review.
When our court grants further review, we have discretion as to which
issues we will consider. State v. Jackson, 4 N.W.3d 298, 306 (Iowa 2024). In this
case, we confine our analysis to Hampe’s claim that Gabus violated
section 730.5’s testing pool requirements.
III. Standard of Review.
We review summary judgment rulings for correction of legal errors.
Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R. Civ. 7
P. 1.981(3). We view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. And we draw every reasonable inference in favor of the nonmoving party.
IV. Analysis.
A. Overview. Iowa Code section 730.5 governs drug testing by private
employers. Section 730.5 permits random drug tests only under “severely
circumscribed conditions.” Harrison v. Emp. Appeal Bd., 659 N.W.2d 581, 588
(Iowa 2003).
Even so, we have held that section 730.5 requires only substantial
compliance, not strict compliance. Dix, 961 N.W.2d at 681–82. “Substantial
compliance is said to be compliance in respect to essential matters necessary to
assure the reasonable objectives of the statute.” Id. at 682 (quoting Sims v. NCI
Holding Corp., 759 N.W.2d 333, 338 (Iowa 2009)). Thus, “if the employer’s actions
fall short of strict compliance, but nonetheless accomplish the important
objective[s]” expressed in the statutory text, “the employer’s conduct will
substantially comply with the statute.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Sims,
759 N.W.2d at 338).
Moreover, even when an employer falls below the substantial compliance
threshold, this does not mean that every employee is entitled to relief. Id. at 692.
Rather, only “an aggrieved employee” is entitled to relief. Id. (quoting Iowa Code
§ 730.5(15)(a)(1)).
It bears adding that a special burden-of-proof system applies where, as
here, an employee alleges that “an employer has required or requested a drug or
alcohol test in violation of” section 730.5. Iowa Code § 730.5(15)(b). In these
cases, “the employer has the burden of proving that the requirements of”
section 730.5 “were met.” Id. (emphasis added). But the employee has the burden
of showing aggrievement. See Dix, 961 N.W.2d at 692, 694. 8
B. The Pooling Claim. With this framework in mind, we now address
Hampe’s claim that Gabus violated section 730.5’s requirements for the
composition of the pool from which employees may be selected for testing.
Section 730.5(8)(a) permits unannounced drug testing of employees “who
are selected from any of” three designated “pools of employees.” Iowa Code
§ 730.5(8)(a). One of these pools is described in subsection (8)(a)(1) as follows:
The entire employee population at a particular work site of the employer except for employees not subject to testing pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, or employees who are not scheduled to be at work at the time the testing is conducted because of the status of the employees or who have been excused from work pursuant to the employer’s work policy prior to the time the testing is announced to employees.
Id.
The question here is whether Gabus used a pool of employees that met
subsection (8)(a)(1)’s requirements. The answer is no. The pool used in the
December testing consisted of all of Gabus’s active employees. The pool did not
exclude those employees who “[were] not scheduled to be at work at the time the
testing is conducted because of the status of the employees or who have been
excused from work pursuant to the employer’s work policy.” Id. Nor did the pool
exclude the other categories of employees who were required to be excluded
under subsection (8)(a)(1). See id.
So it is clear that Gabus failed to strictly comply with subsection (8)(a)(1)’s
pooling requirements. As mentioned, though, we have not required strict
compliance with section 730.5. Substantial compliance is enough.
But we cannot find substantial compliance here. As Dix v. Casey’s General
Stores, Inc. teaches, substantial compliance requires reasonable efforts to ensure
that the pool is formed in the way that the legislature has commanded. 961
N.W.2d at 689–91 (concluding that the employer substantially complied with the 9
requirement that the pool consist of “[a]ll employees . . . who are scheduled to be
at work at the time testing is conducted” because the employer provided the
testing agency with a mostly accurate list of the employees who were scheduled
to work at the planned testing time, and holding that compliance was substantial
despite some inaccuracies in the pool that were caused by schedule shifts,
employee no-shows, and human error (alteration and omission in original)
(quoting Iowa Code § 730.5(8)(a)(3))); see also id. at 691 n.3 (suggesting that
substantial compliance might not be found if there were long periods of time,
“particularly with no justification,” between the employer’s compilation of the
pool and the time for testing or if there was evidence “that an employer compiled
its list knowing that work schedules would change significantly before the time
of testing”).
Gabus did not make those efforts. It is undisputed that Gabus made no
attempt to exclude “employees who [were] not scheduled to be at work” because
of their work status or because they had been excused pursuant to a policy as
required by subsection (8)(a)(1). Iowa Code § 730.5(8)(a)(1). So Gabus’s pool did
not substantially comply.
But Gabus says we should look beyond the pool composition and also
consider the testing itself. As explained, Gabus skipped over—and, therefore, did
not test—anyone whose name appeared on the to-be-tested list but who was not
physically present at work. It follows, Gabus argues, that no “employees who
[were] not scheduled to be at work” could have been actually tested. Id. This is
substantial compliance, Gabus argues.
We disagree. The text of subsection (8)(a)(1) is clear. Compliance with
subsection (8)(a)(1) does not turn on the physical presence or absence of
employees at the time of testing. Instead, by its plain language, subsection 10
(8)(a)(1)’s requirements are focused only on the “pool” from which employees can
be drawn. Id. Its plain purpose, then, is to limit the ways that those pools can be
constructed. And so, as we said in Dix, substantial compliance requires efforts
to properly construct the pool. 961 N.W.2d at 689–91. Because Gabus did not
make those efforts, we can’t find substantial compliance.
Remember also that under subsection (8)(a)(1), the pool must exclude
those employees who are not scheduled to be at work due to their status or who
have been excused from work pursuant to a policy. Iowa Code § 730.5(8)(a)(1).
But Gabus included its entire employee population in the pool—and then, on the
day of testing, Gabus excused not only those employees who should have been
excluded through proper construction of the pool but also those who simply were
not physically present at the time of testing, even if those employees were
scheduled to be at work but were simply away from the worksite at the time. An
improperly constructed pool cannot be made substantially compliant by merely
skipping selected employees who should have been excluded altogether. But
even if it could, Gabus’s further action of skipping employees who were properly
part of the pool but who happened to be physically absent is plainly inconsistent
with the statutory testing requirements.
Gabus also complains that the fluid circumstances of “today’s workplace”
make compliance too difficult. This concern might be better directed to the
legislature. In any event, we see no evidence that it would have been impractical
(or even inconvenient) for Gabus to comply with subsection (8)(a)(1). We see
nothing that would have prevented Gabus from compiling a list of employees who
were scheduled to work on the planned test day and then giving that properly
designed list to Mid-Iowa for use as the testing pool. Indeed, in our modern
computerized age, these seem like easy steps, especially for a workplace of only 11
165 employees. And even if the resulting pool hadn’t been perfect—even if the
fluidity of schedules had led to errors—at least Gabus’s effort to create a
statutorily required pool could have supported a finding of substantial
compliance. Cf. Dix, 961 N.W.2d at 689–91. But again, the record shows no such
effort here.
For all of these reasons, we conclude that Gabus did not substantially
comply. As mentioned, though, even when an employer fails to substantially
comply, that doesn’t automatically mean that an employee is entitled to relief.
Rather, an employee must first prove that he or she was “aggrieved” by the
violation. Iowa Code § 730.5(15)(a)(1). “Determining whether an employee is
aggrieved necessarily depends on the nature of the violation.” Dix, 961 N.W.2d
at 692.
In Woods v. Charles Gabus Ford, Inc., we held that an employee was
“aggrieved” by the employer’s violation when his notice of termination for failing
a drug test did not include information about the cost of a retest. 962 N.W.2d 1,
8 (Iowa 2021). Although the employee testified that he might not have done a
retest—and although the retest might not have exonerated him—the record was
enough to show aggrievement. Id. We said that “[e]ven though Woods testified he
might not have asked for a retest had he been informed of the cost of the test,
he was aggrieved when he was prevented from making an informed decision, and
there is no way to know what the outcome of the retest would have been.” Id.
Similarly, Hampe was aggrieved because (1) he was selected through a testing
process that was based upon a pool that did not comply with section 730.5, (2)
there is no way to know whether he would have been selected if the pool had
complied with the statute, and (3) his employment was terminated because of a
process that did not comply with the statute. 12
C. Conclusion. In short, based on the undisputed facts, we conclude that
Gabus failed to substantially comply with Iowa Code section 730.5, and Hampe
was aggrieved by that failure. So Hampe is entitled to summary judgment on his
claim that Gabus violated section 730.5. We remand this matter for further
proceedings to determine what relief should be awarded pursuant to
section 730.5(15)(a)(1).
As to the other issues in this appeal, we allow the court of appeals opinion
to stand. We note, however, that the court of appeals remand instructions
anticipated further proceedings on Hampe’s claims concerning supervisor
training and uniform disciplinary policy. We conclude that those claims are now
moot in light of our resolution of the pooling claim in Hampe’s favor.
V. Disposition.
We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Decision of Court of Appeals Affirmed as Modified; District Court
Judgment Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Case Remanded with
Instructions.
McDonald, Oxley, and McDermott, JJ., join this opinion. Mansfield, J.,
files a dissenting opinion, in which Christensen, C.J., and Waterman, J., join. 13
#22–1599, Hampe v. Charles Gabus Motors, Inc.
Mansfield, Justice (dissenting).
I. Introduction.
I respectfully dissent. In my view, Charles Gabus Motors, Inc. (Gabus)
substantially complied with the selection requirements in the drug-testing
statute, Iowa Code section 730.5(8)(a) (2019).
The established definition of strict compliance in Iowa and under our drug-
testing cases is whether the party complied “in respect to essential matters
necessary to assure the reasonable objectives of the statute.” Puente v. Civ. Serv.
Comm’n, 7 N.W.3d 15, 19 (Iowa 2024) (quoting Burnam v. Bd. of Rev., 501 N.W.2d
553, 554 (Iowa 1993) (per curiam)); see also, e.g., Woods v. Charles Gabus Ford,
Inc., 962 N.W.2d 1, 6–7 (Iowa 2021); Sims v. NCI Holding Corp., 759 N.W.2d 333,
338 (Iowa 2009). In other words, “substantial compliance is compliance with
respect to those requirements that are necessary ‘to assure the reasonable
objectives’ of the statute are met.” Harrison v. Emp. Appeal Bd., 659 N.W.2d 581,
586 (Iowa 2003) (quoting Super./Ideal, Inc. v. Bd. of Rev., 419 N.W.2d 405, 407
(Iowa 1988)). Accordingly, “the starting point for our analysis is an identification
of the purpose served by the [selection] provisions.” Id.; see also Residential &
Agric. Advisory Comm., LLC v. Dyersville City Council, 888 N.W.2d 24, 49 (Iowa
2016) (“[W]e must determine whether the purpose of the statute or rule has been
accomplished.”).
Just four years ago, in Dix v. Casey’s General Stores, Inc., we identified
that purpose. 961 N.W.2d 671, 689 (Iowa 2021). We said that “[t]he selection
requirements are aimed at preventing employers from targeting or exempting
specific employees for drug tests.” Id. Here, Gabus fulfilled that purpose. It
selected the employees to be tested using a random method that avoided 14
targeting and, as a practical matter, differed little from the statutory
requirements. Applying Dix, our other cases, and common sense, I would find
that Gabus substantially complied with Iowa Code section 730.5(8)(a).
II. Gabus Substantially Complied with the Statute.
Iowa Code section 730.5(8)(a)(1) allows unannounced drug testing of
persons randomly selected from the following pool:
The entire employee population at a particular work site of the employer except for . . . employees who are not scheduled to be at work at the time the testing is conducted because of the status of the employees or who have been excused from work pursuant to the employer’s work policy prior to the time the testing is announced to employees.
Strictly speaking, section 730.5(8)(a)(1) contemplates that the “pool” will
be formed of all employees at the worksite after excluding those “not scheduled”
to be present or who have been “excused” from work under the employer’s work
policy. Id. Gabus didn’t quite do that. Instead, treating all employees at the
worksite as a pool, it allowed the outside vendor to develop a random list of
employees to be tested, including alternates. At the time of testing, it then
excluded from the testing list anyone who wasn’t at the worksite that day.
I do not think it is a big deal whether the exclusion occurs before or after
the testing list has been developed. Either way, the unannounced testing is
random; anyone who is present has an equal chance of being selected, and the
procedure doesn’t allow targeting or exemption of disfavored employees or groups
of employees.
As I’ve already noted, substantial compliance is “compliance in respect to
essential matters necessary to assure the reasonable objectives of the statute.”
Sims, 759 N.W.2d at 338 (quoting Super./Ideal, Inc., 419 N.W.2d at 407). So
what is the objective here? We discussed it in Dix: 15
The selection requirements are aimed at preventing employers from targeting or exempting specific employees for drug tests. See id. § 730.5(14)(a) (imposing a civil penalty of $1000 for improperly targeting or exempting employees from drug tests).
961 N.W.2d at 689.
In Dix, after concluding that the purpose of the selection provisions was
as described above, we considered whether there had been substantial
compliance. Id. at 682. There, the employer had 184 employees originally
scheduled to work on the day of testing. Id. at 689. The plan had been to test
167 names selected at random, but in the end only 145 employees were tested,
including alternates. Id. Twenty-seven employees had been slated for testing and
avoided testing because of shift changes or vacation or because they called in
sick, went home sick, or were “no shows.” Id. at 679, 689–90. In addition, two
persons were inadvertently left out of the pool, although they had been scheduled
to work and did work that day. Id. at 689–90.
Obviously, none of the foregoing twenty-nine people were tested. Still, we
held that this amounted to substantial compliance. Id. at 690–91. We cited the
need for “some give,” particularly as to the employees who didn’t show up the
day of testing, and “some room for human error,” especially as to the two who
did show up and got away with not being tested. Id. at 690. We spoke of the
importance of examining section 730.5 selection for drug testing “from a
practical standpoint.” Id.
If there was substantial compliance in Dix, there was substantial
compliance here. In the present case, as in Dix, there is no basis for claiming
deliberate targeting or deliberate exemption.
In Dix, it was undisputed that everyone at the worksite (with two
inadvertent exceptions) was tested. Id. at 679. Here, it is undisputed that a 16
totally random selection of the people who were present on the worksite was
tested. Both scenarios substantially comply with the statute. In essence, both
the Dix employer and Gabus did the same thing: working with an outside vendor,
they developed a list with alternates and then went through the list, skipping
over the people who weren’t at the workplace that day. See id. at 678–79.
In the end, the only practical difference between what Gabus did and what
the statute requires is that employees who weren’t physically present when
testing was announced but who were technically “scheduled” to work and had
not been “excused” should have been summoned to the workplace and tested.
Yet we tolerated the same situation in Dix, holding that it amounted to
substantial compliance. Id. at 689–90.
The majority glosses over the facts and law of Dix, instead relying on what
Dix supposedly “teaches.” According to the majority, Dix “teaches” that
“reasonable efforts” to comply with what “the legislature has commanded” are a
prerequisite to substantial compliance. I can’t find such a teaching in Dix, and
it’s not consistent with what Dix actually says about substantial compliance.
See id. at 682 (“Substantial compliance is said to be compliance in respect to
essential matters necessary to assure the reasonable objectives of the statute.”
(quoting Sims 759 N.W.2d at 338)). Our cases do not hold that substantial
compliance requires efforts to strictly comply with the statute. Instead, they focus
on whether the objectives of the statute have been met. Thus, they indicate that
one can substantially comply with a statute by intentionally doing something
that’s a bit different but just as good. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Loyd Roling Constr., 928
N.W.2d 651, 655 (Iowa 2019) (finding that service by email substantially
complied with a statute that required service by mail). That’s what Gabus did
here. 17
Perhaps it is time for the legislature to reexamine the statute. In these days
of flexible work schedules with opportunities for remote work, it seems
increasingly impractical to determine in advance who is “scheduled” to be at the
workplace and who is “excused” from work. Iowa Code § 730.5(8)(a)(1). But in
the meantime, we should apply our established definition of substantial
compliance, including our four-year-old Dix decision. I would find substantial
compliance here.
For the foregoing reasons, I would vacate the decision of the court of
appeals on this issue and affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of Gabus.1
Christensen, C.J., and Waterman, J., join this dissent.
1The court of appeals also found issues of fact as to Gabus’s compliance with the written
policy and training requirements. See Iowa Code § 730.5(9)(b) (written policy requirements), (h) (training requirements). I would affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on these points as well.